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'It is something of a stroke of genius to make gift exchange the guiding thread 
of an introductory book ... Sykes introduces many of the most important 
debates that dominate anthropology today. As that rare book that accessibly 
introduces students to the discipline without talking down to them, I think this 
book will be widely used.' 
Joel Robbins, University of California, San Diego 
Arguing with Anthropology is a fresh and original guide to key elements in 
anthropology, which teaches the ability to think, write and argue critically. 
Through an exploration of the classic 'question of the gift', which functions in 
anthropology as a definitive example of the entire human experience, it pro-
vides a fascinating study course in anthropological methods, aims, knowledge 
and understanding. 
The book's unique approach takes gift-theory - the science of obligation 
and reciprocity . as the paradigm for a virtual enquiry which explores how the 
anthropological discipline has evolved historically, how it is applied in practice 
and how it can be argued with critically. By giving clear examples of real 
events and dilemmas in the history of the discipline, and asking students to 
participate in arguments about the form and nature of enquiry in recent years, 
it offers working practice of dealing with the obstacles and choices involved in 
anthropological study. 
From an expert teacher whose methods are tried and tested with students 
Clearly addresses the functions of anthropology, and its key theories and 
arguments 
Effectively teaches core study skills as the extension of a research and 
enquiry model of learning 
• Draws on a rich variety of Pacific and global ethnography 
Karen Sykes is a Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University of 
Manchester, where she teaches a popular introductory course in anthropology. 
She received her doctorate from Princeton University in 1995 and has con-
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Although there may be other pathways of intellectual exchange the example 
of 'the gift' remains both eloquent and apposite to the present. This book 
emerges from a course of the same name, which I have taught since 1998 to 
undergraduate students. I owe a great deal to those people who have made my 
years teaching in the Department of Social Anthropology at the University of 
Manchester both intriguing and pleasurable. Over a decade ago, my doctoral 
supervisor, Rena Lederman, first suggested that it might be possible to teach 
undergraduate students about the history of the discipline through the lens of 
gift-exchange. Mauss had posed a good question; namely, why do people feel 
obligated to reciprocate what they have received? Anthropologists continue to 
respond to that question, and this book charts some of the replies. This is the 
'how' of this book. 
This book also benefits from conversations with colleagues in the Depart-
ment of Social Anthropology at the University of Manchester and colleagues 
elsewhere. Debbora Battaglia's intellectual friendship gives greater value to this 
work. For chapter 8's insights I am deeply indebted to Anna Grimshaw and 
Keir Martin, who helped me to see the north west of England (and perhaps 
the Republic of Mancunia) in their different ways. Ann Kingsolver, Mark 
Whittacker and their son, David, helped me learn to see with the camera 
obscura on Eastbourne Pier. Joel Robbins read and commented on the entire 
book, but his comments are unparalleled. Joel, like Debbora and Keir, pro-
vided the kind of conversation about anthropological thought that keeps the 
discipline focused. 
In the course of writing the final form of this manuscript over the past year, 
I have been fortunate to benefit from the friendship, wisdom and good judge-
ment of a number of people. I hope they will recognize their thoughts in this 
book. They are Sandra Bamford, Debbora Battaglia, Stephane Breton, Tony 
Crook, Melissa Damien, Mattia Fumanti, Ilana Gershon, Sarah Green, Anna 
Grimshaw, Eric Hirsch, Lawrence Kalinoe, Ann Kingsolver, Stuart Kirsch, 
James Leach, Rena Lederman, Keir Martin, Michele McComsey, Michael 
O'Hanlon, Victoria Price, Rosie Read, Joel Robbins, Will Rollason, Jacob 
Simet, Marilyn Strathern, Mark Whittacker. 
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1 
A SCEPTICAL INTRODUCTION 
TO THEORIES OF GIFT 
EXCHANGE 
Anthropology is the study of social life as humans make it. In many ways it is 
an argument about how people do live and how to live. Exploring the history 
of the discipline itself is an excellent way of understanding this argument and 
that is one of the main aims of this book. Unlike other social sciences such as 
economics or politics, which aim to understand particular aspects of human 
life, anthropology approaches the study of social life as a totality. Anthropolo-
gists address the totality of social life because people live their lives out wholly 
and embrace the spiritual, political, economic and environmental as one. The 
earliest anthropologists took this total approach very seriously. For example, 
Boas founded a discipline that was a composite of studies into the material, 
intellectual and social life of men and women across the world. He argued that 
the totality could be encompassed in the idea of culture, which had different 
and particular emphasis around the globe. Similarly, Rivers, with Haddon's 
inspiration, examined the ways in which people claimed each other as kin, 
making this habit of social life the core of social anthropology for many 
decades. If the grasping of the totality of experience seemed and seems a 
somewhat daunting or fuzzy task, then it was probably right to proceed also 
with some inspiration from Durkheim and Mauss because they aimed to elab-
orate a social science that systematically theorized the totality of human 
experience. In this book about the many kinds of arguments that anthropolo-
gists make, I take up anthropology's claim to study the total picture of what it 
means to be human by examining a practice common to people around the 
world; that is the practice of giving and receiving gifts. 
The gift can seem a small thing, but the habit of giving and receiving gifts 
resonates through human lives because the gift is more than the material 
object. It establishes or confirms a relationship between people and in this way 
has been described as a kind of cornerstone of society. The observation that 
some goods can be given to others as 'gifts' asks that anthropologists think 
more clearly about what kinds of relationships can be made in a material 
world and beyond it. For anthropologists, just as for many people, there 
is nothing self-evident about ownership or non-ownership of gifts. When I 
receive a gift, it opens more possibilities in my social life than it closes. I puzzle 
THEORIES OF GIFT EXCHANGE 
through what to do next. Why should I receive a gift with the understanding 
that it is the thought that counts, except to acknowledge that I do not necessar-
ily like or need what l receive in order to be glad for it? The conventions of 
giving gifts remain both eminently reasonable and good mannered, and some-
times enigmatic because receiving a gift can acknowledge that more than one 
kind of relationship exists between giver and receiver. 
Today many anthropologists undertake their work in capitalist societies 
( although not all do). It is something of an enigma that people give gifts, either 
small and intimate or grand and global, because the habit of giving and its asso-
ciated ideas of generosity seem to run at odds with ideologies sustaining capital 
accumulation. At the very least, making a gift is an altruistic way of making a 
relationship when conventions and dominant modes of relating within capitalist 
societies suggest that calculated or rational self-interest should dominate deci-
sions about human relationships. I am writing this in 2003 in Manchester, on 
the eve of the World Trade Organization meetings in Cancun, Mexico. I have 
been reading the Guardian newspaper supplement on 'Trade'. Many of the arti-
cles discuss the benefits and difficulties in forgiving the debt of the developing to 
the developed world. of regulating obligations rather than freeing international 
trade, of making (for example) pharmaceuticals and other medicines freely 
available at no cost in poorest nations, and of creating a fair trade organization. 
Some authors argued that free market capitalists could not lose sight of human 
hopes for equality, without risking the best aims of the work of trade. More so, 
the unnamed authors of the pamphlet argue for reforms to the practice of 
world trade that include a reconsideration of alternative forms of distribution, 
using and sharing of wealth. Rethinking fair or free trade in terms of obligatory 
relationships would entail hefty and complex arguments for any anthropologist 
to make, if not for journalists to advance. Fortunately, there is a tradition of 
thinking about gift exchange in anthropology. 
When facing the analysis of a large problem, anthropologists take responsi-
bility for their ignorance by raising difficult questions. In the early twentieth 
century, Marcel Mauss began to think about gift exchange as a totally human 
social act. Then, to put it in colloquial language, he began 'thinking through 
things' as if imitating the commonsense practice of making objects the focus 
of human thoughts, desires and memories. He framed a lasting question that 
grasps at the totality of social life: namely, why do people feel obligated to give 
back when they have received'? There have been many answers to that question. 
By reviewing the kinds of arguments anthropologists make and have made 
about gifts, I aim to introduce some of the history of the discipline. I begin 
with those scholars who came before Mauss. In order to embrace examples 
from many societies, I will discuss most closely the kinds of relationships 
people make with the things they call gifts. 
Mauss's insights help contemporary anthropologists to raise a warning 
against assuming that economic reason, especially utilitarian value, dominates 
human life. In line with his critiques of early twentieth-century economics, 
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anthropologists can draw on the history of research on the gift in order to con-
tribute to wider debates about the global economy. The reason they can do this 
recalls Mauss's basic insight, that any analysis of the obligation to give and 
receive things shows that human relationships cannot be contained wholly 
within usury forms of exchange. In particular, he argued that the gift contra-
dicts the assumption that human relationships aim towards only utilitarian 
ends. Mauss's essay shows that Homo Economicus is a recent development. 
and perhaps we could add that it has been specific to the trans-Atlantic 
relationships between America and Western Europe that make many of us 
Euro-Americans. Its extensions to the Pacific in the period of exploration and 
settlement of that region presented extraordinary problems to traders and 
administrators alike. There is no reason to think that the idea of utilitarian 
humanity bears universal applications now, any more than it did in earlier 
years. Perhaps a time has come for reassessment of the legacy of anthropo-
logical theories of the gift if anthropology is to embrace the study of the 
totality of human experience. Talking, writing and thinking about gifts draw 
anthropologists into long conversations about how to examine what it means 
to be human. 
Gift giving: a totally human act 
It is possible to study some features, or phenomena, as a 'total social fact' in 
order to illuminate social life in its entirety. Anthropological arguments about 
exchanges, especially gift exchanges, shaped social theory since the Enlighten-
ment and continue to do so today. I think that speaks to the future success of 
anthropology, more than its past. The scope of this book will appeal to the 
history of the discipline in order to generate the terms for future analysis. In 
this book, I return to the insight given to the discipline by Mauss, that giving 
gifts concentrates and constitutes a totality of human experience. 
In these 'total' social phenomena, as we propose calling them, all 
kinds of institutions are given expression at one and the same time ~ 
religious, juridical and moral, which relate to both politics and the 
family; likewise economic ones, which suppose special forms of pro-
duction and consumption or rather, of performing total services and 
of distribution. This is not to take into account the aesthetic phenom-
ena to which these facts lead, and the contours of the phenomena 
that these institutions manifest. 
(Mauss 1990 [1925]: 3) 
Gofman underscores Mauss's words to mean that the totality of social life 
could be contemplated within a singularly human habit of association known 
as a total social fact. Total social facts are '[p]henomena that penetrate every 
aspect of the social system, they concentrate it and constitute its focus, they 
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are the constitutive elements and the generators and motors of the system' 
(Gofman 1998: 67). Although Mauss did not fully theorize the concept of 
total social fact, the giving and receiving of gifts was his case in point. In this 
book I take the case of the gift as illustrative of the concept of the total social 
fact and explore its uses in anthropological argument. 
Mauss's work is monumental in anthropology because he chose to describe 
gift exchange, as it constitutes social life or 'society' most generally and philo-
sophically. Moreover, a less well-developed theoretical strand of his work 
remains important to the discipline. Mauss also poses a central question in 
what it means to be human by asking why a person should feel obligated to 
give back what he or she had received from another. The problem of 'the gift' 
comprises two kinds of questions: how people keep their social life at the 
centre of consciousness, and why it should seem meaningful for them to do so. 
Mauss's theory of the exchange of gifts as the total social fact shows that 
the gift is a cornerstone of the whole of society because it encapsulates the 
concern with what it means to be human. He uses the example of the gift to 
make new advances over Durkheim's most philosophically inspired anthropol-
ogy. Mauss finds in gift exchange an analytical idea that is uniquely 
ethnographic. Those people who were exchanging gifts also understood obli-
gation to be an abstract idea; that is, an abstract idea that could be enacted in 
everyday life. This layering of significance, from the analyst's to the partici-
pant's work, makes the subject of giving and receiving gifts good to study. 
In English, Mauss's The Gift is a short, four-part essay; but the unabridged 
edition in French is a longer book which was written at a time when he and his 
colleagues hoped to contribute to a growing debate over the nature of material 
life and government in their own country. By the 1920s, when The Gift was 
published, the intellectual community in France was discussing the importance 
of a social democracy to buffer the elaboration of capitalist investment in 
social institutions, and to counter the critique from the Bolshevik community 
that aimed to establish communal property. Recently, those researchers inter-
ested in the social history of Mauss's work (Gane 1992, Godelier 1999, Allen 
2001) argued that Mauss carried forward the earlier Durkheimian project of 
pitching anthropological questions towards problems of the day. At the very 
least, this was a sceptical project in anthropology. 
The essay on the gift: trials of reason 
How do anthropologists approach the study of human experience as a total-
ity? One answer might be to approach it sceptically. Mauss does not explicitly 
say that social anthropology requires a disciplined philosophical scepticism, 
but he assumes simply that he must work with that form of enquiry into the 
nature of social life and that the example of gift exchange presses ethnologists 
to think through things carefully, sceptically and philosophically. For the pur-
poses of this book, it helps to recall that Mauss and other anthropologists 
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inherit the disciplines of scepticism from the legacy of Enlightenment scholar-
ship, and that this is deeply entangled in ideas about the 'Noble Savage' and 
the social grounds for a revolution of political and economic life - key issues in 
rethinking what it means to be human. Cartesian philosophy raised doubts in 
order to ascertain truth. Anthropologists argue from scepticism about how to 
make veritable claims, not from personal or societal beliefs. 
Contemporary anthropologists hold an awkward position on the current 
view that capitalist political economy dominates the whole of human life when 
they acknowledge that people give and receive gifts. This is a common form of 
scepticism that challenges accepted conventions, in this case commodity-
exchange habits, with alternative ones, such as gift exchange. Gregory (l 997) 
discusses the different philosophical traditions of scepticism from South Asia 
and from the late medieval period in Europe. Holding a sceptical view means 
that anthropologists raise doubts about orthodoxy of belief by exposing con-
tradictions in analysis, from which they elucidate arguments for more truthful 
claims about social life. A common example of scepticism arises in everyday 
acts of intellectual exchange, at a point when a person raises a question to shift 
the terms of discussion. This is true in fieldwork, as I learned when my 
acquaintances tested my reasons for living with them by asking for assistance. 
They changed their relationships to me in measure with my response to them. 
For example, when I was a student researcher in New Ireland, the elder man in 
the clan who took responsibility for looking out for me asked me for a plane 
ticket from Port Moresby to New York City, just to see what I might answer. I 
hesitated too long. and before I could answer he said that a radio would do 
just fine as a substitute for the trip, which would in any case tire him too much. 
From that time when he raised a first doubt about the terms of my residence in 
his hamlet, I learned to become responsible for his well-being too. Raising a 
question, a simple way of dissenting, can be a means to change implicit agree-
ments and challenge conventional wisdom. Holding a sceptical point of view 
can be a matter of dissent, as when anthropologists present alternative inter-
pretations or opposite points of view to more conventional claims. 
Scepticism pervades the Enlightenment beginnings of the science of anthro-
pology. Some Enlightenment scholars expressed doubts about how humans 
did live and could hope to live because they knew of a record of descriptions 
and stories of other lifestyles. During the 'age of trade', in the period pre-
ceding the Enlightenment, people began to wonder about the world. Seagoing 
vessels and overland caravans returned with objects for resale and with gifts 
from distant princes in Pacific islands or from civilizations to the east of 
Europe. Even in Shakespeare's day, the city of London was cosmopolitan, its 
streets busy with sailors and foreign traders, temporarily resident to sell their 
spices and goods. London Bridge housed small market stalls and temporary 
houses for the sellers, until it toppled under the weight of the improvised build-
ing and the residents were sent back to other lands. But years go by and the 
rebuilt bridge falls again. Problems of how to trade fairly and how to create 
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social ties to distant peoples came into full discussion in public life well beyond 
the elite world of religious or secular scholarship. 
The 'age of discovery' followed upon the age of trade. Explorers made maps 
of the known world of trade, and then laboured in order to fill in the gaps and 
discover the places they imagined they found. Explorers and scientists tried to 
determine what was known about distant places that they had only heard 
about or imagined from examining the new objects that came from distant 
islands and kingdoms. A journey up the St Lawrence river in North America 
took ships to impassable rapids. They were (and still are) named the Lachine 
rapids by explorers surmising ironically that China, the East, was only a little 
bit beyond the present horizon. Subsequent westward travel from Europe 
skirted around the continents and across the Pacific Ocean to circumnavigate 
the globe on the way to the Far East, to the same distant kingdom of China 
that earlier European traders had travelled eastward to find across the land-
masses of Europe and Asia. Beche-de-mer, sandalwood, spice, botanic speci-
mens, tulips and orchids, new species of birds and animals - these were 
collected and catalogued. Stories circulated that needed confirmation. The 
Chinese told of the bird of paradise that descended from the heavens and 
never touched the earth, its legs non-existent because it kept its abode in para-
dise and had no need to rest on tree branches or the ground. Early storytellers 
of extraordinary things and places moved their listeners - and perhaps the 
tellers moved themselves in the telling - to rethink what they comfortably 
could claim to know about the world. Stories of distant places upset habits of 
thought and the grounds of belief came under scrutiny. 
Earliest anthropological arguments recognized that different habits of orga-
nizing knowledge and thought, described on the one hand as custom and on 
the other as natural reason, each proposed different understandings of what it 
means to be human. Anthropologists recognized that the parameters of the 
epistemological crisis of the Enlightenment hung between custom and reason. 
That difference between natural reason and custom marks the terrain of scep-
ticism in Enlightenment social science and its implications for social life in 
Europe, the 'New World' and the colonies. Some proclaimed that both the blur 
of customary thought and the damages of historical change obscured human 
natural reason and disabled the human capacity to interrogate and understand 
what others say. Others believed that only civilized humanity exercised natural 
reason most fully because civilized people interacted with each other in an 
intellectually generous manner, learning how to be consciously rational by 
communicating clearly with each other. Anthropologists posed a new question 
for themselves: how could they know to trust their sceptical reason if custom-
ary knowledge could so easily fog their vision? 
Although the discipline of anthropology was yet to be refined, anthropolo-
gists used the Enlightenment genre of the essay to their best advantage in early 
arguments. In the eighteenth century, scholars following the earlier work of 
Montaigne used the essay as an argumentative form to show how the writer 
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could compare cannibals and kings to criticize the present social conditions, 
which might be obscured by customary beliefs about the world order. If so-
called 'natives' exercise reason without the same confusions of customary 
belief and superstition that peasants suffered, then how could Europeans free 
their thoughts from the burden of traditional belief? Whatever limits exist in 
these first assumptions about peasants, natives or custom, what should be 
remembered is that philosophers argued from idealized concepts of these life 
conditions and were not social scientists whose researches confirmed the extent 
of that belief. Thus, 'native reason' and 'custom' better describe the ways in 
which people see the world. 
Ruth Benedict was inspired by the potential of these arguments for shaping 
the emergent discipline of anthropology into a critical exercise. She argued that 
for Montaigne natural reason (sceptical thought) and custom (knowledge 
embedded in practice) are each like spectacles; they are glasses that stand 
between people and the world they inhabit, whether that world is thought to 
be natural or the result of a history of mistakes (Benedict 1946, 1963). This 
creates a problem for anthropologists because natural reason can be as much 
the product of history as is custom. The point is that European reason, both 
now and then, is as much 'custom' as the thought of Hawaiians or Amer-
indians of the eighteenth century. Ruth Benedict, in a later period, defines 
anthropology as a way of seeing that anthropologists aim to make explicit 
through fieldwork and writing. She likens the craft of anthropological argu-
ment to the work of lens grinding, in so far as the lens grinder knows best just 
how to grind the spectacles that sit between a person and the world in which 
he or she lives. In the hands of the early Enlightenment philosophers and in 
the literary sensibility of Benedict and others of her era, the sceptical essay 
becomes the ultimate form of anthropology. In the contemporary period when 
scholars are encouraged to entrench educational orthodoxy in the name of 
democratization, perhaps it is good to remember scepticism's legacy. 
Benedict, and others of her time, found an avenue forward for anthropo-
logical thought, leaving the Enlightenment dilemma behind. If natural reason 
could not be trusted as being a universal capacity shared around the globe, 
then surely a degree of scepticism was necessary to any claim by anthropolo-
gists that they might know something? Benedict's scepticism treads between 
different forms of customary belief expressed by people living in the 1920s 
with the state in Europe and America, and the belief of people living on the 
fringes of the state in the American south west, the Canadian north-west coast, 
or the Trobriand islands in the Australian Territory of Papua. These compar-
isons exude complexities and make things nearer to home seem a bit strange, 
as is often the case in ironic writing. This elucidation of the bizarre and the 
peculiar is an aspect of Benedict's style that might be misunderstood by those 
who fail to acknowledge her ironic sensibility. In the early 1930s Benedict pub-
lished a book comparing Dobu sorcery with the Kwakiutl ritual of 'potlatch', 
and the Zuni rituals. It is a tidy triad of examples, but Benedict's ironic turn or 
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argument disturbs the comparison and prevents the book failing on a false 
commensurability between the cases of what she describes as 'cultures as per-
sonalities written large'; Kwakiutl megalomania, Dobu paranoia and Zuni 
equanimity receive similar treatment in the assessment of the styles of life in 
each place. 
Contemporary anthropological thought continues to find full expression in 
the essay because the form enables the author to utilize a sceptical stance to 
the best advantage of making a critical contribution to wider knowledge. An 
essay is a try at explanation ~ no more and no less and that can be quite 
enough. Mastering its form remains difficult, largely because being a good 
essay writer in anthropology entails working with the sceptical argument, or 
even ironic style. This is not always straightforward because it can be easy to 
confuse scepticism and irony with emotional responses such as vitriolic sar-
casm or dispassionate cynicism. In the early part of the twentieth century, 
anthropological argument received explicit attention from several different 
disciplinary 'fathers'. No doubt the effort undertaken to establish different 
schools of anthropology included attempts to clarify what counted as an 
anthropological argument in each of the respective schools. If anthropology 
could be a discipline of thought, if anthropology could be supported and 
taught in a university, and if colleagues could make assessments of each 
other's work, then anthropologists should standardize a particular form of 
essay writing. Anthropologists of the twentieth century worked within two 
shared assumptions. They shared one assumption with other scholars of the 
modern era: namely, they recognized for the first time that they conducted 
their scholarship within the traditions and terms of Enlightenment scientific 
legacy. Anthropologists shared the second assumptions among themselves. 
They acknowledged that they felt the first twinges of doubt about the value of 
the Enlightenment for the world beyond Europe. 
Among the declarations for the creation of social science, some of the most 
compelling claims for anthropological argument arise from Durkheirn's intro-
ductory pages of The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Durkheim aimed 
to surpass the philosophical impasse between Kant and Hume with the science 
of society. On the one hand, Kant insisted that shared forms of knowledge 
existed in the human mind prior to thought and these forms made it possible 
for humans to reason. On the other hand, Hurne argued that human senses 
exposed patterns of the natural world which people learned to recognize and 
share as conventional knowledge. Durkheim, drawing on the different claims 
of Hurne and Kant for the primacy of the role of sensual knowledge and the 
definitive role of apriori knowledge, argues that the problem of knowledge is 
posed in new terms. He argues that anthropology, as a modern science, should 
analyse the practices by which people make their experience coherent to them-
selves. In his example of totemic ritual in Australia he shows us that this 
exercise remains a project of something like 'critical reason'; that is, the Abo-
rigine might well engage in totemic ritual as a rational exercise given to the end 
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of self-knowledge. This act of explaining creates rational knowledge. In trying 
to explain themselves to themselves, people will find that they must reason 
through their experiences coherently, eloquently and clearly in order to agree 
an account of what they do. 
In the midst of the act of explaining experience to themselves, people can 
also criticize their own actions. In this way, a critical form of reason (rather 
than dogma) emerges as one of the tutelary aspects of ritual. In religion as in 
science, truth will elude the practitioner of the faith or of the science, whether 
they are believer or agnostic in its devotions or methods. In anthropology the 
exercise of critical reason means that truth remains beyond the grasp, beyond 
the average ken. Its distance suggests that the spaces and gaps in the short-
comings of contemporary knowledge serve to darken rather than enlighten 
shared understandings of the modern world. If the anthropological aim is 
true, then knowledge cannot settle into received truths and new research 
should serve to illuminate an imperfectly understood modern life. 
It helps to know something about these questions, because they point to the 
shift in Durkheim's thought, away from adherence to Comte's positivism, to 
outline the need to establish a critical programme for social science. It is part 
of his larger interest in moral reasoning and education. Durkheim spent the 
later years of his scholarly career discussing the role of education in modern 
society. He established a school of anthropological and sociological research, 
remembered to this day. L'Annee Sociologique was nearly destroyed by the loss 
of so many of Durkheim's students in the devastations of the First World War, 
but its legacy of establishing social science research in a tradition of sceptical 
thought remains. He thought that education took the lead over other knowl-
edge practices because it replaced religion and ritual for its role in the 
constitution of modern society. His research and writing on education comes 
at a time when the nation sought to formalize national education, in an effort 
to ameliorate with social planning the failings of the political visions for equal-
ity in modern democracy. Doubts about the success of democracy escalated 
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and had an influ-
ence on the earliest attempts to formalize the discipline of anthropology in the 
university's roster of courses of study. 
In what alternative ways have anthropologists tried to understand the nature 
of social connections between people? In the years leading to the turn of the 
century, the anthropologist and social psychologist, WH.R. Rivers began his 
work in the Torres Straits, as a part of the Cambridge Expedition led by the 
university's new chair of anthropology, A.C. Haddon. Rivers tried to under-
stand how people made claims on each other as kin. Most importantly, he 
made a lasting contribution to the discipline by creating the idea of genealogy, 
presented as a diagram or map of the ways in which people understood how 
they should keep their relationships to each other. Rivers worked with Torres 
Straits islanders to record the details of the chain or network of people they 
named as their kin. In this work, he invented what anthropologists later came 
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to call 'the genealogical method' as a way of making diagrams and patterns to 
represent relationships made by childbearing and marriage. He argued that 
people also used goods to honour their relatives and remember that they had 
obligations to their kin. These illustrations can often be used to clarify how 
people think of each other as kin, and show how they disperse material goods 
among them. 
In common with Mauss, Rivers's anthropological approach triumphed 
social interconnectedness as a fundamentally human condition. This made it 
possible for anthropologists to clarify the social matrix within which all 
humans claim to know each other. Rivers's personal influence in social anthro-
pology finished with the end of the First World War and his early death, but 
the contribution to the epistemological matrix of the discipline persists. Most 
recently, Marilyn Strathern (1994) clarified that Rivers's early study of kinship 
and genealogy influenced British social anthropologists to pursue knowledge 
about social life as connected up relations, and to investigate the implications 
of living or participating in the shadow of each other's relationships. In her 
address to the Association of Social Anthropologists (ASA) decennial meeting 
in Manchester (2003), Strathern reminded her audience that practical knowl-
edge of the world entails using knowledge that is socially mediated. She 
continued to argue that what a person knows is a matter of how they know it in 
relationship to another person. 
Another way of expressing the concrete reality of relations must be to recall 
that anthropological science acknowledges that social scientific knowledge is 
conditional upon specific relationships. At the ASA Strathern argued that 
anthropologists' kinship theory remains a model of scientific thought in the 
discipline because it emphasizes that people are related by their knowledge of 
each other. 
In summary, the work of early anthropologists explored many different 
paths of enquiry, only some of which I have mentioned here. But I do empha-
size in the above examples that anthropology joins other disciplines in the 
legacy of Enlightenment science by trying to say something about social life. 
The contemporary form of Enlightenment science, social theory, makes the 
same claim to illuminate the character of social life. Social theorists cannot 
claim to argue about social life without first recognizing that knowledge is first 
and foremost social. An anthropologist can 'test', so to speak, a social theory 
by checking just how it is 'social'. 
As I have outlined here, doubts about anthropological certainty can be 
raised in several ways. One way in which anthropologists can raise doubts 
about claims to the certainty of truth might be to show that what people say 
and do generates superficial knowledge. Durkheim contributed to general 
understanding of religious belief by taking seriously the contention that what 
people said and did could be very different from how the same people analysed 
their own actions. In The Elemenatry Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim sug-
gested that scholarly human rationality excelled with a critical project. In a 
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critical project, the researcher feels the tension generated between experiential 
knowledge and interrogative knowledge. 
A second way in which anthropologists used sceptical enquiry in early 
ethnography acknowledged that knowledge grew or depended upon relations. 
The early research of Rivers shows how he astutely assessed that what any one 
person knew about the world could only be uttered or demonstrated in their 
actions, because they spoke or enacted those assumptions for another person. 
A person is a child only in relation to the parent. What people know can be 
made clear only in relation to another person; that is to say, anthropologists 
recognize that knowledge is relative to social relationships that constitute and 
concentrate it as social facts. 
Third, anthropologists continue a sceptical project in ethnography through 
reflecting upon differences between the habits of themselves and others. This 
reflexivity exposes anthropologists' biases, or presumptions about what they 
can observe in their fieldwork. In reflexive anthropology. scepticism is simply a 
tentative stance in the field; it is a position articulated by expressing doubt. 
Some find this a double bind that immobilizes anthropologists from speaking 
their minds, and raises doubts about anthropologists' ability to share their 
insights as conclusions of research. In this approach, the anthropologist 
cannot settle into scepticism, as he or she might settle into another epistemol-
ogy such as faith. Anthropology becomes a project of social criticism in the 
anthropologist's home society when it casts doubt about people's certainty that 
some truths are self-evident. Reflexive anthropology works to unsettle 'received 
truths' or 'common 1visdom'. 
Anthropological research has much to offer its students, not the least of 
which is the gift of disciplined enquiry and reflection on the total human con-
dition. That kind of gift is hard to be rid of and difficult to carry. The 
anthropologist's obligations entail remaining open to the gifts received as 
wisdom, insight or argument. There is no surprise in finding that intellectual 
exchange traces the give and take of anthropological knowledge in argument. 
We could say that the logic of gift exchange lies at the centre of the discipline, 
and how ethnographic knowledge finds its way into the pathways of dialogue 
created by writing and talking leaves anthropologists to risk one last thing: 
What should anthropologists do with what they know, except give it away? 
In the opening pages of this chapter, I suggested that current debates made 
the anthropologically informed discussion of gift exchange as important as it 
has ever been. Here, I modify that claim a little. Even without the increasing 
demand for clarification of concepts in the contemporary debates about trade, 
debt and reciprocal obligations, I do think that the history of arguments about 
gifts can be a rewarding study for anthropologists and their colleagues. 
Anthropologists who want to understand what kinds of relationships people 
make with gifts can find much in the history of the discipline: the nature of 
evidence, economic rationality, the comparative approach, grand theory, false 
consciousness, alienation, bourgeois values, sacrifices, property relations and 
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ethics. Taking the question of what it means to be human in the round, I think 
this makes a few things clearer to any student of anthropology and the social 
sciences about what anthropologists do, have done and can do in each of their 
contemporary social milieus. By the end of the book I can return to the themes 
introduced here. First, anthropologists engage deeply in the concrete details of 
social life by examining human experience as a totality. Second, anthropolo-
gists argue in disciplined ways that criticize common wisdom that otherwise 
hides or overshadows broadly and deeply felt aspects of human experience. As 
this book unfolds, I will discuss how anthropologists practise this unique pair-
ing in fieldwork and writing in a disciplined social science with doubts about 
how people live wholly, artfully and creatively. 
Overview of the chapters 
In this book I approach the history of anthropological theory through the lens 
of gift exchange. Like Mauss I privilege gift exchange as a focus of study, as a 
total social fact that concentrates and condenses social processes and thereby 
provides anthropologists with the descriptive and explanatory means to discuss 
how people live in the round. The analysis of gift exchange as a total social 
fact undermines the fallacious ground of utilitarian theories of value, as a par-
tial view of society that finds pervasive expression today, just as it did in earlier 
eras. Anthropology as a discipline does not limit knowledge to matters of how 
people live politically, economically or spiritually because people live life 
wholly. 
As this book was going to press Strathcrn, in her Huxley Lecture, proposed 
that anthropologists might become 'a community of critics', suggesting that 
over history anthropologists disciplined themselves to create a community of 
conversation and argument (Strathern 2004). Throughout the book, I address 
many anthropologists' sceptical approaches to the study of society. I aim to 
describe the different ways in which modernist anthropologists have used the 
gift exchange to understand the integrity and meaning of everyday life in small 
societies; in which postmodernist anthropologists have used gift exchange in 
assessing the extent to which the particulars of historical consciousness and 
the experience of subjectivity can be shared across a society, and in which 
anthropologists working in virtual society and across globalizing communities 
address gift exchange as a medium through which to describe social reality, the 
ontological challenges, and the ethics of exchange relations there. 
Part I describes the work of gift exchanges as a constitutive and concentrat-
ing social process in small integrated societies, where everyday relationships arc 
lived face-to-face. Four chapters comprise the discussion of modernist nostal-
gia in anthropology. 
Chapter 2 describes how different anthropologists have used the rhetorical 
construction of the Noble Savage, and especially Rousseau's accompanying 
fable of the loss of the state of nature with the loss of common wealth and 
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property, to launch critiques of state power. I examine ideas about the Noble 
Savage in evolutionary theories of the 'natural economy', in theories of politi-
cal economy in the history of colonial relations, and in structural theories of 
natural reason as the grounds of communicative and social exchanges most 
broadly defined. 
Chapter 3 describes the effort by Malinowski to recover through fieldwork 
the description of an apparently irrational economic practice of the exchange 
of 'kula' wealth as an institution significant to the internal coherence of a 
small society in the Trobriand islands. By comparing his method of fieldwork 
with the methods of others, such as Boas's historical particularism, I discuss 
Malinowski's goals in participant observation to provide an integrated holistic 
description. The numerous critiques of participant observation are reviewed 
and critiqued in turn for their ability to accomplish similar aims of providing a 
total description of social relations. 
Chapter 4 describes Mauss's comparative approach to the study of gift 
exchange, such that it is possible to make a theory of society through compar-
ative assessments of the practice in 'kula', 'hau' and 'potlatch'. I explore 
Godelier's thesis that the habit of keeping while giving enables participants in 
ceremonial gift exchange to contemplate the sacred as an expression of their 
common humanity in political economic processes. In concluding the review of 
the Godelier thesis, I pose some tentative claims for the further study of how 
power relations depart from Mauss's insight that gift exchange is a total social 
fact rather than a singularly economic institution. 
Chapter 5 describes Levi-Strauss's theorizing of gift exchange as an expres-
sion of rational principles of social organization and communication most 
broadly defined. I discuss the significance of the fact that the gift in matrimo-
nial exchange is a woman, who is at once sister to some and wife-to-be to other 
clansmen. The feminist critiques of structuralism's project expose the ways in 
which women's outside labour, domestic work, reproductive capacity, sexuality 
and femininity cannot be contained by structuralist's theories of social varia-
tion. Strathern's alternatives to the structuralist theory of society are explored 
by referring to her critique of gender relations. 
Part II distinguishes approaches to the problem of historical consciousness 
and the critique of subjectivity for the ability of postmodernists to enlighten 
understandings of the complexity, ambiguities and deceits of consciousness. 
Four chapters comprise the review of postmodern reflections on the discipline 
of anthropology. 
Chapter 6 describes the limits of attempts by postcolonial anthropologists 
to resituate studies of exchange relations in colonial context. The transactions 
of gifts of beads, land, labour, money and identity are considered through 
three colonial encounters. These are: first, colonial Americans among the 
Iroquois; second, south Asian agricultural workers from the lowest rungs of 
the ladder of the Jati system of caste relations living with monetary policy 
enforced by well-meaning but confused colonial administrators; and third, 
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Fijian gift exchange misread as begging by early English traders seeking to 
make a little profit on the side of the larger trade of luxury wealth taken from 
the Pacific island's people. All three cases fail to provide a clear account of 
how to theorize context without reducing it to a background of the machina-
tions of force. 
Chapter 7 describes practice theory's efforts to address the extent to which 
historical consciousness is shared and reproduced in small everyday acts of gift 
exchange as well as in ceremonial ones, even where that knowledge entails non-
conscious arrangements to reproduce social inequality. I compare the work of 
time in Bourdieu's practice theory of matrimonial exchange as it creates the 
ideology of prestigious honour and reproduces underlying kinship structures, 
with Levi-Strauss's analysis of how the passing of time over generations in 
cross-cousin marriage is bound by principles of social structure. As after-
thought, a question arises as to how anthropologists should address the uses of 
cultural stereotypes and conjecture in joking accounts of recent history, or far-
cical descriptions of ritual exchange, especially when the joke turns on 
misunderstandings or ambiguities of customary habits of exchange. 
Chapter 8 describes the ways in which commodity exchange relations 
are hidden in order to make the bourgeois subject appear as if a singular indi-
vidual, or a 'self-made man'. I draw loosely on the insights of Derrida, that a 
critique of the subject can be made aesthetically; that is, the art of exposing 
the self-deceptions necessary to commit an act of bourgeois generosity. This 
chapter examines visual arts and visuality to consider how people come to envi-
sion the bourgeois individual as separate from social relations. Through the 
case study of Manchester capitalism I explore processes of learning how to sec 
the bourgeois individual and conversely how to see otherwise hidden exchange 
relations, whether gift or commodity relations. This analysis of nineteenth-
century Manchester and the Free Trade Movement of Smith compares 
provocatively with contemporary efforts in the city and elsewhere to sell the 
symbols of free trade for example, the sale of the Free Trade Hall building in 
Manchester or the sale of the photograph of the World Trade Center by street 
vendors in New York City. 
Chapter 9 describes attempts by anthropologists following Bataille to 
provide a fuller picture of society by considering its excesses of production and 
its detritus, which are parts of social life that are often left out of analysis. 
By looking at potlatch on the north-west coast of North America, it is possible 
to describe how people give too much, how they live with the aftermath of 
their excessive giving and expenditure, and how the activity is variously judged 
to be reasonable. Is it a rational response to the social crisis initiated by the 
penetration of capitalist market exchanges into every social life or an irrational 
response to capital accumulation or an irrational form of exchange relations? 
The chapter examines the ways in which the aesthetics of exchange and its 
excesses are incorporated into the analysis of social life. Some of the impli-
cations include a fuller account of psychological dimensions of exchange 
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relations to include the irrational aspects of human behaviour with rational 
understandings. 
Part III describes the work of anthropologists of exchange relations who 
describe forms of human association at the close of postmodernity. Three 
chapters comprise this exploration of the anthropology of the present. 
Chapter 10 examines the exchange of knowledge and of perspective by 
which technologically assisted life is made real in the virtual society that 
allegedly encompasses people in an almost intimate global village. How does a 
technology privilege a new mode of exchange such that a Cartesian space 
opens humans to disembodied transactions that dominate most of social life? 
Or does technology privilege new modes of exchange that evoke affective 
aspects of experience that are neither singularly bodily nor mentally/intellectu-
ally forged relations? Does this virtual reality require anthropologists to use 
new techniques of description? 
Chapter 11 examines attempts to construct culture as the new commons in 
global debates about property, and thereby provoke a crisis of how to be in the 
world. In particular, cultural property debates challenge the people who partic-
ipate in them to examine their assumptions about ontology as a matter of 
what interests them. I examine the different ontological assumptions of Mauss 
and Malinowski, and ask how people come to feel both interested in the own-
ership of the material forms of their culture and disinterested in possessing 
cultural artefacts as evidence of their own membership. 
In chapter 12 I close the discussion of exchange relations in contemporary 
anthropology with a discussion of the ethics of representation in fieldwork. I 
focus on the transaction of vulnerability, and thereby depart from earlier doc-
uments that highlighted the protection of the informant and the responsibili-
ties of the anthropologist. Using a case study in visual anthropology, which 
could be read in the context of the wider discussion of ethics in fieldwork more 
generally, I discuss how anthropologists can foreground ethical practice as 







THE AWKWARD LEGACY OF 
THE NOBLE SAVAGE 
People do inherit ancestral wealth. As with a family member who inherits 
a legacy of personal effects, an anthropologist inherits numerous intellectual 
legacies: from her teachers, from the cultural areas in which he conducts his 
research, and from his or her reading in the discipline of anthropology. As 
with ancestors who leave a legacy of goods, heirlooms and even sentimental 
trinkets for people not yet born, anthropologists write with a sense of duty to 
leave ethnography for the readers of the future. In both cases, the problem 
remains what to do with it. It can be a blessing or a burden depending upon 
the ease with which a person can live with the restrictions peculiar to the use of 
any family wealth. Some people protect their legacy. The holder of a legacy 
cannot give it away, except to the holder in the next generation. They must care 
for it. Other holders lose or squander the wealth and thereby risk the network 
of connections between the family members who share in the legacy, and the 
family's connections to their own past. Some people want nothing of the 
legacy, and try to give it away by dispersing the goods judiciously according to 
the social values they hold to be important to the present times. The person's 
choice to use his or her legacy differently, to either destroy the possibility of 
passing it on (by dispersing the valuables), or to reject the privileges of the 
legacy (by not assuming them) bears most significance as it is known against 
the fact of their inheritance. A legacy remains inescapable. Similarly, intellec-
tual legacies enable or hinder anthropologists because they cannot give them 
away. Coming to terms with the legacy remains the course of action. This 
chapter takes steps towards reconciliation. 
The Noble Savage is an image, a term that denotes a particular constellation 
of ideas that hold importance from the earliest years of anthropological argu-
ment through to the present. As a term its first usage in English appears rather 
late in the eighteenth century and early in the nineteenth (Elligson 2001 ). It is 
clear that it is not a phrasing that Rousseau would have used in French. His 
essays are contemplations of the human condition in the state of nature; yet, 
he does not use anything remotely akin to this turn of speech. None the less, 
the discipline of anthropology bears this intellectual legacy from the Enlighten-
ment, which distinguishes it as a unique intellectual undertaking. The balance 
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of this chapter will describe how this legacy remains important. I will show 
that anthropologists cannot give away the image, or the idea of the Noble 
Savage, even when they try to rid themselves of it or insist they have left it 
behind. In reflecting upon the image, the ethnographer discovers that norma-
tive and descriptive social sciences have different ends. No ethnographer 
believes they describe 'Noble Savages' whether in ideal or real ways. What they 
describe makes anthropologists rethink the material and the immaterial condi-
tions of their research; yet, few ethnographers believe that they provide only 
descriptions of places and people. These ethnographers think that the image 
helps to focus the account on the way of life that people might hope to have. In 
these ethnographies the image of the Noble Savage might appear as other 
things, such as ethnicity, poverty or violence. These accounts focus on senti-
mental or intellectual connections between what people know about the world 
and what they hope for themselves and for other people who live in it. 
In The Social Contract, Rousseau tried to establish an image of how life 
might be lived outside the state. He discussed the natural state and the state as 
commensurate ideals of human existence, each one exposing the other's short-
falls and successes. He wanted to demonstrate the optimum claims that the 
individual person and the state could and should make on each other. Rousseau 
dignified the state of nature, envisioning human beings' natural condition as 
free. By contrast the state's restrictions on freedom emerged through histories of 
abuse and injustice, which remained sadly present in a world where history 
could not be wholly reversed. The aim of a new state would be to remove as far 
as possible the limits on human freedom that ignorant habits and custom 
secured. Then the state should make rational attempts to enable the kinds of 
human freedom known by the Noble Savage. Anthropological writing from the 
eighteenth century onwards remains deeply imbued with the vision of freedom 
in an image of the Noble Savage. Many anthropologists adjudicate the distance 
between how to live and how people do live by reappraising the ideals expressed 
in this image of the Noble Savage. 
I take the Noble Savage to be a rhetorical image that gives shape and form 
to a capacity of all human relationships: that is the ability to reason about the 
world. Reason entails knowing how to conduct relationships and how to 
change them. Anthropologists find this in common wisdom, not only in elite 
intellectual traditions. More importantly, they conduct fieldwork because they 
believe that common people anywhere in the world can ably reflect upon who 
they are and the lives they hope to have, and discuss these subjects with an 
anthropologist. Why anyone should want to talk to anthropologists and how 
they do must be considered as part of the anthropological project. In what fol-
lows I will overview anthropological study under conditions of exploration, 
colonization and independence, by considering the different meanings of the 
Noble Savage as they unfold from one situation to the next. 
Early anthropologists imagined that understanding the Noble Savage might 
enable them to better comprehend what it means to be human. Inspired by 
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Rousseau's essays, they sought to explain the social and political life of people 
in the natural 'state'. As the Enlightenment period unfolded from the seven-
teenth to the eighteenth century, scholars in Europe created a record of 
ethnography gathered from the history of exploration by drawing on records 
made by the naturalists and geographers who accompanied the voyages of dis-
covery. Notable among these have been the voyages made by Captain James 
Cook, in the aptly named vessel Discovery. His encounters with early Hawaiian 
chiefs became the events of popular and even anthropological legend. Cook 
returned to Hawai'i after a storm at sea, but unfortunately did so at the time 
when the seasonally told mythic return of a Hawaiian deity would normally 
precipitate a fertility ritual to ensure harvest success. Confusion of characters, 
chiefs, deities and men led people to doubt what could be said or done with 
any certainty about the situation. Today, anthropologists still debate what 
happened in those days when Cook's crew got it all so badly wrong and, in the 
fight that broke out between the Hawaiians and the British seamen, Cook died 
at the hands of a Hawaiian chief Sahlins (1985) argued that ancient Hawaiians 
struggled to understand the events and exposed in the most horribly public 
way the arbitrary grounds of belief, perhaps leading them to conclude that 
they could play with ritual, prohibitions and the signs by which they communi-
cated with each other. In a somewhat different way, Obeyesekere argued that 
the various Hawaiian and English understandings of the event exposed the 
pragmatic conditions of each of their own systems of belief. The event destroyed 
English fantasies that they might be deities, and sustained Hawaiian belief that 
human actions folded different capacities of the social relationships into each 
other either as mythical reality or as historical myth (Obeyesekere 1992). The 
encounters between Europeans and others in the late eighteenth century can 
show how contemporary philosophers, scholars and anthropologists came to 
doubt the certainty of their belief 
Later anthropologists in the nineteenth century shared the legacy of this his-
tory of moral and political philosophy with sociologists, linguists and political 
theorists. Among the other disciplines, many anthropologists held an abiding 
concern in exploring the life ways of the Noble Savage in order first to describe 
the many aspects of inequality by exploring its contours in an allegedly egali-
tarian world of non-state society. Having done that they hoped, second, to 
expose how inequality came into the world with the advent of the political 
state. In fantasy anthropologists, in both the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies explored an image of what they did not have in their contemporary life, 
a free and egalitarian society. The Noble Savage was a fantasy used by anthro-
pologists seeking illustrations of how to live in modern society. 
This chapter describes the legacy of the fantasy of the Noble Savage in 
anthropological arguments that address inequality in non-state society. Not 
only do I expose the history of failure in the discipline; but also, I address the 
effects of holding on to this image. The 'savage slot' in research continues 
to fascinate anthropologists, especially when they make new things into the 
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savage others. In the chapter's conclusions, I also seek to expose what might be 
called the 'real effects' of the fantasy of the Noble Savage for academic work 
and for political policy affecting others living in society beyond the state. 
Rousseau's essays in the times of political change 
Anthropologists bear a legacy from the philosophical work of Rousseau, 
largely for his insightful use of the ideal of the Noble Savage in constructing 
his political philosophy. This being the case, anthropologists have found that 
they struggle with dilemmas similar to those suffered by all heirs to such intel-
lectual gifts. Bearing an intellectual legacy can spawn opportunities for the 
inheritor and at the same time keeping that legacy obligates the inheritor to the 
ancient benefactor in ways that confound contemporary social relations. Per-
haps it is not surprising that in histories of intellectual legacy a student will 
read of the 'ghost' of an earlier writer exercising influences on the contempo-
rary scholarship. Consider how the Noble Savage animates anthropologists' 
work. 
It helps to know something about the historical period of Rousseau's basic 
intellectual project before I outline several enduring ideas in his early work that 
anthropologists continue to use in their own arguments about how to live. 
Rousseau's argument with anthropology begins in pre-revolutionary France 
and ends after the revolution, in the era of social reform. Typically, historians 
have seen the revolution as the beginning of the modem period, and point to 
the ways in which Rousseau and other philosophers of society and politics 
inspired a century or more of reason and enlightened social action that aimed 
to free people from oppressive regimes. 
After his early essay, the discourse On Aesthetics, he developed three major 
works with care: A Discourse on Inequality, The Social Contract and Emile. Later 
scholars often understood these as steps in the development of his thought. As 
an essayist he influenced the time of enormous political transformation that 
followed their publication. A Discourse on Inequality coincides with the period 
before the French Revolution. It urged people to change the world they lived in 
by reasoning clearly, that is by using their natural intelligence to ascertain what 
in the world was wrong. The Social Contract coincides with the earliest years 
after the success of the revolution when the new republic tried to find its feet, 
and has been said to be a philosophical impetus to the political work of that 
era. In this period political futures were being re-written in dramatic ways for 
large numbers of people living across Europe. Emile coincides with the period 
following the establishment of the republic, when leaders sought the best ways 
to prepare the next generation to make wise political decisions and not deceive 
themselves with misunderstandings about history. 
Rousseau's essay, On Inequality, which I shall discuss in this chapter, opens 
the questions for his longer-term series of political challenges to what has been 
called 'the ancient regime' of power that ensconced personal privilege and class 
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differences through claims to aristocratic heritage. In On Inequality, Rousseau 
argues that inequality comes into the world by deceit. at a point when some 
people make private claims to have special access to what would otherwise be 
common wealth, and use that wealth for purposes beyond their physical and 
human needs and to further their own privileges. Many later scholars made 
Rousseau famous by quoting his paragraph describing the implications of the 
enclosure of common land as private wealth. Marx, of course, chose to write 
about this as history rather than philosophy. But Rousseau's concerns had 
been with establishing the rule of reason in political thought, and his goal had 
been to make better political philosophy for compelling events in his time, 
rather than to write a better history of events and things past. 
I think that Rousseau expresses his views best over all three essays. each one 
developing the next stage of his thought, and mirroring his engagement with 
the questions posed by the changing political milieu in revolutionary France. 
Of course, his actual literary corpus is larger than these three texts suggest, and 
Rousseau is an avid thinker and writer of his day who was read and highly 
regarded by many people. Following the inspiration of Montaigne that writing 
should open the eyes of the reader to better and clearer reasoning about social 
life. Rousseau propelled the literary form to new importance for political 
results. Essay writing was a new activity in the eighteenth century. and 
Rousseau excelled at it. Early in his life, he won a competition for his essay 
On Aesthetics, and after this success felt inspired to turn his attention to the 
changing times. He entered another competition with the essay On Inequality, 
but won second prize. Yet, it is On Inequality that precipitates the work for 
which he is best known. The essay was a new literary form in Rousseau's 
day, and many believed that such a literary tool could be used to bring about 
political change. Rousseau argued for the advantages of reasoning clearly 
about the natural state, and the rights inherent to life as the Noble Savage. He 
assumed that the modern person could discover his contemporary link back 
to the capacities of that natural state by turning inward. A person should 
sharpen his intellectual skills to exercise the natural reason that was part of his 
internal human nature. For his time, Rousseau demonstrated some of the best 
executions of the essay as a form of writing and argument. He showed us the 
successful essay as the best product of natural reason, and he argued about the 
advantages of using natural reason in arguments about how to live, especially 
in the making of his contemporary political life. 
In the essay On Inequality Rousseau provides an alternative picture of life as 
it might be lived without the state, and thereby critiques everyday life in his 
times because under the rule of the state some people prosper more than others 
do. He uses the concept of the Noble Savage to establish the dignity of human 
nature, as it is common to all people: and further, to elaborate the character of 
human relationships as they might be made within the 'state' of nature. He dis-
tinguished the human ability to reason clearly as a capacity of human nature 
that his political contemporaries had befuddled with corrupt, deceptive actions 
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made against the best interests of all. This essay evokes the more hopeful spirit 
of the pre-revolutionary time, and inspired many to seek political change. In his 
second essay, The Social Contract, Rousseau elaborates how the best precepts of 
social life in the natural state can be brought to the effort to remake government 
and establish democratic rule in the new nation. ln The Social Contract he 
argues that humans should enter freely into agreements to surrender natural 
rights to the government, keeping only the right to own the property that would 
be essential to their well-being. In the third political tract, Emile, Rousseau 
writes extensively about the education of a young man, as an example of an 
ideal education. Through a series of instructions about how to tutor a young 
boy, he provides a vision of education as a means to the rule of human reason 
in the democratic nation. He argues that a young man could take responsibility 
for making just decisions about how to live only if he understood how to distin-
guish between different moral choices. Some in Rousseau's day, and many more 
people later, used Emile as a manual for pedagogic practice. (It has been used as 
a set text in twentieth-century teacher training courses.) I think it fair to say that 
it would have horrified Rousseau to think that education could be reduced to 
following a rulebook. For him, human reason could not flourish in classrooms 
where students were inculcated with procedures and rules, but developed by 
doubting what seemed self-evident. 
The fable of the tragedy of the commons 
Consider Rousseau's essay On Inequality. In it he challenges his readers to con-
sider how inequality came into the world. It is by a trick of argument that 
ensures that one man will succeed in the enclosure of common land as private 
property: 
The first man, having enclosed a piece of land thought of saying 'this 
is mine' and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true 
founder of civil society. How many crimes, wars. murders: how much 
misery and horror the human race would have been spared if some-
one had pulled up the stakes and filled in the ditch and cried out to 
his fellow men: 'Beware of listening to the impostor. You are lost if 
you forget that the limits of the fruits of the earth belong to everyone 
and the earth itself belongs to no one.· 
(Rousseau, On Inequality, Part 2) 
Rousseau takes a lesson from this historic moment when the first man cheated 
the rest of his acquaintances out of their shared, common wealth. Knowing 
how to reason clearly protects the average person from lies of others and from 
being exploited by those lies into surrendering their rights to personal property. 
Rousseau's essay describes the nature of human reason in the state of 
nature. It is clearly the corruptions of society that make men needy, greedy, 
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prideful and selfish. Society blurs the best thought of even the best philoso-
phers, such as Hobbes, and tricks them into imagining these corruptions as 
dishonesty of character. Rousseau argued, against Hobbes, that those human 
lives in civilized states, not in the state of nature, were nasty, brutish and short 
and that they experienced a 'war of all against all' not to be found in the state 
of nature. 
Philosophers agree that Rousseau shifted his arguments, changing the defin-
ition or the state of nature, and especially the nature of human reason in that 
state. In Rousseau's argument human reason begins with effective commu-
nication, which itself is a social act. Human communication began with altruism 
and compassion. A person uttered the first words to another person in response 
to an alarm or cry for help. Natural reason begins with moral and ethical oblig-
ations to others. The most reasonable arguments are profoundly given to 
keeping obligations to others, but only obligations that reflect human beings' 
natural compassion for each other. 
Field-testing the evolution of reason 
The legacy of the Noble Savage in the nineteenth century presents a complex 
problem for understanding anthropological argument. As Stocking, the histo-
rian of anthropology, explains, Victorian anthropology was characterized by 
experiment and innovations. Mostly, the Victorian anthropologist worked to 
explain, even to account for and justify, the history of civilization as they knew 
it. Among anthropologists a strange idea emerged. Whereas Rousseau used the 
Noble Savage as a figure or an example to hold up as an example or image 
contrasting with life in his times, the later anthropologists came to believe it 
was an ancestor, living among them. Rather than understanding the capacities 
of the Noble Savage as the ability to reason shared by humans in any civiliza-
tion, the Victorian anthropologists fantasized that the different people they 
encountered were manifestly Noble Savages in various stages of social evolu-
tion towards civilization. The anthropologists imagined the Noble Savage to be 
alive and well and dwelling among them. How did the idea of the Noble 
Savage emerge as a reality to be discovered, met and researched? 
There are many answers to this question of how people came to assume that 
the Noble Savage was a real person, and not an ideal figure. One comes from 
Kuklick's (1991) account of the Cambridge expedition to the Torres Straits. 
The members of the group, which was headed by Haddon, are pictured in 
Figure 2.1. They contributed to the founding of the discipline across Britain 
and its individual anthropologists, Seligman and Rivers. initiated early 
methodological innovations in fieldwork and opened various pathways of 
investigation in the discipline (Herle and Rouse 1998). Kuklick traces the sig-
nificance of evolutionary theory by showing that the arguments carried a 
purpose to change social life of the times and aid in the founding of British 
social anthropology in the late nineteenth century and after. Kuklick directs 
25 
Figure 2.1 Members of the Haddon expedition with assistants (l~r) seated: Jimmy Rice, 
Debe Wali; front row: Alfred Haddon, Charlie Ontong, Anthony Wilkin; 
second row: William Rivers, Sidney Ray; third row: William McDougall, 
Charles Myers, Charles Seligman (Museum of Archaeology and Anthropol-
ogy, University of Cambridge). 
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attention to the intention of anthropologists to study selectively some forms of 
social life in order to advance the evolution of human civilization, adding to 
the best of Victorian knowledge about how to live. By paying attention to the 
way these scholars understood their own contribution to the evolution of 
human knowledge about how to live, she recovers for anthropology a vital part 
of the story of the beginning of the modern discipline that others missed, 
among them Asad (1973), Sahlins (1976), Stocking (1988) and Kuper (1992). 
Kuklick and Kuper reminded their readers that the evolutionary anthropol-
ogy aimed to describe a figure that had never existed, or at least had long since 
disappeared from the face of the earth. Sahlins wrote bemusedly about the 
attempt to revise Rousseau's ideas about human's 'native reason' by running a 
battery of tests to test empirically the capacity for logical reasoning of the res-
idents in the Torres Straits Islands. Stocking ( 1988 ), and in different ways, 
Asad (1973), described anthropology as a kind of moral argument made for 
and against policies of the colonial period and the advance of the values of 
European civilization. By contrast, some members of the Cambridge expedi-
tion sought to test Spencer's evolutionist theory that historical events in 
medieval and modern Europe had twisted human reason and left Europeans 
less able than Torres Straits Islanders to think rationally about their existence. 
Anthropologists' collective follies interest Kuklick, but she elaborates each 
anthropologist's intentions and purposes in her history of the evolution of the 
discipline of anthropology. In her book, The Savage Within, she recovers the 
ideas of evolutionary theory - selectivity, intentionality and progress - in order 
to explain the development of anthropology as a distinctly different discipline 
from biology, geography and psychology. That is, Kuklick recalls that the 
legacy of the eighteenth-century ideal of the Noble Savage presented anthro-
pologists of the late nineteenth century with an opportunity to differentiate 
and distinguish their discipline in order to make better arguments about how 
to live. 
Kuklick tells of the relationship between Darwin's and Haddon's theories of 
evolution, the latter being an innovative adaptation of the former. In The Origin 
of Species, Darwin did not argue that social evolution would proceed in the 
same manner as natural evolution. Haddon worked to extend the theory of 
natural selection to explain the evolution of some civilized societies. Kuklick 
reminds us that Haddon entwined his academic and intellectual efforts with his 
contemporary belief that people could rectify the injustices of social inequality 
by selectively choosing some social habits over others. He counted generosity 
and charity among the social dispositions that ensured the survival of a society 
and the evolution of more civilized forms of living among its members. 
Some anthropologists revived the theory of cultural evolution in the period 
immediately following the Second World War, arguing that it was time to revive 
aspects of the theory that Boas's attack had ignored. Service, Wolfe and, in par-
ticular, Sahlins developed the theory of cultural adaptation to environmental 
conditions. Sahlins made a particular contribution with his review of social 
27 
MODERNIST NOSTALGIA 
stratification in Polynesia (Sahlins 1958, 1963). He begins wittily that the series 
of small islands provided an unparalleled opportunity to explore theories of 
cultural change. He outlines the evolution of different forms of political life, 
from atomistic, leaderless, anarchistic association of individuals in Melanesia to 
chiefly noble 'states' of Polynesia focusing on the variations of their trade that 
can be deduced from the archaeological and ethnographic record. He ends 
desultorily, his project completed but his argument undermined by his failure to 
explain the course of evolutionary history with reference to the facts on the 
ground. Reflecting upon his efforts, he concludes that the theory of state forma-
tion and deepening of inequality did not cohere with the chronology of histori-
cal developments (Sahlins 1963). Sahlins showed that Pacific islanders over the 
centuries responded to the intensification of social relationships by leaving 
behind deepening inequalities and migrating further and further east in order to 
advance a frontier of most egalitarian social relations. This predicted that the 
western Pacific islands should appear to have the most complex and most 'civi-
lized' forms of social and political structures while eastern Pacific islanders 
should appear to have the least complex forms of social structures. The oppo-
site was true. Polynesia seemed more 'advanced' than Melanesia. Ultimately, 
this closed down future discussion of evolution within most anthropological 
debates outside biological anthropology. 
Contemporary anthropologists certainly share Thomas's later cautions 
against colluding with the racist ideology that underpins much of evolutionary 
theory (Thomas 1984). Yet, to his credit, Sahl ins (1963) had raised earlier seri-
ous doubts about the significance of the idea of cultural evolution by pointing 
out the recklessness of distinguishing the evolution of the eastern from that of 
the western Pacific islands. He broke the back of the body of his assumptions, 
even his ideal theory, on ethnographic reality elaborated in numerous fieldwork 
reports from the region. Cultural evolutionism had spent its legacy from the 
Enlightenment in two ways. It deployed sceptical ethnographic scientific 
description to critique the political ideology encompassed within the ideal sci-
ence of the Noble Savage. 
Ideological commitments to the Noble Savage's ideals 
Anthropologists bear the legacy of the Noble Savage into the twentieth century 
even as the search for egalitarian society continued. Eric Wolf argued that the 
search for the Noble Savage blurred the anthropological vision of the other 
social relations that coexisted with village life. In effect, describing the Noble 
Savage as different and distinct from the modern human elided the long history 
of relationships between them. Rather than study humans in the state of nature, 
Wolf insists anthropologists must study the colonial territory, the administra-
tors and missionaries who reorganized the everyday life of people into new 
colonies. One can imagine easily a picture of the social world of the Pacific 
that Wolf would have anthropologists investigate because newspapers carried 
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Figure 2.2 'Hoisting the British flag in New Guinea: Mr H.M. Chester, Queensland 
Magistrate calling for cheers' (lithograph from The Illustrated London News 
of 1885 from a photograph taken on the spot by Reverend W.G. Lawes). 
The illustrated newspapers in the nineteenth century, which often carried 
reports of overseas events, were extremely popular. This image records the 
British adoption of the territory of Papua on the island of New Guinea, 
with the families of the region looking on with apparent approval. 
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accounts of the colonial project in their reporting on events throughout the 
empire. Figure 2.2 is one of the many illustrations of the colonial world that 
were easily available to the middle-class readers of the late nineteenth-century 
paper The Illustrated London News. 
In a definitive statement in his book, Europe and the People without History 
(1986), Wolf argued for a recasting of anthropological research. He showed 
that the history of colonial power changed the lives of the villager and the tribal 
people indelibly. He reminded readers that the anthropologist rarely described 
a society of people whose women and men had not already been trading for 
many years with Europeans, among whom missionaries had not been living for 
a generation, or whose leaders, chiefs or bigman had not been arguing with 
colonial administrators. He also argued that if anthropologists failed to 
include the ways in which colonial relationships, and even postcolonial rela-
tions, shaped what they knew about human experiences in any locale, then 
they would risk their own authority as truthful and reasonable scholars. In 
effect, Wolf argued that by not providing a critique of colonial power, that is, 
by forgetting the history that leads anthropologists to research the Noble 
Savage. anthropologists had forgotten the driving question about how to live 
that had inspired the Enlightenment project itsel[ 
Wolf made his criticisms most pointedly against the structuralism elaborated 
in the anthropology of Levi-Strauss, criticizing that school of thought for 
seeking to describe the deep structures of thought that shaped and organized 
social life without providing an account of the history of the power machina-
tions that made those structures. Wolf may have been wrong to focus on 
Levi-Strauss in his critique of ahistorical anthropology. Levi-Strauss's work 
used Rousseau's critical insights in a different way, and will be considered in 
chapter 5. If anthropology was an argument about how to live, then it had to 
attend to the full range of human experience, including anthropological collu-
sions with the administrative and state powers of the time. 
Over the years, anthropologists made at least two sophisticated lines of 
argument that embraced Rousseau's critical efforts to use the example of non-
state society in order to expose the creation of inequality by the state. Some 
researchers follow one line of argument to consider how they share a political 
problem with those who live elsewhere, perhaps beyond the reaches of the 
state. But, later day anthropologists admit that few people live without the 
effects of the state in their lives. In his brave reworking of Rousseau's insights 
for the late assessment of the emerging inequalities as they occurred with the 
rise of the African state, Diamond argues that modern anthropologists can 
find authority to speak about the experiences of the 'other' in the African or 
South American village because they share a common human problem: how to 
explain the suffering that the state brings to people everywhere, whether in the 
European metropolis or the African village. Diamond argued that anthropol-
ogy best carries the legacy of Rousseau's intellectual gifts when it recovers the 
political philosopher's original impetus to criticize the explicit and implicit 
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ways in which the state works against the well-being of common people. For 
Diamond this entailed examining colonial wars, the rise of inter-ethnic vio-
lence and the erosion of the capacity of the state to provide institutional 
services to its people. The anthropologist can analyse these experiences because 
they resound across political life in Europe, even when the reverberations 
might be felt differently there as the after-effects of decolonization, of immi-
gration or surveillance, and of loss of social services. 
Many anthropologists working since Diamond's time use similar terms to 
ground the claims of their work, although they do not cite his inspired revis-
ing of Rousseau. Among them, Scheper-Hughes (1995) called for a reclaiming 
of anthropology's legitimate role in describing existential crisis and suffering 
at the invisible or visible hands of the state. D'Andrade (1995) launched a 
criticism of the use of moral argument in these studies, raising doubts about 
the markers of good and evil for specific expressions of power that generated 
or sustained inequality. He asked anthropologists to understand inequality as 
a term relative to equality, and to withhold their judgements about the good 
or evil character of social relations until they held a fuller understanding of 
them. 
Political power takes only one form under the state, and the state renders 
this a historical travesty by commanding all forms of power to its own pur-
pose (cf Clastres 1987). Gledhill (1994) examines the rise of the European 
capitalist state power against the fear of Byzantine power, whether evidence, 
allegation or fantasy sustained the supposed threat of the "Oriental' state. In 
his history of the European capitalist state's efforts to overwhelm the dangers 
of the mysterious foreign Oriental state, he shows how agrarian reforms at 
home organized social life towards the goal of competing with and dominat-
ing the barbarian states of the east. In turn, the European states rushed to 
control and dominate the territories where many thought that numerous 
people lived in the state of nature. Driven by fear of the corruptions of 
Byzantine power, European capitalist states built colonies, incorporating and 
growing by drawing the livelihoods of people in distant territories into their 
larger project of civilizing the globe. The colonial and imperial policies of the 
European state that aimed to civilize the world, also disguised the machina-
tions of coercive power. In Gledhill's analysis the disguises of the European 
state in the history of colonial and capitalist power hide but one coercive and 
racist form of power. 
In a different way, Spencer ( 1997) asked for a better articulation of power in 
different societies after independence and after colonialism. Such scholarship 
would broaden anthropologists' knowledge of how power worked in postcolo-
nial worlds, and enable their analysis of the beginnings of social movements 
there. He argued that political anthropologists should consider whether power 
or, by association, inequality could be differently understood in different colo-
nial contexts. Spencer's radical argument asks that anthropologists consider 
different forms of inequality and power around the globe. Each different form 
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of inequality predicts wide-ranging choices about how to live, yet distinct 
choices from other forms of inequality. This positions him differently from 
Gledhill. There are intriguing differences between these two positions: one that 
finds power to be differently disguised but similar in its coercive project of 
dominating others, and one that describes how power might be differently used 
by different people. Clearly, anthropologists deploy the concept of political 
power with difficulty. 
Troubles in the Amazon before and after the Second World War 
The personal journey of one intellectual leader or structuralist theory bridges 
the decades from modern times of the early twentieth century to the new 
modernity or the later twentieth century. Levi-Strauss conducted his first 
research in the Amazon river basin in the 1930s, and published the book 
Tristes Tropiques (1955) as an account of a disappearing way of life among the 
Amazonian Indian villages there. This record remains with anthropologists as 
a primary example of the ethnography of that era, research conducted when 
even the anthropologist had become aware that nations in Europe had begun 
to prepare for war. Levi-Strauss undertook great efforts to convey the elements 
of Amazonian social life, largely because he aimed to record the dynamics of a 
world on the wane. His account of the end of Amazonian warfare finds him 
asking in what ways did people in the Amazon basin make peace. They did not 
create treaties; there were no politicians to negotiate international agreements 
that would be written down for future reference. How could statecraft exist in 
this place without writing'? 
In the Amazon river basin of South America, deep in the interior of the 
continent and far away from the bustle and noise of cities in North America 
and Europe, distant from the parliaments, government departments, and offi-
cers that made the political world, the exchange of women secured the 
principal means to peace after warfare between language groups and tribes in 
the region. They negotiated an end to warfare by showing goodwill to the 
enemy, as emphasized and symbolized by the gift of a woman. Thus, the peace 
was kept through ongoing negotiation of relationships between her clan and 
the clan of her husband. As these connections thickened with histories of the 
give and take of small everyday gifts, then too did the reasons deepen for the 
end of conflict between the former enemies'? Often they did. Levi-Strauss 
explains how negotiations can achieve peace between warring enemies. He 
described all manifest and surface meanings of the exchange of wealth and the 
interchanges of communication as evidence of the successful accomplishment 
of peaceful social life (even at times when that would appear otherwise). 
The analysis offered by Levi-Strauss does not offer any explanation of why 
the warfare existed, or why people wanted peace. These were not his concerns 
because these lead to statements of belief about human nature, that the basic 
human condition was either warlike or peaceful. 
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Other anthropologists took up the question of what motivated people, and 
posed critiques of Levi-Strauss by exploring examples of violence in human 
society. Chagnon ( 1977) offered a new evolutionary account of the successful 
accomplishment of peaceful social life out of the condition of war. In his 
effort to understand the human nature that informed Amazonian Indian 
behaviour he undertook to describe environmental and historical causes 
for the events unfolding in the time of Levi-Strauss's visit. Chagnon described 
the lifeways of the Yanomami, whose identity now falls famously into the 
view of anthropologists of the region. The Yanomami people feature as the 
subject of a thirty-minute ethnographic film. Chagnon used the film to pro-
vide evidence of the nature of social life in the region in order to support his 
own larger theory about the evolution of political structures. Whereas Levi-
Strauss decried evolutionism as a theory of social variation, Chagnon cham-
pioned it. 
In particular, Chagnon aimed to show the facts of human social make-up, 
using film to record evidence of warring behaviour in everyday life and going 
beyond the claim that warfare could be best described as ritualized activity. He 
claimed that the film showed important descriptive material, and used it to 
support his claims about the evolution of political society following the old 
argument that states emerge with the aims of ending the warring condition 
and of containing the legitimate uses of violence towards winning peace. 
Chagnon had worked hard with the film maker Tim Asch to create a com-
pelling portrayal of events in the Amazon. Asch's own record of Yanomami 
life extends to well over thirty films, few of which portray the violence that 
Chagnon had tried to theorize. Ruby (I 995) explains that Asch's corpus of 
films do not promote theoretical projects. Asch's principal concern was the 
development of collaborative methods in visual anthropology. Both Ruby and 
Grimshaw (2001) underline the ways in which Asch used collaborative work 
with anthropologists to answer questions posed by both anthropologists and a 
new generation of film makers inspired by Rouche's explorations of cinema. 
The more interesting film by Asch, The Feast was inspired by Mauss's essay 
The Gift. Asch made two innovations in film making in it: the uses of still 
frame highlights shown at the beginning of the film, and the minimal use of 
subtitles on the observational representations. He used the text to enhance the 
possibility for the viewer to understand the meaning of the actions, without 
relying upon words to interpret them. For the creation of The Ax Fight, which 
appeared to be a realistic shot of the events that developed naturally in front of 
them, the film makers worked to create the violent conflict on the screen. They 
focused on the build-up of antagonism more than on the restitution of peace-
able relations. From this Chagnon aimed to show the emergence of structures 
of control in the village, which enforced the argument for the origins of politi-
cal evolution in the management of conflicts. 
One anthropologist pursued the question of violence in the Amazon some-
what differently, by focusing on historical events, rather than on the stages of 
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political evolution. Maybury-Lewis asked why warfare existed with such inten-
sity in the Amazon basin during the twentieth century. His answer finds 
somewhat different solutions assessing the context of broadly social and eco-
nomic changes in the region. As a result of changing land policies for white 
settlers and businesses in the Amazon, many of the indigenous communities 
moved into territories previously used by other clans. Maybury-Lewis argued 
that the divisions between people emerged through political changes to the 
environs brought about by the colonization of the region and the advent of 
Amazonian states. Directly addressing Levi-Strauss (rather than Chagnon), 
Maybury-Lewis argued that the 'dual organizations' of wife givers and wife 
receivers did not exist as social forms reflecting the mental constructs of the 
Amazonian Indian. These groups emerged because of recent history, and were 
not important to the development of a grand theory about the structure of 
society. Anthropologists must conduct good history before they theorize about 
the variety of societies around the globe. Maybury-Lewis insisted on good his-
tory first, whether the anthropologist pursued the evolutionist's question of 
why a politically negotiated peace exists or the structuralisfs question about 
how that peace might be made in any society. In the final analysis Maybury-
Lewis believed that the anthropologist could not know what human nature 
constituted, nor how human cognition shaped social life. Instead, the anthro-
pologist could know what people did and describe simply that. As a rejoinder 
to larger theories of social and political evolution, Maybury-Lewis's argument 
offers an objection with a description of historical events, but neither a new 
theory nor a defence against the efforts of arguments elaborating theories of 
social evolution. 
By offering a structuralist theory of how societies varied across the world, 
especially one that did not depend on evolutionary assumptions of the superi-
ority and complexity of some societies over and above others, Levi-Strauss 
offered a powerful intellectual alternative both to evolutionary theory and to 
historical accounts. It can judiciously be said that as an alternative theory 
structuralism provides a powerful counter to the theory of social evolution 
because it can explain how people develop political structures to address 
violence, but in entirely different ways. It is a particular advantage of the struc-
turalist theory of social difference that it does not imply either racism or 
elitism, two of the ideological predispositions that some evolutionists relied 
upon more than others. It is also an advantage of structuralism that it did not 
rely upon a theory of human nature; so much as upon a theory of human 
society. Within structuralist theories of social variation, social relations never 
can be reduced to differences in human nature. Instead, structuralists argue 
that differences are always an effect of human social capacities, and a reflection 
of human abilities to make the world comprehensible in speech, act and artis-
tic forms. Structuralists argue that potentials of human communication rather 
than nature ground human difference. 
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Conclusions: the legacy of the Noble Savage in 
anthropological argument 
I began with a very brief introduction to Rousseau's idea of the Noble Savage, 
placing it in the context of his contemporary political milieu of revolutionary 
France and Europe, showing only how he reasoned through an argument 
about how to live. He wrote a series of essays about the life of humans in the 
state of nature and from this work emerged the concept of the Noble Savage 
as an ideal for human association. He writes first of the Noble Savage to 
describe the state of humans in nature, then of the Noble Savage within the 
social contract and as an accomplishment of that contract where a noble and 
natural lifestyle could be protected. Finally, he writes of how to educate youth 
so as to cultivate their natural reason, so that they might remain Noble 
Savages even as civilized humans. Although Rousseau and his contemporaries 
found the idea compelling, the Noble Savage remains today a perplexing and 
difficult concept. The legacy of the Noble Savage after the Enlightenment 
complicated and burdened anthropologists more than at first appears, largely 
because the idea of the Noble Savage benefits and constrains the intellectual 
orientations and ideological positions of the anthropologist, but a bit differ-
ently in each case. This chapter has discussed, in turn, the evolutionists' (both 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century versions). the Marxists' and the historicists' 
uses of the concept, and the structuralists' use of the legacy of the idea of the 
Noble Savage. 
What are the lessons for anthropology that a student can learn from consid-
ering this legacy of the Noble Savage in social science research? ln the first 
case, the theory of social evolution stumbled because the ideological claims 
for the advancement of human values could be sustained by ethnographic 
evidence. But that oversimplifies a complex problem. The ideal of the Noble 
Savage came to have material effects in the colonial history of social transfor-
mation. Early researchers mistook Pacific islanders for Noble Savages. They 
found Polynesian nobility in the fantasy of incipient Pacific 'states' built on 
charity, and Melanesian savagery in the fantasy of cannibalistic practices that 
fed the perseverance of an anarchic society. In the subsequent generations 
European admiration for the nobility of the eastern Pacific peoples proved to 
be insipidly destructive, changing Polynesian chiefdoms into state bureaucrats 
in two generations. By contrast, European angst about the alleged savagery of 
western Pacific peoples continued into the present as fear of the anarchism and 
threat to world order posed by allegedly weak western Pacific states. 
The play or the difference between the ideal of the noble and the material 
effects of making colonial and state policy based on that imaginary person 
plagues anthropological work, at the same time as it enlivens it. Michel-Rolph 
Trouillot named the unstable image of the Noble Savage, 'the savage slot', but 
not because he hoped to dismantle the ideal in favour of the material evidence 
that humans are not 'savage'. Instead, he aims to show that anthropologists in 
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the first place mistakenly divided the material form from the ideal. It would be 
a tragedy if anthropology gave up on the search for the better way to live, and 
it would be a tragedy if anthropologists continued to mistakenly turn their 
examination from enquiries into how humans tried to make good lives, with 
descriptions of the lives they did make. Simple material evidence of the failures 
or successes of the greatest human efforts simply do a disservice to the social 
sciences if they are not considered as a part of a wider anthropological disci-
pline of arguments about how to live. 
Some contemporary anthropologists have expressed concern about the awk-
ward legacy of the deployments of the concept of the Noble Savage by 
anthropologists across the centuries, and have focused on the failure of schol-
ars to match their work to the real lives of people in the places they described. 
Summing up this kind of search for the 'primitive' in anthropology, Adam 
Kuper rightly shows how it has been an extraordinary failure. He cynically 
exposes a history of failure in anthropology given to the exploration of a fan-
tasy; the primitive did not 'really' exist. He discusses the history of kinship 
theory as a fantasy that illuminated an African past, but hid the social 
processes of resettlement and social-economic development in the Africa con-
temporary with anthropological research there. Kinship theories of Fortes and 
Evans Pritchard wobble under the weight of Kuper's inspections because 
allegedly they grasped for the fantasy of the African past. The extended case 
studies, or rational actor theory of the Manchester School, were a more viable 
model for research in the decolonizing world. However, if the members of 
the Manchester School had not measured simple economic rationality as a 
universal capacity, they could have mapped a better course of action for them-
selves. Kuper remains despondent about his anthropological bearings. 
Trouillot challenges anthropologists to escape the narrow role they have 
made for themselves. Moreover he argues that anthropologists must find a way 
out of the mire of problems in the 'savage slot' if they only reason more clearly 
about how to live. He points out that whatever criticisms have been made of 
research with the elusive "primitive·, it is likely that anthropologists remake 
other equally abstract topics into the contemporary 'savage'. For example, 
research into such abstract concepts as poverty can denigrate the material 
aspects in the lifestyle of people in the condition of poverty in order to enno-
ble the ideal elimination of poverty. Perhaps it is better to ask the complex 
question of who is doing what with whose money? In seeking to describe the 
material forms of the abstract idea, anthropologists often shift their focus away 
from other arguments, such as those about the creation of inequality. I agree 
with Trouillot that contemporary anthropology must proceed fully aware that 
the Noble Savage was a fantasy that fuelled the imagination of the researchers, 
and with cynicism about the implications of that fantasy for contemporary 
anthropology. One way to take up Trouillot's challenge would be to examine 
how anthropologists used the concept of the Noble Savage to understand the 
problem of inequality. 
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Summary of chapter 2 
The Noble Savage leaves an awkward legacy in anthropology because it cannot 
be given away or forgotten without making its role ever more potent and 
important to critical thought. The Noble Savage is best understood as a 
rhetorical construction, used by anthropologists working in the shadow of 
Rousseau to write critically about their contemporary political and social con-
ditions. Often, as it did in Rousseau's day, the Noble Savage represented an 
alternative lifestyle from that lived by European people in his time. Social criti-
cism using the image of the Noble Savage has been directed most often at the 
nature of state powe1~ and has been used as an impetus to change and to create 
new ways of living. Over the decades the Noble Savage has been used to estab-
lish the capacity of humans to reason critically and reflect upon their lives by 
explaining how people in other societies live differently. Evolutionist accounts 
have used the label of the Noble Savage to describe other societies, as if they 
were contemporary ancestors of allegedly civilized people. Historical anthro-
pologists charge social evolutionists with writing false history because they fail 
to account for social change as a product of purposeful human actions. While 
acknowledging this complex claim, historical anthropologists reassessed the 
colonial relationships in which most ethnographers worked and argued that 
ethnography should be examined in the context of that history. The reframing 
of studies about the Noble Savage as an artefact of colonial history did not 
produce a new anthropological theory about social change and cultural diver-
sity. The more successful rejection of evolutionary accounts of social 
variations put a new theory in place in order to argue that the Noble Savage 
and the contemporary civilized human shared the ability to make rational 
insights into their respective conditions. In a case study from the Amazon the 
anthropologists posed the question: if rationality of thought underpins all 
social relations then how can anthropologists account for the power of vio-
lence in social life? We see that the answer to that question cannot assume that 
violence exists separate from social relationships and that it is wrong for 
anthropologists to 'slot' violence into the place of the 'savage' and study it as if 
separate from our humanity. Recently, anthropologists argue that the discipline 
needs to make self-consciously a rhetorical space for the Noble Savage so that 
researchers do not reinvent it in new forms and mistake it for objective reality. 
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Many anthropologists agreed it was time to return to fieldwork in order to 
gather their thoughts after the philosophical arguments by numerous scholars 
about how to live, especially the well-observed thoughts about how to live 
within the state. In fieldwork anthropologists cultivate anthropological knowl-
edge, in a unique disciplined approach to the study of humanity. Early 
researchers likened contemplation and enquiry into the order of things to a 
kind of detective work, where they confirmed with ethnographic evidence 
simple modest proposals about human action, rather than grand theories 
about humanity. Collecting evidence is detective work; but collecting is an 
approach to knowledge that assumes that 'things add up' to make an alterna-
tive explanation from the conventional understanding of events. From the 
facts, using the evidence, an anthropologist builds up a case about how people 
act and even how they think. An account takes shape through an accumula-
tion of evidence. They use the evidence to show how people do act and what 
they say about how they live to elaborate a fuller picture of a time and place. 
At the critical point when the collected evidence takes shape or presents some 
regularity to the sense of the anthropologist, an interpretation of details or a 
rule of behaviour can be stated. By accumulating a wealth of detail an anthro-
pologist prepares to make an argument, especially an argument against the 
common wisdom of the day. 
Although in the past decade some anthropologists accepted the assertion of 
the cultural critic James Clifford (1988) that participant observation was an 
accidental invention of Malinowski's, this seems unlikely if a contemporary 
anthropologist looks at the evidence. In the following I will collect some evi-
dence to define the method of participant observation. I begin by discussing 
the way in which Malinowski, and his contemporary Boas, used ethnography 
against the speculative theory that Western civilization was more complexly 
evolved than were other societies. Second, I discuss the intellectual company 
that Malinowski kept during the years when he invented the method of partici-
pant observation and assess the relative importance that different thinkers 
might have had for his project. Finally, I review the arguments against the 
validity of results that can be had with Malinowksi's method, rejecting the 
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claims that participant observation is purely subjective or deeply compromised 
by colonial power. The evidence is assembled to show that participant observa-
tion emerged as a method that functioned within a larger framework of the 
development of social science. 
A story that often is told about the beginnings of participant observation 
takes listeners and readers to the time of the outbreak of the First World War, 
when the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski met difficulties with the Aus-
tralian government. Legend has it that as a citizen of the Austro-Hungarian 
empire, with residence in the United Kingdom, his alliances seemed uncertain 
to the Australians, and so they detained him for a while. His choices were few. 
He could find accommodation in an Australian detainment settlement for those 
citizens of enemy nations who did not normally live in their home country. 
The better option must be to travel to the solitude of the Trobriand islands, 
of the territory of Papua in the south-west Pacific Ocean, where he might 
conduct an extended study of the livelihood of the people who lived there. 
Two years of residence passed before he returned to Australia, and ultimately 
London. This period of his residency in the Trobriands, from 1914 to 1916, 
largely came about because of the circumstances of the war. Here, the anthro-
pological method of participant observation was born. Malinowski found in 
this time, the means to advance the cause of anthropology. 
There is a myth that anthropologists discovered their fieldwork methods by 
accident or happenstance. It would be easy to assume this about Malinowski's 
experience because he came to the Trobriands under duress, rather than fully 
by will. None the less, it was his plan to do such research, and he had antici-
pated the duration of his stay with years of study before that day when he first 
found himself set down on the beach of a quiet lagoon. He did not discover 
fieldwork methods by accident; participant observation emerged as a method 
after years of cautious and careful deliberation about what a person could 
know from direct experience of living in a different place and from people who 
adhered to the cultural habits of another society. By the time Malinowski 
began his fieldwork, there already had been many examples of how to conduct 
research in the new discipline of anthropology. He learned a great deal about 
solo fieldwork from Seligman, who aside from working in Africa had been part 
of the group expedition to the Torres Straits. In the previous chapter, I referred 
to the nineteenth-century history of that expedition, led by Haddon to the 
Torres Straits, and recalled that the team of researchers from Cambridge 
wanted to adapt the field methods used by scholars of special or biological evo-
lution to the analysis of social evolution. They used the best of observational 
techniques and methods to create a model of evolutionary social change. But, 
by the early twentieth century, Malinowski felt that fieldwork by naturalists 
and by anthropologists should differ dramatically. Before I discuss the aims 
and scope of Malinowski's method of participant observation as a solo or 
individual project, it helps to know that a number of others had established 
the value of solo research. 
39 
MODERNIST NOSTALGIA 
Recording the particulars of cultural life 
One anthropologist in particular shared a similar intellectual history with 
Malinowski. Franz Boas was a European student of physics at the end of the 
nineteenth century. As a physicist, Boas pondered the limitations of human 
perception in discerning facts about the physical world. He lived on Baffin 
Island in the Canadian Arctic over a winter in order to assess how people 
understood the colour of snow. Snow as frozen water has no substantial 
colour except for the shades of the world it reflects; and so human perception 
of the environment becomes central to the 'naming' of the colour of snow. 
Another solo researcher in Africa, namely Seligman, recommended the value 
of working alone to the scholar of anthropology who needed to learn how the 
community worked. This could be accomplished by participating in it, and 
fieldwork became a kind of initiation into the social life of the village. 
The tradition of fieldwork distinguishes anthropology both from the history 
of the civilization's evolution, and from the philosophy that sustained that his-
tory. Boas used anthropological evidence to critique evolutionism, particularly 
the evolution of culture and civilization. During Boas 's early career at the turn 
of the twentieth century many European philosophers discussed phenomenol-
ogy, which is the assessment of experience as it can be felt directly by 
consciousness as 'meaning'. The philosophers of phenomenology experi-
mented with this approach of the human or historical sciences to advance a 
theory of cultural life, as a form of human experience that insisted itself in 
consciousness as 'meaning' and was shared by people in almost all societies in 
a variety of expressive artistic forms and habitual styles of living. But Boas 
criticized the general evolutionary model underlying phenomenological 
approaches because they triumphed only one vision of culture, rather than the 
multiple forms of expression that culture might take. Immediate experiences in 
the research location quickly led fieldworkers to doubt the apparent 'success' of 
the evolution of Western culture over and against the many cultures of the 
American Indian or the African village resident. 
Like Malinowski, Boas remains most clear about the value of the descrip-
tive efforts of fieldwork in creating arguments against the dominant evolution-
ary models of the day. Boas argued rigorously, and even more overtly than 
Malinowski, against the efforts to generate the evolutionary theory of social 
change. Boas argued that anthropologists should work first to describe the cul-
tural life in the community in which they lived as researchers, rather than to fit 
it to a larger theory of culture as the artistic and literary expressions of the 
grand history of human civilization. Adamantly disputing the evolutionary 
models of his day, Boas proposed that ethnographers should be 'historical par-
ticularists' and reject the search for idealist or transcendent truth. That is, 
ethnographers as historical particularists should create as closely as possible a 
description of the particulars of everyday life during the period of their stay so 
as to keep the written account relatively truthful to the research interlude itself. 
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From the careful record of early ethnographic descriptions, Boas believed that 
later anthropologists could build up better explanations about what it means 
to be human. In Boas's day, the ethnographic record exposed as conjecture the 
claims that the history of civilization found its fullest expression in the urban 
and cosmopolitan centres of Europe and America. 
Boas's criticisms of evolutionary anthropology won him a rebuttal from 
those contemporaries who were more committed to that theory, who dismissed 
Boas·s historical particularsim as 'atheoretical'. Others named it a form of 'sal-
vage anthropology', as if it were an effort to describe the maladaptive social 
developments in evolutionary history. It was not that. However, it is true that 
Boas sought to keep the record of cultural life for future use, and it was 
equally true that he saw that the lifestyles of the American Indian had quickly 
vanished from the world around him with the encroachments of the develop-
ment of modern cities upon the American frontier. Others have recorded the 
complicity between evolutionary theory and the ideology of modernity that 
supported change in the name of the progress of a few centres of culture and 
social life that eventually should lead the rest on the same path. If Boas's his-
torical particularism was a history of mistakes, the mistake was surely not to 
create a record of disappearing communities. Rather his ethnography is testa-
ment to the mistakes made against other cultures in the name of modern 
progress. A fairer assessment of historical particularism includes its record of 
criticisms of evolutionary theory, as a science colluding with the worst results 
of the ideology of modern progress. 
Beyond Boas's adamant critique of evolutionism, Malinowski established a 
definitive fieldwork method for social anthropology that ultimately undermined 
the theory of social evolution for a long time to come. Participant observation 
described the aim and scope of an anthropological method that made the 
description of the lifestyles of other societies its ultimate result. Rather than 
add to the assumptions of evolutionary anthropology, Malinowski added to the 
growing body of knowledge about what it means to be human. In his introduc-
tory pages to Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Malinowski (1935 [1922]) is very 
clear that the idea that so-called primitive economy was a kind of foundational 
model of human economic behaviour must be put to rest once and for all. He 
reasoned that if by postulating that primitive economics exists scholars also 
came to understand European economics as civilized, then the discipline, to jus-
tify its own existence, had entered truly into the intellectual domain of 
generating myth and legend. 
The kula trade in the Trobriand islands 
The place and subject of Malinsowski's research is famous in anthropology, 
and even beyond. The Trobriand islands trail off in an archipelago to the 
south and east of the main island of New Guinea (Figure 3.1). Today Milne 
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Figure 3.1 The kula ring, from The Encyclopaedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology, 
edited by Alan Barnard and Jonathan Spencer (2002), London: Routledge: 
18. Reprinted by permission of Routledge. 
D'Entrecasteaux islands) as well as the Louisades lying further to the south 
and east and the shores of the mainland of New Guinea. 
Some islands remain a vital part of the anthropological imagination, among 
them Woodlark. where Malinowski conducted research into the 'kula' and 
other institutions of Trobriand life, and Dobu where Reo Fortune studied sor-
cery. Kula itself is most important to the anthropological imagination because 
it did not conform in any way to notions of barter where basic goods were 
traded off against other goods which trading partners mutually deemed to be 
of use. Kula valuables are luxury items, necklaces ('soulava') and armshells 
('mwali') that partners can admire aesthetically and for which they can recount 
the long list of previous traders who once held the item in their care. Kula 
must be conducted with definite and complex rules within firm and lifelong 
relationships of kula partners, such that an elderly chief will have a hundred 
partners to the south and an equal number to the north of his village. Mali-
nowski described elegantly the trade of necklaces in a clockwise direction 
(always towards the south) and arm-bracelets in a counter-clockwise direction 
(towards the north). Men entered eagerly into trade, deploying magic and 
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recounting myths, while seeking to meet up with established trading partners, 
especially those reputed to hold famously beautiful valuables. 
Here is an account by Malinowski of how the exchanges progress through 
time and space, as taken from the words of a kula trader: 
Let us suppose that I, a Sinaketa man, am in possession of a pair of 
big armshells. An overseas expedition from the Dobu in the d'Entrc-
casteaux Archipelago, arrives at my village. Blowing a conch shell, I 
take my armshell pair and I offer it to my overseas partner, with some 
such words, 'This is a vaga [initial gift] - in due time thou returnist to 
me a big soulava [necklace] for it!' Next year when I visit my partner's 
village, he either is in possession of an equivalent necklace, and this he 
gives to me as yotilc [restoration gift]. This means that the main gift 
has to be repaid on a future occasion and the abasi is given in tone of 
good faith -- but it, in turn, must be repaid by me in the meantime by 
a gift of small armshells. The final gift, which will be given to me to 
clinch the whole transaction, would be then called kudu [equivalent 
gift] in contrast to basi. 
(Malinowski 1920: l 02) 
In this very helpful short, early essay on the kula. Malinowski continues to 
remind readers that partners hold close to their selves the virtues and spiritual 
aspects of the kula. The 'abasi', or 'basi·. is given as an emblem of the good 
faith with which the kula traders operate. Upon the receipt of basi, a trader 
must trust that a more valuable gift will follow in the future. Kula involves ele-
ments of trust and a sort of honour. A kula partner shows his own trust of his 
trading partner when he demonstrates his deeply engrained ideas with liberality 
of giving. Generosity is the most important of virtues. Trobriand men can 
shame a man by saying he is mean and miserly in his kula dealings. Just as 
importantly, kula traders must conduct their work with magic at every step of 
the journey, from the earliest work of carving a canoe prow decoration so that 
it speeds the traders safely over the sea. through the magic to ward off witches 
who would endanger the lives of men should they fall into the waves. to the 
work of enticing the trading partners at their destination to be reckless in their 
generosity and lavish on the traders the best of gift necklaces or arm-bracelets. 
These virtues and the spiritual aspects of kula distinguish it from ideas of 
'primitive barter'. as advocated by anthropologists (such as Morgan) and histo-
rians (for example Engels) who sought to explain the evolution of civilization. 
Collecting the facts against evolutionism 
Malinowski"s fieldwork description of life in the Trobriands played a large part 
in toppling the efforts to establish a general theory of the ascent of European 
civilization. In elaborating his approach, Malinowski made certain distinct 
43 
MODERNIST NOSTALGIA 
Figure 3.2 'Scene in Yourawotu (Trobriands: preparing sagali)' (Plate IV, Argonauts of 
the Western Pacific by Bronislaw Malinowski, first published in London in 
1922, and under the same title in 1978, reprinted 1991 © London School of 
Economics and Political Science). Malinowski 's photo of women's participa-
tion in sagali (ceremonial distribution of wealth) was taken at his doorstep 
shortly after his arrival (Malinowski 1922: 8). His caption reads 'A complex 
but well-defined act of sagali is going on. There is a definite system of socio-
logical, economic and ceremonial principles at the bottom of apparently 
confused proceedings.' 
efforts that his students and generations of anthropologists after him remem-
ber very well. First has been the one already alluded to in the above 
paragraphs, namely, Malinowski 's language and word use. He insisted on the 
importance of relinquishing the use of the word 'primitive' as a label for any of 
the social institutions of the islanders he studied. In his introductory pages to 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Malinowski claims that his research, once 
and for all, jettisoned the abusive and obscurant label from scientific study. 
Malinowski's students recalled his habit of establishing the 'facts' of Tro-
briand life. He urged that fieldworkers rigorously build up their descriptions of 
both everyday life and of ceremonial events so as not to impose their prejudices. 
Although the researcher must work slowly to put each fact in place, they can 
finally know the structure of the society. A viewer of the photograph of the 
'sagali', a funeral feast in the Trobriand islands (Figure 3.2), might think that all 
social activity is anarchic and disorderly, but the anthropologist would put 
together a detailed account of the rules by which this society normally func-
tions in ritual and everyday life. A student of anthropology might be tempted 
to see the street scene in the village in the Trobriand islands (Figure 3.3) as a 
precursor to the form of a modern village, or a simpler version of the British 
village (see Figure 8.la). Sometimes the effort to create a perspective on social 
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Figure 3.3 'Street of Kasana'l (Kiriwina, Trobriand islands)' (Plate III, Argonauts of 
the Western Pacific by Bronislaw Malinowski, first published in London in 
1922, and under the same title in 1978, reprinted 1991 © London School of 
Economics and Political Science). Malinowski's caption reads, 'An everyday 
scene showing groups of people at their occupations' . 
life, in this case a common photographic perspective on street scenes half a 
world apart, can create meaningless or even false similarities between the places. 
Famously, Malinowski returned to his field notes to establish the verity of 
his claims about Trobriand society, even as they met challenges in much later 
years of his tenure at the London School of Economics. Shelves lined with 
notes and journals from those years could be consulted for what details they 
yielded up about the livelihood of the residents of those islands. The value of 
such facts lay in disarming the speculations of armchair philosophers who 
waxed eloquent about human nature, while holding more parochial personal 
understandings of it based on the limited experiences of their own societies. 
Anthropology served to undermine such philosophy with evidence to the con-
trary of the most common wisdom with which they reasoned through their 
theories. 
Third, Malinowski admired inductive reasoning as the means to establish 
certainty about what was true, and more so his students admired this habit in 
him. His seminars at the London School of Economics operated with the aim 
of establishing what could be known within reason, and many other universi-
ties came to imitate this style of anthropological discussion. Even today, his 
field notes are kept in the departmental library and students with specialist 
interest in the region can consult the voluminous record. A student of Mali-
nowski brought the habitual investigation of the facts of ethnography to one 
American university, where it continued into the 1970s and finally emerged as 
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a debate in virtual society, with a web-site address where the Malinowski Sem-
inar can be joined on-line as an on-going discussion group. 
Malinowski's efforts to establish ethnography as a descriptive science, in the 
broadest sense of the term, also can be understood as a part of the effort to 
institutionalize the discipline of anthropology. Malinowski, and those of his 
era, showed us that anthropologists do much more than 'hang around' in the 
process of participating in social life and observing it. Anthropologists create 
ethnographic reports from the careful record of planned research. 
Participant observation: Malinowski's prescriptions 
for anthropology 
Malinowski writes clearly about how anthropologists might conduct their 
work. They must begin with the facts, as these can be discerned through in-
ductive reasoning. This is particularly the case if the researcher wishes to 
understand the nature of unusual or foreign knowledge and belief. Mali-
nowski's concern to explain the principles of the kula trade begins with his 
fascination with the kula as a ritual institution. He chooses to study the kula 
trade because Trobrianders undertook it against the basic or subsistence inter-
ests of their community. The trader launched a canoe with a few luxury goods 
such as necklaces and arm-bracelets, hoping to exchange these for other similar 
valuables of renowned men living on more distant islands. In order to conduct 
this trade, in which he had invested enormous hopes that more prestigious men 
than himself might recognize him as their peer, he crossed hazardous seas in a 
small canoe with only magical protection from the elements and buoying up his 
preparations for successful trading. Such economic practices easily escaped 
modern understanding. 
Malinowski addressed this social practice, hoping to isolate its peculiarities 
for closer understanding. He used the analogy between anthropological field-
work and laboratory science, referring to the field as a natural laboratory. He 
showed the controlled experimental conditions with limited external factors on 
the focus on the research (which the lab scientists created with much difficulty) 
which the anthropological fieldworker found available to him in distant places, 
far away from the influences of modern life. In Malinowski's eyes the con-
trivance of research design in the physics laboratory threatened the validity of 
the results. The presence of colonial administration, missionaries, and other 
Europeans endangered the accuracy of the account of 'native' life. As in the 
natural science, the researcher must minimize these influences on the aims of 
the research. 
Malinowski writes famously of the arrival of the fieldworker at the lagoon, 
and in describing the setting shows his reader how far separate he is from the 
white man, 'who is unwilling to waste any of his time on you'. He writes of a 
person immersed into the natural laboratory. 
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Imagine yourself suddenly set down surrounded by all your gear, 
alone on a tropical beach close to a native village, while the launch or 
dinghy which has brought you sails away out of sight. Since you take 
up your abode in the compound of some neighbouring white man 
trader or missionary. you have nothing to do but to start at once on 
your ethnographic work. 
(Malinowski 1935 [1922]: 4) 
In these pages we learn that Malinowski aims to develop an approach to the 
'natives' that is different from that of his white hosts and thus begins his 
enquiry with the most banal and technological investigation possible. This 
first approach to the field should also influence his reception by the people 
living in the village. He does not come to take a census, nor does he come to 
enquire after infractions of the law. Rather, he comes to make an enquiry 
into the routines of village life that even the villagers understand to be mun-
dane information, and of no importance to the Europeans present in the 
territory. 
Malinowski establishes three recommendations for the student: to have 
scientific aims which include knowing the value of good ethnography. to put 
himself in a good condition for work, and finally to apply a number of meth-
ods of fixing his evidence. The first of these is best discussed by examples 
of Malinowski's own work. The value of a good ethnography lies in its aim of 
destabilizing received common wisdom about human nature, by showing that 
people residing elsewhere - with fewer contrivances of modern living, and with 
different assumptions about what in their social life should be valued from day 
to day - do things differently and hold different beliefs about their own human 
nature. Malinowski shows the value of ethnography of Trobriand economy by 
bringing it to scrutiny as an alternative vision of humanity to that fantasy of 
the Noble Savage, in Western imagination. 
The second set of recommendations includes an elaborate discussion of the 
conditions for fieldwork, in which we learn that Malinowski encourages the 
future student of ethnography to approach his work holistically. Holism in 
research can be accomplished only if the fieldworker makes the fieldwork loca-
tion his or her entire world. cutting him or herself off from home society and 
immersing himself or herself totally in village life. After the extended residence 
there. the fieldworker will begin to 'acquire the feeling for manners, for humour, 
and for recognizing matters of significance' (1927: 8). 
In the third point of the set of recommendations, Malinoswki says that 
fieldworkers should rigorously test the facts of their knowledge in a systematic 
manner. On this point, he writes rather explicit and copious directions for the 
fieldworker to advance inductive truths throughout his research. He reminds 
his readers that neither people in England nor those in the Trobriands can 
utter general truths about their social life with ease, whereas a fieldworker can 
accept generalizations as scientific abstractions. When the Trobriander or the 
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English speak these truths, they hold the status of folk wisdom, not general 
knowledge of social life. 
The fieldworker should ask about particular cases, and from these interpret 
the data without letting the fieldworker's own common sense overtake the data 
or cloud the information. In order to assess what he knows, a fieldworker might 
make a tabular chart of the details, distinguishing between information inferred 
from indirect experiences and that recorded as direct experience. This inductive 
reasoning about the social life allows for a record of the ambience and sensibil-
ity of life as it is lived. In this way, ethnography surpasses science. 
Malinowski's pragmatism 
Malinowski's ideas about empirical knowledge, about the ways in which a 
researcher can know something by his direct experience, reflect the concerns of 
his day. In his student days, a number of different European (and some Amer-
ican) philosophers experimented with challenges to rationalism. They argued 
that knowledge of the world could be won through direct experience of it, 
rather than through rational analysis. Direct experience could be understood 
as 'meaning', as felt insights into the workings and processes of life ways. 
Malinowksi does not leave a record of his thoughts about this movement, 
known as phenomenology, nor does he record his relationship to the work of 
the pragmatic philosopher of religion, William James. Yet, in the introductory 
chapters of Argonauts of the Western Pacific, he remains clear that he values 
inductive reasoning as it facilitates the aims and scope of his ethnographic 
method to record Trobriand lives. Perhaps the virtue of Malinowski's ethno-
graphic work is that he eschews theories and the intellectual trends of his day 
in order to show readers the depths of Trobriand knowledge. 
Jn Firth's (1957) collection honouring Malinowski, Edmund Leach argued 
that the work should be judged as an early contribution to pragmatism, espe-
cially as Malinowski had been deeply concerned with myth and magic and the 
nature of religious thought in Trobriand society. As Gell (1992) pointed out in 
later years, the magic that moves the canoes of the kula trader flying across the 
water causes kula traders to consider deeply the nature of their more mundane 
and fantastic work on the seas. On the one hand they use magic to protect 
themselves against harm in rough waters, and on the other they use magic to 
draw others to them through the seas. Jn many respects, the study of Tro-
briand religion, myth and magic is the way to the better understanding of 
Trobriand economics. Gell argued that the myth of the flying canoe shadows 
everything of Trobriand exchange, and the imagination of possibility presages 
ethnographic fact. Were one to follow the insights of the pragmatist philoso-
pher William James, it might be possible to argue that Malinowski, like James, 
argued that belief is established in religious practice rather than in religious 
doctrine. But that would be to put the theory of pragmatism before the assess-
ment of ethnographic evidence, a habit of thought that Malinowski rejected. 
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Malinowski's debts to James do not stand up well against any tests of direct 
influence, even though these are arguments that he could have formed with 
influence from the American philosopher's thought. Perhaps Stocking is correct 
to argue that there is a more compelling connection between Malinowski's 
thought and that of the German physicist, Mach. At least Malinowski lived in 
the same country as Mach did, during the time at which Mach taught in the 
German university where Malinowski studied for a while. But this too is an 
overly tenacious claim by Stocking, who had enthusiastically pursued the links 
between anthropological thought and nineteenth-century philosophy. Mach as 
purveyor of phenomenological insights in physics research drew large crowds of 
students into his classroom, making him one of the most influential lecturers of 
his time. The gist of Mach's argument was that direct knowledge of the natural 
world could be had through the sensory means. A human touching a tree could 
learn much about the qualities or essence of 'tree'. Mach's claim for the power 
of direct experience could have been a greater influence on Malinowksi's 
thought than we know. Unfortunately, we do not know that Malinowski ever 
studied with Mach or that the two of them came into direct contact. 
While it is tempting to dismiss the power of Mach's ideas on Malinowski on 
the grounds that the two probably never met, Gellner (1988) recalls that Mali-
nowski held some beliefs in common with this philosopher of science. First, it 
is clear that Malinowski remained certain of the common biological unity of 
humans, and understood this as the common grounds upon which humans 
could know anything. This remained an important feature of his commitment 
to the science of society. The power of the body on the mind remained a 
common feature of human experience, and one that predicted the possibility 
that anthropological science could be practised equally well by Trobriander 
traders as by Polish scholars. Neither should be bound to the transcendent 
power of categorical thought over and above sensual knowledge. It remained 
Malinowski's aim throughout his career to understand the way in which the 
human mind might comprehend the world without pre-supposing a number of 
categories to filter that experience. Gellner finds a historic influence for Mali-
nowski, not Mach or James, but instead the classical philosopher of science, 
Zeno. 
I think that Malinowski would resist all efforts to reduce his research in the 
Trobriands to a philosophical pursuit in any of these traditions. The more 
important influence on Malinowski's thought remains the thought of Trobriand 
islanders themselves. 
Malinowski's functionalism 
Throughout his career, Malinowski remained resolute. The study of history, 
especially evolutionary history, could not inform the anthropologist about the 
lives of the people of the present. He advocated that the meaning of contem-
porary social institutions was in their relations with each other, most narrowly 
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the function that one institution played in the work of the others. Each of 
Malinowski's books or major essays, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, 'Baloma: 
spirits of the dead', Crime and Custom in Savage Society and The Sexual Life 
of Savages, discusses one institution of Trobriand life, in the round. Firth 
(1957) points out that Malinowski never produced the ethnography that knit 
together their relationship, although he often asked his students to do so. Firth 
judiciously points out that Malinowski does accomplish this, but as a matter of 
his life's work, not in a single book. 
If anthropology could have a method without theory, functionalism would 
have been it. Its theoretical underpinnings generally emphasize more 'Western' 
or 'European' ideas about the self: the social contract, and some of the bio-
logical basis of human nature. This uncritical acceptance of many of these 
assumptions left Malinowski's work vulnerable to a number of charges. Most 
often he is accused of writing social change out of the lives of Trobrianders, as 
if Trobrianders could be people trapped by the force of their own belief within 
the bounds of history. 
In many ways, Malinowski's student Raymond Firth correctly protests that 
later anthropologists unfairly judge the work, expecting a theory where Mali-
nowski gave them none. (Later, Radcliffe-Brown would try to fill in the 
theoretical absence from Malinowski's work with his own theory of structural-
functionalism.) Malinowski's functionalist method remains no more than a 
method. It is not a theory. It is especially not a theory about the nature of soci-
ety, or what it means to be human. It is possible to argue that all methods 
imply theories, and that Malinowski can still be held accountable to his own. 
However, this would be to ignore that Malinowski did not aim to build a 
theory, largely because he wanted to undermine the most corrosive aspects of 
theories about human social evolution. In his hands, the functionalist method 
emerged as a tool to carve out the evolutionist fallacy of creating a historical 
account. The synchronic approach of Malinowski's fonctionalism presents 
the possibility that history of Trobriand society could be no better than 'false 
history', or even a dangerous and racist ideology. Confirming this general 
suspicion of historical argument, Gellner (1988) re-analyses Malinowski's 
experience in Krakow (Polish) politics in order to show what the anthropolo-
gist knew all too well. Those arguments about the past served the present far 
too well to be truthful about that past. Malinowski reasoned that it was better 
to avoid the clouds cast over research by such claims than to reduce the 
strength of the argument by sprinkling it in badly argued history. 
Subjective bias? The diaries and the verity of 
participant observation 
Did Malinowski find that his method of participant observation could be 
easily undermined by personal concerns? Was his attention unadulterated as 
it needed to be in order to record pure perceptions? These are concerns that 
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preoccupied Malinowski well before the period of extended fieldwork. His 
record of contemplations about the influences of previous experiences, his 
personal emotions on his observations prove to be very interesting in later 
years. 
Many anthropologists reassessed Malinowski's method of participant obser-
vation when new information about his years in the Trobriands appeared in 
print in 1967, nearly a generation after his death. A posthumous publication of 
Malinowski's diaries, released by his daughter, set the anthropological world 
astir. The diaries written by Malinowski during his fieldwork in the Trobriands 
revealed the doubts of a complex personality, conducting a difficult project, 
within a multifaceted social milieu. A contemporary anthropologist looking 
back on these events might ask if it should be any surprise that Malinowski's 
approach did not go as planned, and he often redirected his aims as he drifted 
off the course he chose to pursue. 
Malinowski's own diaries posed a challenge to his ethnography because the 
writings betray a man ridden by angst throughout his time in the Trobriands. 
His fieldwork created long lonely periods, when he wrote about his frustrations 
with everyday life in the village. The diaries contain some honest confessions of 
dislike for individuals, and for village people more generally. More disturbing 
sections use racial epithets which, although common to his day, do not convey 
the impression of a professional fieldworker with sympathy for the daily rou-
tine of Trobriander life. 
Do the diaries stand as the true, but unpublished, ethnographic record, 
revealing the backstage real fieldwork account? Do they overcome the value of 
the carefully written, published ethnography, as Clifford later argued? First, 
assuming the ethnography of Malinowski as a genre of writing, a kind of liter-
ary effort to describe the lifestyle of Trobriand islanders, Clifford then assesses 
Malinowski's work for its personal tones, insisting that the subjective account 
is all that Malinowski understands about the Trobriands. The ethnography 
that comes to the attention of so many later anthropologists appears to be 
grounded in misperceptions, and wrong assessments that were potentially 
drawn by a person who is harder to admire than the consummate fieldworker 
who won the respect of earlier students. 
Here an enigma arises. Malinowski's apparently personal approach seems to 
be in direct opposition to the multifarious intellectual tradition that formed his 
earliest fieldwork style. Like Clifford, some of Malinowski's contemporaries, 
working in the traditions of continental philosophy, argued that all that could 
be known reduced to the insights of each single individual - yet, Malinowski's 
participant observation had aimed to overthrow such suggestions. Malinowski 
held that knowledge could not be objectively true, if its meaning lay only in its 
sense as the individual person sensed it. Different from Clifford, other contem-
poraries of Malinowski examined the terms by which experiential knowledge 
could be directly assessed as meaningful, but they did not all agree that this 
then implied that that knowledge gained from direct experience reduced to 
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personal or subjective understandings. Many of these contemporaries of Mali-
nowski elaborated their approach as a vigorous undertaking in establishing 
shared truths. Further, some of these scholars sought to explain how the 
meanings won from direct experience constituted a form of objective knowl-
edge, free from the haze of prior personal opinion. They took issue with the 
claim that, at best, anthropology provides only a subjective account. 
Geertz (1983) assessed the furore created by the publication of Malinowski's 
diaries in 1967. He recalled that Malinowski had aimed to create an objective 
ethnographic account with his fieldwork. Gecrtz's work contributed to a better 
understanding of the role of subjectivity in fieldwork, and he remarks on how 
Malinowski used himself as a research tool in order to better understand just 
what can be understood from experience. In elaborating this, Geertz drew on 
Kohut's psychological terms, 'experience-near' and 'experience-distant' knowl-
edge. Geertz coined anthropological uses of the terms, pointing out that in the 
example of his own unconscious, he could say that it remained as distant from 
him as anything, forever impossible to capture in its entirety. 'Experience-near' 
anthropological knowledge described the puzzling array of understandings 
that make up the daily knowledge gathered from specific questions, mundane 
interactions and sentimental communications. ·Experience near' knowledge 
can be written down for future reference in field notes or in personal diaries. 
Fieldworkers then might use these more specifically close descriptions, allu-
sively or for citation as they develop more sophisticated analysis of what they 
have understood from their experience. By comparison with 'experience near' 
knowledge, the ethnography analyses the fieldwork experience for the point of 
contributing to knowledge shared among anthropologists. The 'experience dis-
tant' knowledge, as Geertz calls this by comparison, might be the details and 
interpretations of the field notes. For example, the ethnography can report a 
description of the ways in which Trobrianders use shell valuables in a luxury 
trade, showing that they do not operate it as if a primitive economy. This 
brings Malinowski's ethnography away from the convolutions of personal 
experience, towards the wider aims of shifting epistemological understandings 
about the nature of exchange of goods. 
Geertz did not argue that the record of the fieldwork was true, while the 
ethnography was false (as had James Clifford). Rather, the work of interpretive 
anthropology falls in between the fieldwork and the ethnography, in the space 
of interpretation. Geertz likens interpreting experience into field notes in the 
process of generating ethnography to 'getting a joke'. Field notes, or reports 
written close and near to the experience, become intelligible when the anthro-
pologist draws insight from them in order to write about that experience 
differently. Getting the joke, finding the insight, is a matter of being able to 
find new terms of reference to describe that experience to the wider anthropo-
logical community. Meaning is made in the process of living, because 
understanding comes in the midst of translating between experiences near and 
distant to 1.he fieldwork itself. Although some would oppose the claim, partici-
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pant observation does generate objective knowledge by using the subjective 
knowledge as a tool to greater understanding. 
Ideological preferences? 
A different criticism of Malinowski's research emerged when his fieldwork 
methods came under direct evaluation, or restudy. An anthropologist revisited 
Malinowski's field site for the purpose of refiguring his fieldwork data. 
Although it was half a century later, her concern to get it right did not 
address the nature of social changes there. Rather, she was interested to see 
what difference being a female fieldworker made to the analysis of Trobriand 
social life. 
In Malinowski's famous text, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, significant 
descriptions of the men's kula trade provide the reader with insights into 
Trobriand economics, but it is another form of trade that comes to the fore-
front in Weiner's book, Women of Value, Men of Renown (Weiner 1977). 
Weiner becomes interested in banana leaf bundles. collections that women 
amass on the occasions of funerals, in ceremonial trade with each other. 
Women make the banana leaves into skirts, which in turn are exchanged for 
yams, or sometimes for shell armbands used in the kula trade. By collecting 
skirts and redistributing them, a woman shapes the pathways of exchange 
between her husband and her brother. Her wealth of banana leaf skirts can 
influence the means by which men value their kula wealth of armbands and 
necklaces. In this way, women are 'of value', while men are renowned. 
Weiner argues that Malinowski overlooked the importance of the exchanges 
made between women at the time of the mortuary feasts in the Trobriands. 
Banana leaf bundles could be traded at funerals and converted to other forms 
of wealth. They became a kind of measure of the value of women's personal 
labour. Did Malinowski dismiss as 'mere women's wealth' what Weiner exalts 
as women's wealth'? If so, this perceptual shift in determining the significance of 
women's wealth provided a new departure for much of the literature on feast-
ing, gardening and trading in Melanesia. It asked if the feminist point of view 
could be usefully brought to a re-analysis of social relations and the reproduc-
tion of power dynamics in the Trobriands. 
Jn the Malinowski Memorial Lecture of 1981, Marilyn Strathern assessed 
the claim for feminist anthropology as it was posed by Weiner's work. Accord-
ing to Strathern, the problem lies in how the anthropologist first imagines the 
categories of analysis, then values those categories in research, and then cen-
tres or foregrounds them in the description, before going on to the work of 
interpreting such 'evidence' for general anthropological theory. These ques-
tions emulate the issues Malinowski so often addressed. Here, Strathern finds 
Weiner's imagined Malinowski to be no less than a 'straw man' to batter while 
feminizing anthropology. His fieldwork becomes emblematic of all of a patri-
archal account, and Weiner attacks this emblem rather than the work itself As 
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a result, Weiner supplants the patriarch of Trobriand economy with a matri-
arch, while avoiding the work of reassessing the ethnography. 
Malinowski might have approved Weiner's reassessment of his older ethnog-
raphy had she simply carried out the full ethnography of Trobriand exchanges, 
including the account of women's exchange in the most rigorous methodo-
logical style. Unfortunately, this reassessment of ethnographic fact escaped 
Weiner's glass, as she set out to establish contrasts with selections of Malinow-
ski's texts. Had Weiner reassessed Malinowski's ethnography on ceremonial 
exchanges at death in the light of the meanings of the yam gardens and 
exchanges, it could have been necessary for her to drop her charges against the 
male fieldworker. The problem arises around yam houses, yams, and the stor-
age of yams in those houses. Yams, houses, and storage are concerns of direct 
importance to understanding the nature of women's work, which is given to 
gardening with her husband in order to fill her brother's yam house. Women's 
husbands stand in between them and their brothers, but conduct the important 
work of passing on the gifts of the yam. As well, experiences with yam gardens 
influenced the ways in which Trobrianders imagined the idioms to describe 
women's work and men's work. But the question arises as to how yam gardens 
came to the Trobriander consciousness as the place of fertility, and so how 
could they be likened to the work of production? Trobrianders, as much as 
Europeans, seemed to draw upon their experience in order to find the words, 
the images or the metaphoric language to communicate wisdom about how 
people kept social relationships alive to contemporary concerns. 
Gardens give up, or bear, yams for exchange, as if giving up children to live 
within the village. The storage of yams in houses for future use accounts for 
the prestige of men and women who can disdainfully choose not to eat all that 
they have, even letting much of the crop rot so as to show that they have no 
need for it. The yam houses compare with the canoes, laden with kula valu-
ables, taken by traders on long seafaring journeys. The full canoe, like the full 
yam house, indicates that the trader has no need for such wealth. He can risk 
it by leaving it in the hands of another person, or chance that it is lost to the 
rough seas. The presence of kula valuables, and the storage of yams, indicate 
that there are many more yams and kula valuables than the public display of 
these could ever reveal. Children give evidence of a married couple's fertility; 
yams give evidence that the garden is so full that the gardeners can relinquish 
great numbers of yams to storage towers until they rot; kula canoes laden with 
shell wealth give evidence that even more significant items of exchange exist 
beyond public sight. These terms engender social relations as male or female, 
and predict the way in which people choose to interact with each other as kin. 
A feminist anthropology, drawing on Malinowski's fieldwork, would not 
only find the woman's point of view as distinct from the man's, but would go 
so far as to ask: what is a woman's point of view in Trobriand society? This 
suggests that the question of what is feminine can (and must) be posed before 
the question of what is a feminist analysis. 
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As with Geertz, who argued that ethnographers claimed authority to pro-
vide an objective account on the grounds that as anthropologists they knew by 
'being there', Malinowski argued that ethnographers claimed authority over 
their objective accounts by thinking through their subjectivity as a kind of 
research tool. Strathern, rethinking Malinowski's ethnography in the wake 
of Weiner's critique, argues that getting the interpretation straight is a matter 
of reaching as far as possible towards the terms of analysis that Trobrianders 
would have used to assess relationships between men and women, in the world 
of work, procreation and ceremony. In sum, one could remain true to the facts, 
and still manage to complete analysis sympathetic to the questions of femi-
nism, such as men's power, women's economic and social well-being, and the 
trade between the genders. 
Did Malinowski erase the role of colonial power in his research? 
Some contemporary scholars have charged Malinowski with the failure to 
account for colonial powers in the lives of Trobrianders. Indeed, the colonial 
concerns put Malinowski into the Trobriands in the first place. Even a cursory 
reading of the diaries and ethnography reveals that Malinowski did not fully 
remove himself from the company of Europeans and Australians living in the 
country. It is reported that he lived in a tent, rather than in a house with Tro-
briand villagers. The tent protected Malinowski's privacy, and provided him 
with the opportunity to write about his day's work. He also spent long periods 
away from the village, in the company of the Australians who were administer-
ing the territory, and seeing to the policing of the village. These aspects of 
Malinowski's fieldwork practice do not appear in his ethnography, and remain 
rather shadowy events and experiences in the background. 
Some scholars raise a few questions about the importance of Malinowski's 
time with the colonial administration. To what extent could Malinowski truly 
participate in the lives of the people who lived in the Trobriand village if he 
kept company with such figures? It is possible that his village neighbours might 
dislike and distrust the colonial white people as law enforcers. It is possible that 
the Trobriand chiefs resented the power of the colonials. It is possible that by 
spending too much time in the company of Australians, by visiting their homes 
and sharing European and Australian food, Malinowski sent an implicit mes-
sage to his Trobriand acquaintances. In so doing, he may have suggested with 
his actions that he also shared the values of the administrators. 
Another question arises. If the administration kept such a presence in the 
Trobriand islands, then to what extent did Malinowski find himself to be par-
ticipating in a Trobriand villager's life as that lifestyle was dying out? Did he 
describe only a corruption of that alternative, non-European lifestyle that he 
most wanted to describe? 
Answers to these questions might first be found in Malinowski's published 
work that describes his fieldwork methods, and by analysing the significance of 
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the diaries with reference to Malinowski's own understanding of the nature of 
human knowledge. In the next section, I return to the description of the field-
work method. 
Conclusions: participant observation in comparison with 
other methods of fieldwork 
Malinowski forged a unique method for the discipline of anthropology with 
the definition of participant observation. Participant observation does require 
that the fieldworker lives in the village, and participates in life in ways to fit in 
as nearly as possible to locale conventions. It is a method defined by doing 
things with people, and thereby coming to know what they think about what 
they are doing and why it should matter. It is telling that Malinowski would 
suggest that the fieldworker initiate his or her work with the most routine or 
mundane work of the place. He suggests that it is wise to begin with learning 
small crafts and skills, telling his readers, 'I began by learning to cook and to 
mend roofs, the first activity primarily undertaken by women and the second 
largely by men.' But, by the learning of basic skills the anthropologist builds 
up trust with the community. 
It remains the case that the fieldworker's time in the village is short, by com-
parison with the other residents who make their entire lives there. As researchers, 
anthropologists often have to remain focused on their work, and keep the 
single research question in view, rather than lapse into the work of the village 
itself. By staying focused on their intellectual enquiry, even while getting on 
with daily routines of living, they can solicit assistance from the members of 
the community in such a way as to be able to negotiate the provision of that 
help in an adult manner. Malinowski is consistent in this; he describes partici-
patory observation as a kind of science. 
Malinowski's experience refigured anthropological fieldwork for a genera-
tion of scientists working after the First World War. Participant observation is 
not the only transformation of fieldwork practice to have occurred after a war. 
I have not discussed how anthropologists dramatically changed the nature of 
their participation in fieldwork communities after the Second World War, and 
even more so after the Vietnam War. These transformations might compare 
intriguingly, even disturbingly, with Malinowski's own. For example, in the 
decades after the Vietnam War, some anthropologists sought to form intensely 
personal local relationships and insisted on becoming members of clans and 
using the appropriate kin terms as ways of addressing their informants. This 
was not an effort familiar to anthropologists of an early age, who did not seek 
to become kin with the villagers. There is nothing in Malinowski that suggests 
that the anthropologist should seek to be socialized into the community by 
becoming a relative with the inhabitants. He thinks that would be a false 
attempt to seek inculcation into village life, in the way that a child might be 
nurtured into social relationships. 
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In other cases of later years, fieldwork became an exercise of finding gate-
keepers, key informants, and expert witnesses, as ways of figuring out who can 
comment helpfully on the anthropologist's own project being carried out. This 
search for a few key informants whose words could substitute for the anthro-
pologist's own analysis came sometimes to typify the interpretive approach 
to fieldwork. The interpretive approach assumed that everyone analysed and 
made meaningful accounts of their experience. The anthropologist should 
simply work hard to find the few people able to give voice to the issues. Again, 
Malinowski's participant observation was not like interpretive ethnography. 
Rather than give them voice, he emphasized the unlikely possibility that the 
people of the community of research could reflect upon or analyse their own 
behaviours because this is the nature of human actions. For example, consider 
an analogy to the study of linguistics. If the speaker thinks about how lan-
guage works while he or she speaks the language, then it ties the tongue of the 
speaker into knots, even in the act of speaking. It is difficult for humans to be 
vocal about the underlying rules, or the principles of association by which 
humans live. Malinowski argues that it takes another person who is different 
from the community in which the research is done, to create a reasonable 
explanation for the events. 
The researcher planning his or her study to be an undertaking in participant 
observation will succeed in collecting insightful and sensitive evidence about 
the locale, the community and the individuals that comprise it. If an anthropolo-
gist of Malinowski's tradition (and today, many do exist because functionalist 
thought seems close to everyday common sense) dedicated him or herself to 
the job of exposing through systematic study the social institutions that teach 
the rules of life in that culture, the logic of people's association, or the 
unvoiced rules of behaviour that people observe in the course of their day's 
work, then they might be considering different options available to them as 
anthropological fieldworkers, and hence, as Malinowski had hoped, as research 
scientists. 
Summary of chapter 3 
Fieldwork in early anthropology aimed to create a descriptive account of the 
total social life of a society, often a small society. It was not an accidentally 
discovered activity, but a purposefully planned science of humanity drawing 
on insights into the methods of the natural sciences in which early ethnogra-
phers were trained. Malinowski worked to build a case from evidence so as to 
avoid subordinating the knowledge of other societies to a broader theory of 
evolution or world history. His functionalist approach argued that other soci-
eties were not fragments or artefacts of the past. Rather, other societies were 
'integrated wholes' in which each part or institution was defined by its useful-
ness to the rest in terms of natural and psychological needs. By contrast Boas 
argued that the integration of the different parts of a society depended upon 
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how people found them to be meaningfully shared, rather than useful to them, 
and hence societies were known as cultures (sometimes defined as linguistic 
groups). Critics of Malinowski's work - of its subjectivism by looking at his 
diaries without considering Malinowski's own ideas of the psychology of the 
fieldworker in research, of its debts to pragmatic philosophy by mistakenly 
associating it with other theorists, of its gender biases by criticizing its pre-
sumptions without creating the alternative account, of its ignorance of 
colonial power and history without considering the battle fought by Mali-
nowski to defeat false history - often do not consider Malinowski's research 
within the social and intellectual context of his academic life. One danger of 
criticizing his fieldwork injudiciously is that contemporary anthropologists will 
fail to exercise an adequate level of reflexive scrutiny of their own work such 
that they can make it possible for the fieldwork community to respond help-





People keep relationships by remembering their obligations to give to another; 
in giving gifts I remember that I have a relationship with you. Any attempt to 
understand the habit of giving and receiving focuses on the complementary 
processes involved in that work. On the one hand a person gives away wealth, 
and on the other hand, obligations are kept to others. When the renowned 
kula trader honours another kula partner who has given him armshells over 
the years, by returning a beautiful necklace to him, he keeps his relationship 
with that person by so honouring him and by enhancing the renown of both 
kula partners for their largesse. By habit, Kiriwinians of Malinowski's day gave 
away shell valuables in order to meet their obligations and keep their relation-
ships secure. 
Much of this seems straightforward, yet not. The exchange of gifts poses 
problems for anthropologists to understand. People use, feel and see some 
objects as if things were entities separate from human relationships. At the 
same time, to give is to do more than transact an object. How people give and 
receive is a matter of what kind of relationships they imagine they make and 
keep with each other; immediately immaterial or ideal concerns become a part 
of the issue. The habit of giving gifts complicates anthropological understand-
ings of the material world, by introducing the idea of the relationship as 
essential to material life. Once a person understands how to receive and how to 
give a gift, then the material world can never be simply distinct from his or her 
ideas about the relationships he or she keeps in that world. 
In this chapter, I discuss how people keep obligations by giving and receiv-
ing gifts. I discuss keeping obligations to reciprocate wealth as a distinct 
departure from those theories of political economy that emphasized the utility 
of wealth. The mistake of focusing on utility led social theorists to emphasize 
the centrality of the individual person in measuring the value of wealth for his 
or her singular interests, rather than the relationship of exchange. I follow 
Mauss, who wrote most thoughtfully about the obligation to give, receive, and 
to reciprocate. He discussed gifts as gift exchange. But Mauss is interested in 
the gift, as an exchange between people. The gift makes the ideal relationship a 
material fact because giving and receiving gifts creates and changes human 
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relationships. The gift also makes the relations of exchange substantial. 
Yet, with all of these insights, Mauss knew that the gift is more than just 
words, intentions and perspectives. By giving gifts people create concrete or 
substantial forms of their relationships. I describe the advantages of compari-
son across cultures, and discuss Godelier's thesis that Mauss's comparative 
approach 'almost' succeeds. Throughout, I emphasize the cornplementarities 
between ideas about relationships and material forms of those relationships. 
Mauss's gift 
It is hard to write of Mauss without writing of the spirits and ghosts that seem 
to inhabit his oeuvre of publications. The anthropologist Maurice Godelier, 
himself working in the shadow of Mauss, tells about the complex intellectual 
legacy of the gift. Fournier remains a great intellectual biographer. It is from 
him that we learn how Marcel Mauss worked in France in the late nineteenth 
century, but comes to greatest prominence in the 1920s, just after the First 
World War. Much of this lies in his efforts to publish the works of his col-
leagues. In the earliest years, the research group used L'Annee Sociologique, 
which they founded in 1898, to expose new ideas to a wider intellectual com-
munity, to advocate the widest implications of the work of the school. Mauss 
and Durkheim aimed to set more radical directions for socialism of the time 
(for a discussion of Durkheim's thoughts on socialism and an English language 
translation of Mauss's on Bolshevism, see Gane 1992). The contemporary 
appraisal of this period shows that the essay The Gift aimed to undermine the 
economic philosophy of Bourgeois, a contemporary of the two, but who had a 
popular following. Narotzky (personal communication) has argued that even 
in these years, Durkheim and Mauss held contemporary debates about social-
ist economics, and had developed a germ of an argument that the analysis of 
gift exchange could be used against the claim that utilitarian economic reason-
ing was natural to humans. The obligation to keep social relations was not so 
new, but the idea that objects had value locatable only in their utility was quite 
a recent notion. 
The First World War takes many of the members of the school away from 
research because so many of them enlisted in the military. It cost lives and 
research careers, first in the work left undone by those who died too young, 
and later in the work of those whose own studies were usurped by the effort to 
publish the unfinished writing. Perhaps it is because of this history that Mauss 
begins a statement of his intellectual life, meant for a review of his invitation to 
the College de France (James and Allen (1998)). In his intellectual self-portrait 
of 1930, which Bailey and Llobera translated into English in 1983, Mauss tells 
his readers that 
It is impossible to detach me from the work of a school. If there is 
any individuality here, it is immersed within voluntary anonymity. 
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Perhaps what characterizes my scientific career, perhaps even more 
today than formerly, is the sense of working as a member of a team, 
and the conviction that collaboration with others is a force that 
stands opposed both to isolation and to the pretentious quest for 
originality. 
(Mauss in James and Allen 1998: 29) 
A decade earlier, after the end of the war, Mauss received a gift, both auspi-
cious and burdensome. He 'inherits' from Durkheim the responsibility of 
guarding the future of L'Annee Sociologique, the research group established 
to interrogate the nature of social life in the years of the turn of the century. 
Mauss's good luck to assume the directorship of the famous research group 
hides the burden of that gift of social power. He faces the problem of recover-
ing the lost work of the members of the group who died in the war. The 
succeeding years of Mauss's work are given to establishing his dead colleagues' 
research. Some have wondered whether Mauss would have written more of his 
own thoughts down if he had not devoted his life to publishing the work to his 
dead colleagues. But I think it correct to say that Mauss's career grows by 
meeting his obligations to his peers. 
The circumstances in which Mauss worked help to sharpen an insight into 
the theory of exchange which he offered in his comparative study of The Gift 
(Mauss 1990 [1925]). Mauss worked tirelessly to keep the relations that sup-
ported the works of the early Annee Sociologique alive and to further the work 
begun by Durkheim in establishing a science of society. Mauss resolutely aimed 
to publish the works of his former colleagues. This immediate context, more 
than the ideological concerns of his time, gives greatest shape to contemporary 
understandings of how to approach the study of the exchange of goods. 
In recent years, some anthropologists have addressed the ideological con-
cerns of Mauss's day, in order to put his major research question into 
perspective. Western Europe reorganized its borders after the First World War, 
and it also entertained a new set of ideas about how to organize social life in a 
time when none of the old orders remained quite the same. The resettlement of 
people from the Russian Revolution ended the feudal rule of the Czars, and 
the subsequent movements of numerous people across Europe created the rea-
sons for an intense debate, in both public and academic places. Most famously, 
the Bolsheviks presented the argument for an international revolution that 
would unite workers to share in the commonwealth of property. These intellec-
tuals held high the ideals of communism as they fled during the rise of Stalin 
to leadership. They presented a threat to the new communist state in Russia 
because they believed that it did not realize their revolutionary ambition. Some 
believed the forcible union of all soviets compromised socialism's better ideal 
of achieving an egalitarian community. The same intellectuals advocated that 
the success of such a revolution could better come about elsewhere, in democ-
ratic states. Bolshevism, which had not yet proven itself successful in material 
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or social fact, presented a challenge to the success of the democratic state in 
the early twentieth century. Ideas about economy had almost tangible force, 
and to talk about exchange led people into all-consuming debates about the 
relative virtues of capitalist forms of property, such as the commodity, and 
forms of communal ownership. How people understood their uses of wealth 
remained a significant matter. Did they muddle along with a false knowledge 
about the social relationships they made and kept through exchanging 
and transacting goods? Were people confused in their everyday life? Anthro-
pologists and sociologists were committed to face-to-face research and to 
unearthing common assumptions about how social relations worked and 
should work. Better than ideologues, or philosophers who did not concern 
themselves with 'knowledge on the ground', anthropologists could contribute 
to this problem of understanding human knowledge by examining the con-
cepts that people used as they went about their daily work. 
It is interesting to ask what everyday social life might have been like for 
Mauss's peers in the 1920s and 1930s. From a different perspective, it is possi-
ble to capture the flavour of the life of the dishwasher in Paris of the years 
between the wars from the descriptive personal essays of the English Socialist, 
George Orwell. In Down and Out in Paris and London ( 1933), the reader learns 
that in times of economic duress a camaraderie still existed, or at least 
emerged, among the men who found temporary jobs in the restaurant and 
hospitality business of the city of Paris. Although the situation of the dish-
washer in the Parisian world of hospitality that traded in services for financial 
gain raises disturbing questions about the foundations (and cellar kitchen 
lifestyles) that support a pleasant world of style and taste, Orwell judged that 
condition better than that of the homeless, unemployed individuals in the city 
of London. Londoners who were without work also were without home and 
often without bed, constantly moved on from one place to the next in the 
course of a night. Orwell's experience raises the important question of why the 
London unemployed poor had few, if any, ways of making social connections. 
Orwell's experiment in research and reporting won him accolades from his 
London publishers, The Red Press, because he had exposed that the poor of 
London needed even a tissue of society, especially as there were no social insti-
tutions that existed to help people to find ways of helping each other. Claiming 
an insight into the corrosion of society by capitalist business, the London rad-
ical left of Orwell's days, in the early 1930s, tried to facilitate and make the 
missing links of social life among London's non-working poor. 
I think The Gift is a brave text in the best possible ways because it offers a 
third way of considering the nature of social life through people's use of mat-
erial goods. This observation is shared by many anthropologists who seek the 
means of establishing arguments against the dominance of the concept of 
'economic man' in the West. The basic observation about the nature of gifts is 
simple. Because they are received from others, gifts cannot be claimed as pri-
vate property, nor can they be claimed as communal wealth. In the opening 
62 
KEEPING RELATION SHIPS, MEE TI NG OBLIGATIONS 
pages of The Gijt, Mauss asks, 'Why do people feel obligated to reciprocate 
what they have been given?', recalling that having once received the gift, the 
claim on it is not absolute nor is it ended. His answer to that question comes 
over the remaining four short chapters by setting out a series of comparisons 
across both 'ancient' and 'primitive' society. To put it simply, people feel that 
the gift is a magical or spiritual aspect of human relations, an aspect that 
stands apart from other ways of keeping social associations. Looking back, 
Godelier sums up the problem: acknowledging this as a significant departure 
from longstanding debates suggests that an alternative to capitalist exchange 
exists. This alternative form of exchange does not immediately imply commu-
nal claims on property, as proponents of contemporary theories of exchange 
suggested. 
Anthropologists can understand the obligation to reciprocate, which Mauss 
notes around the world, by analysing gift relations as more than economic 
transactions. It is on this point that Mauss differs from both Malinowski and 
Boas: the gift is not simply an economic relationship as they had assumed in 
the collecting of their evidence about exchange. How to assess why people feel 
obligated to each other becomes an enormous question. This is the puzzle with 
which he begins. I will discuss next the way in which Mauss lays out his puzzle, 
and then I will look at how his work can be assessed for its ability to substanti-
ate an argument about society. 
The Gift remains a definition by example of Mauss's concept of the total 
social fact. In other assessments of his work, he has been criticized for the 
vague notion of the totality of society, and the total social fact (James and 
Allen 1998). Even Godelier (1999) does not pick out the significance of this 
idea to Mauss's theory as much as he could. The gift is a total social fact 
because it is pervasive across societies, but also because it concentrates atten-
tion on social relationships and because it constitutes those relations. It is 
better that the concept of the total social fact does not have a narrow defini-
tion. As a definition made by case or by example, the total social fact remains 
useful because it heuristically describes social life in ethnographic manner. The 
total social fact is profoundly a sociological, not a philosophical concept, and 
as a sociological concept it is best discussed in ethnographic examples. I will 
look at the debate over the significance of the 'mapula'. 
Mapula: a total social fact 
The case of mapula, a father's harvest gifts to his wife's brother made in the 
name of his children, remains something of a puzzle in all theories of gift 
exchange. Annette Weiner used this puzzle as the centrepiece of her argument 
in Inalienable Possessions. Her discussion draws heavily on Malinowski's 
ethnography and on what Mauss made of that ethnography in his essay, and 
clarifies the distinctions between them. She recalls Malinowski's presentation of 
the mapula gift as having two distinct usages; one is that it applies to the gift 
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reciprocated for the previous gift, what Malinowski called the repayment 
equivalent; a second is that mapula applies to the many smaller gifts made by a 
man to his wife and to his children for which there is no reciprocation, and so 
they are 'free gifts'. Mapula could be a Kiriwinian term by which Kiriwinans 
extend their understanding of what it means to keep social relations, but how 
to represent it as such remains something of a debate. 
Malinowski was of two minds about this. In Argonauts of the Western Pacific 
( 1922), his earliest discussions called the numerous small gifts of mapula a 'free 
gift' from fathers to their children. He pointed out that the mapula functioned 
as if it were a free gift that required no retribution, as when mapula completed 
a kula transaction, with the smaller countergift from the recipient of the major 
kula valuable returned to the first giver. Weiner recalls that the term 'free gift' 
could not be easily matched in the vocabulary of the region. Later, in Crime 
and Custom in Savage Society (1926), Malinowski withdraws his first claim and 
acknowledges his error in calling the gift free. He argues that the mapula gift 
reciprocates the generosity of the first giver of kula wealth, by acknowledging 
the custom of giving, but not the explicit value of the wealth. In this explana-
tion, Malinowski aims to show that the concept of mapula upholds customary 
law, as a reciprocal gift that honours and confirms the legal or normative force 
of the custom. 
Mauss uses the concept of mapula as evidence of something more than the 
institutions of either kula economy or Kirwinian law. Instead, he uses it as an 
example of the concept of the total social fact. Neither the first nor the second 
of Malinowski's explanations for 'mapula' answers the question that Mauss 
posed: just why do people feel obligated to give back what they receive? Jn con-
sidering mapula, Mauss acknowledges that Malinowski's research makes a 
major contribution to anthropological knowledge by exposing a transaction 
between people to be laden with the totality of what it means to be human. 
The mapula as both economic and political and even spiritual, combines most 
domains of human relationships into one. The gift of mapula can be taken as 
an instance of what Mauss saw to be foundational to society: that is, the gift 
exchange that created the social and is wholly imbued with it. 
The comparative approach: the Godelier thesis 
In his text, The Gift, Mauss describes the form and explains the meanings of 
exchange. He claims that the gift is a total social prestation, which means that 
giving a gift in ceremonial contexts is not just a part of society as Malinowski 
claimed, but comprises or embraces the whole of social life. Gift exchange 
does not present a theory of society that can be abstracted from the analysis of 
the social relationships in which gifts are transacted. There is some debate 
about whether Mauss intended the gift exchange as a total prestation to be the 
back bone of a theory of society, or whether he aimed to develop a compara-
tive method without elaborating philosophically on the nature of social life. 
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If Mauss did intend to develop a theory of society, then others have been 
left to carry out that work, principally Levi-Strauss and, somewhat differently, 
Godelier. Each provides a theory of society built on the gift, yet neither of 
their respective theories incorporates an argument about how to keep social 
relations that does not reach beyond the social to find an explanation, nor do 
they provide answers to the enigma of how to keep the obligation to give back 
what has been given. How people keep their obligations remained Mauss's 
guiding question throughout his work; and his phrasing of the question may 
have set later students down a difficult course. In the next chapter, I will discuss 
Levi-Strauss's theory of society as the alliances made by the exchange of sisters. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss how Godelier develops Mauss's 
question about why people feel obligated to give. Godelier leaves unanswered 
an outstanding question about how people manage relationships, but fasci-
nates readers with an adroit discussion of the spirit of the gift. Such an 
analysis of the keeping and releasing of relations can provide a theory of how 
a person can be social, and of sociality, without assuming that society can exist 
before individuals make it. 
Godelier develops three main case studies as he contemplates the question 
posed by Mauss about the dynamic of the exchange of gifts: how do people 
come to feel obligated to give back what they receive? His insights into each 
case are compared against the insights of the previous cases. He aims to 
answer a series of questions in order to show that Mauss's essay provides a 
chance to build a theory of how people live humanely within society. 
Godelier compares Mauss's treatment of the Maori 'hau', the Trobriand 
kula, and the Kwakiutl 'potlatch'. Certainly, there are uses of the ideas about 
gifts and votive offerings from the ancient period, of the Greek and Roman 
classics as well as from the Icelandic sagas, but Godelier claims that these do 
not truly advance Mauss's theory, so much as stand to show that Western civi-
lizations hold the texts, practices and beliefs about the gift as significant in 
their own history. However, this aspect of Mauss's work might be usefully 
developed towards understanding the legal aspects of gift exchange, as I will 
discuss in chapter 11. Godelier argues that Mauss begins to answer his prob-
lem by comparing the socially and culturally specific ways of exchange. Each 
case explains a different aspect of the problem: why do people give, why do 
they feel obligated, and why do they reciprocate? 
In the first case, Mauss shows that humans participate in a general practice 
of keeping obligations by giving each other gifts. He draws extensively on the 
ethnography of the Maori, the indigenous people of the south Pacific islands 
now known as New Zealand (or Aotearoa). Anthropologists often wrote about 
the Maori as an example of the Polynesian lifestyle, a way of organizing social 
and political life that spread in a wide region from New Zealand east and 
north across the Pacific defining what is known as the Polynesian cultural area. 
Mauss's choice of the example of the Maori hau compels us to think about the 
rest of the region. 
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The Maori conducted warfare in large seafaring canoes that made the dis-
tances between south Pacific islands disappear rapidly, as they seemingly raced 
through these waters. The Maori powerfully showed that they could command 
a region through a system of exchange practices, in which the deployments of 
power neither created states nor sustained political rivalries between disparate 
nations. The power of exchange, as practices in the spirit of the hau, was that 
it kept trade relations open to negotiation and renegotiation. Much of the 
work of the hau itself depended on persuasion and maintenance of good trad-
ing relationships with other Maori. 
The Maori did launch large seafaring expeditions, and often entered wars as 
a part of their trade routes. Trade was principled, depending upon the partici-
pants to respect and honour the values of the exchange. 
Maori traders helped to ensconce this way of trading, hau, in negotiations 
carried out in Maori debating houses. Maori chiefs might invite the members 
of other villages to discussions in their own Maori debating house, for the 
point of overwhelming them with its glory as well as to overwhelm them in 
debate. Among other things, they would consider the manifestations of hau in 
their lives. Of the Maori hau, Mauss wrote, in particular, material and immate-
rial aspects of human relationships entwine in the gift. Exchange partners of 
the hau took the spirit of the gift very seriously, just as they approached the 
exchange of goods. Mauss elaborates the mingling of material and spiritual 
dimensions of the hau in careful description. Following the Maori teaching on 
the hau, Mauss comes to better understand the exchange of gifts than by fol-
lowing his assumptions about European gift giving alone. 
In Mauss's hands, the comparative approach provides a long answer to a 
short and profound question. He begins with a puzzle, a meditation on the 
meaning of the Maori commentary on the hau. Put down in words, incorpo-
rated into Mauss's writing, the ideas of the Maori become legendary. In 
describing a social and cultural habit known as the hau, Mauss drafts a short 
commentary about how to give to each other and what it means to give to 
others. 
The 'hau' is not the wind that blows, not at all. Let us suppose that 
you possess a certain article [taonga] and that you give me this article. 
You give it me without setting a price on it. We strike no bargain 
about it. Now, 1 give this article to a third person who, after a certain 
lapse of time, decides to give me something as payment in return [utu]. 
He makes a present to me of something [taonga]. Now, this taonga 
that he give me is the spirit [hau] of the taonga that I had received 
from you and that I had given to him. The 'taonga' that I received 
from these 'taonga' (which came from you) must be returned to you. It 
would not be fair [tika] on my part to keep these 'taonga' for myself, 
whether they were desirable [rawe] or undesirable [kino]. I must give 
them to you because they are a 'hau' of the taonga that you gave me. 
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If I kept this other taonga for myself, serious harm might befall me, 
even death. This is the nature of the 'hau' of the taonga, the 'hau' of 
the forest. Kati ena. 
(Mauss 1990 (1925]: 27) 
Mauss uses the hau as a clear example of the ways in which the 'spirit' of the 
gift can move a person to use wealth to create a circle of exchange. The Maori 
informant explains to the ethnographer Elsdon Best how the ceremonial ex-
change of goods works. After several transactions, people give back the gift; 
the last person in the chain remembers the first person in the circle of 
exchange. This description leaves the ethnographer with enormous puzzles 
about what to make of the felt need to reciprocate wealth. The spirit of the 
gift, the hau, does not translate easily into European terms. The script used 
by Mauss comes from the Maori, as translated by Elsdon Best (1909) into 
English. This becomes something of a problem for anthropologists as the trans-
lation can easily obscure allusions that shift the meaning of the text. Sahlins 
and Godelier each tell us that this requires great care. Their respective assess-
ments of the hau differently position the implications of Mauss's essay. 
Sahlins provides the enduring account of the hau as the basic concept oper-
ating within non-capitalist exchange. Notably, the hau is an example of how 
that person uses wealth without being committed to communal ownership, or 
without observing conventions of private ownership. In commenting on the 
Maori hau, many later scholars consider an exciting departure for scholarship, 
a third way forward that honours an alternative way of focusing on the uses of 
material wealth in social life. This has always been the compelling aspect of its 
contribution to wider political and economic theory. Curiously, Sahlins dis-
cusses hau as if the spirit could bear the meanings of motivations and interests 
in exchange. If the spirit of the hau moves the person to give, Sahlins reasons 
that the person's motives and interests can be activated by the hau. 
Many have chosen to focus on the economic aspects of the gift, especially 
once Sahlins chose to locate the hau at the centre of the arguments about the 
nature of inequality in non-state society. For Sahlins, the possibility of describ-
ing inequality could emerge only if others took very seriously the claim that 
alternative forms of inequality exist. Did inequality lie in the substance of the 
person, or did it emerge in the forms that the relationships took over time? 
This effort to return argument first raised by Mauss to the concerns of politi-
cal economy can be praised; economic anthropologists moved to address 
political concepts. However, Sahlins presses too far the argument for revising 
economic anthropology into political and economic anthropology. He misses 
important aspects of the gift that Mauss's work addressed more clearly than 
Sahlins gives credit. 
Sahlins's greatest oversight in the retelling of the spirit of the gift must 
be the nuances of the legal aspects that Mauss so carefully reveals with his 
comparative study. Mauss's essay tells us that the hau remains significant to 
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Maori legal ideas, that is the ways in which legal ties extend beyond the person, 
obligating them to deal with the theft of an object beyond their own holdings. 
People can be moved to recover stolen wealth because they recognize it as a 
theft of an extension of their own possessions. The Maori point out that the 
thing received is not inactive because the hau follows after the thing, precipitat-
ing a response from the contemporary holder of the object. This feature of the 
hau compels more attention than Sahlins has given it. It makes a very different 
contribution to the concept of law and custom than had been comprehended 
by Malinowski who understood the custom of giving and receiving kula 
objects to be deeply tied to the elaboration of Trobriander legal codes. Cus-
tomary law for the Trobrianders contained the motives and inspirations of 
the person, holding them accountable to the greater good of the society so that 
it functioned smoothly and justly. Although many (especially Parry 1986) 
would describe a marriage of Malinowski's ideas with Mauss's as an unholy 
alliance, Sahlins creates a common ground in his insistence that the spirit of 
the gift could be one and the same with the interest or the investment that the 
exchange partners held in it. 
The meaning of mapula 
In the second case, that of the ceremonial kula trade, Mauss, like Malinowski, 
argues that Trobrianders feel obligated because they compete for prestige over 
and against other kula traders. But, unlike Malinowski, who had described the 
competitive exchanges of the kula as economic strategies for the elaboration of 
Trobrianders' prestige, Mauss sought a more general explanation. Mauss uses 
the Trobriand explanation for their behaviour specifically in the dynamics of 
the kula ring to address generally the problem of motive. He justifies his gener-
alizations because he believes kula cannot be a singularly economic practice. 
Instead, kula is meant to sustain ongoing relationships within the kula ring. 
Godelier argues that kula shows that exchange partners make peaceful society 
in the Trobriands first, by controlling social relations through the prestigious 
trade of goods. Later, the partners become prestigious through trading with 
others. It is an example of the general human concern with the continuity of 
social relations. 
The ethnographic observation by Annette Weiner is relevant here. She notes 
that some kula goods can be kept back, as if they were sacred and not meant 
to be displayed or traded with others, thereby risking the goods passing into 
the hands of other clans. She describes this practice as keeping while giving, in 
so far as the trader gives away wealth to traders from other clans, but keeps the 
most valuable for his own clan. In everyday exchange, rather than only in the 
kula ring, fathers habitually hold back wealth from others so that they can give 
to their children. Weiner (1992) focused on this habit of giving while keeping 
as the principal definitive activity of social life because it bridged both the kula 
exchange and the cross-clan funerary exchanges. The question arises: how do 
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some forms of wealth come to be known as more sacred or of greater spiritual 
value than others? 
The idea of 'keeping while giving' is more complicated that it initially appears. 
First, keeping while giving persists as a dilemma of the person who gives 
because it is a contradictory act in so far as it assumes that the giver must be 
duplicitous. Second, keeping while giving creates a problem for the recipient 
because he or she discovers that their relationship to the giver is not what they 
thought. The conditions of 'giving while keeping' assume two things of pri-
mary importance: first, the authenticity of the sacred object, and second, the 
motives of the parties to the exchange. These assumptions can mislead anthro-
pologists so I will describe them as Annette Weiner presents them in her 
ethnography of the Trobriands. 
I think the suggestion made by Annette Weiner drew attention to the ways 
in which a Trobriand individual thought about the gift and giving. Her assess-
ment that Trobrianders give, while keeping, became controversial throughout 
anthropological circles during the 1990s (see Mosko 2000). There is good 
reason for this. It is dangerously subversive of the common image of the gift as 
noble and generous, recalling the more pejorative slur that giving in order to 
'take back' can be dishonest. But, that criticism easily disappears with any 
attempt to fully understand the work of giving in Trobriand society when one 
considers the wider context of mapula exchanges. 
The whole picture of Trobriander life provides nuances of meaning to 
Mauss's understanding of the competitive kula ethos. Men perform kula 
because they have obligations to exchange partners, but also because they hope 
to find fame for their names with their wife's brothers and their wife's children. 
How children perceive their father's work matters a great deal to men. It influ-
ences a man's own renown in the village, but also has an effect on his afterlife. 
The gifts of fathers to children operate as a core ethos of exchange relations, 
an approach and ethics dedicated to the continuity of society in so far as a 
father's gifts express concern for the child, rather than self-interest in search of 
prestige as a powerful trading figure. Malinowski shows the reader that rnapula, 
the gifts made by fathers to their children, can be given without obligating the 
child and his clan to give back the gifts of the father. By giving to the child, by 
using mapula, the Trobriander father expressed openly the cultural ethos of 
charity, of the 'free gift' as both Mauss and Malinowski called it, and recalled 
the value of supporting social life. The mapula gift demonstrated the rule that 
it is fundamentally correct to give to others. Mauss sees the mapula as an 
aspect or instance of the spirit of the gift, an opportunity for a nurturing rela-
tionship between father and child. In kula, necklaces (soulava) and armshells 
(mwali) circulate in alternate directions, and even in this ceremonial exchange 
partners compete for the prestige of giving away a special necklace or armshell. 
It expresses the spirit of the gift; but it is also about power. 
If Weiner correctly assessed the nature of Trobriand exchange, then gifts from 
father to children emerged as rather significant to the social fabric. The mapula 
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gifts keep fast the relationships between the clans, during the lifetime of the 
father. By making a mapula gift, the men of one clan honour the children and 
women of the other clan that holds the children as its members. Men honour 
the clan of their own wives and children with mapula, making them matter. 
Weiner analyses the mapula gifts of a father to his child as a total social fact, 
which must continue as a key mechanism of social solidarity in the region. 
Weiner explains that the mapula, the small gifts given by fathers, do not 
seem to reciprocate any larger work. Instead, the mapula of father to child pre-
cedes the work of the children. The children will contribute to a ceremonial 
gift at the time of his funeral. Here, the mortuary feast recalls the reciprocation 
of the mapula gifts from the participants. Mapula can be made during the life-
time of one man with no recognition or reciprocation. At the death of the 
father, the child recognizes with a ceremonial presentation, an entire lifetime of 
nurture which the father bestowed upon him. Weiner understands this as a 
return of the gift, which belonged to the clan of the father in the first place. 
In some cases, the father gives small gifts to his son, in lieu of the specialist 
magic his child might actually want from him. On many occasions, the father 
substitutes small gifts for the more significant and powerful gift of magic and 
ritual knowledge. The elder man may choose to withhold the magic and ritual 
knowledge from the child because he is saving it to give to another son. This 
would be the case when the magic can be given to only one child, not all chil-
dren. An example of this comes to mind from my own field site where weather 
magic could not be shared among children, but could only be entrusted to the 
hands of one son. Elder men reasoned that only one son could use the knowl-
edge sensibly in each generation, and that not all children could be trusted to 
make wise and just decisions about its use. 
The ambiguity of the situation created a dilemma for the children who 
received the gifts of fathers. Each child accepted yet another small gift, and as 
he did, he assessed the situation in one of two ways. Either the gift pacified his 
desire for the more impo1iant bestowal of weather magic, which was yet to 
come, or the gift substituted for the grander bestowment of magic, which would 
be given to another child and never come to the hands of the youth who waited 
for it now. One might hypothesize a kind of double-bind scenario, whereby the 
father asserts his interests in his young within a matrilineal society with an 
innuendo of promise, but no actual promise is made to give a child the special-
ist knowledge that the son seeks and wants. 
Giving to keep, in this scenario, might look strange and unpleasant to an 
anthropological observer, but it is not if the researcher focuses on the relation-
ships made with the gift. Gifts can be understood as aspects of the 
relationships, rather than material objects that are possessed, or are not pos-
sessed. As such, they make relationships and inflect them with evidence of 
sentimental attachment or even foster sentimental relationships when the recip-
ient enthuses about the gift that his father has given. Instead of focusing on the 
ambiguities of possession, the anthropologist who focuses on the kinds, even 
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qualities, of the relationships made with mapula between fathers and children 
can find the connection itself significant. A father gives gifts to substantiate 
their relations, and by doing so demonstrates the social connections to his chil-
dren. He holds these commitments over his and his children's lifetimes. He 
thereby makes the relationships, a fact which is of greater importance than the 
possibility of securing a recompense for the gifts at the time of his death. 
Power and potlatch competitions 
Godelier makes a further comparison between kula and hau that Mauss does 
not. He seeks to understand the power that resides in social relationships of 
exchange partners. He does this first with reference to the kula. The kula trade, 
as an elite trade, also aims to establish the renown of men. Most importantly, 
Mauss understands the kula trade as a smaller form of potlatch because par-
ticipants compete with each other. Men reciprocate because they advance their 
fame, and in competitive gift giving show they have the power to pull kula 
goods into their sphere of influence long enough for them to pass them on in 
magnanimous gifts. 
In order to explain the significance of the spirit of the gift, Godelier takes 
issue with Sahlins's misrepresentation of the hau. The hau can be better under-
stood with reference to the bush spirits that men honoured with sacrifices at 
the time of the hunt. He shows that Sahlins correctly reinterpreted the Maori 
text to expose the ritual's wider context in the spiritual life of the Maori. But 
Godelier takes issue with Sahlins's final analysis of the hau as an exchange for 
profit in multiple social relationships. At the core of Sahlins's ideas about the 
hau, it is possible to find that he conceptualizes kula traders as if they were 
profit-maximizing individuals. Godelier then proceeds to show the end results 
of that process. Here Godelier spells out the fascination with power that 
resides in the work of the hau, but that Mauss elided from his account. 
After pointing out the slippage of Mauss's attention away from the gift 
and on to matters of the power of the spirit of reciprocity, Godelier addresses 
the potlatch in detail. I will describe the potlatch ceremonies first. The occa-
sion for a potlatch might be a commemorative funeral of a senior clansman of 
a major chief The senior clansman might be commemorated for his name and 
spirit, having died years earlier; the potlatch is not simply the funeral of his 
death. Taking into deep consideration the wishes and urging of the spirits of 
the dead ancestors (who speak to him collectively in his dreams), a chief of a 
large matrilineal clan will host a potlatch ceremony with the help of his entire 
clan. The clan organizes enough food for all guests, and comes with additional 
gifts to give to those who visit. If they have them, then members of the clan 
will bring forward their best pieces of sculpture and carvings, so that these art-
works may be displayed with those of the chief. Often these are made of 
copper, beaten into images of the different animal totems that the clans recog-
nize to influence them, perhaps the eagle or the bear. This display is followed 
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by an extraordinary ritual act, in which the sculpture is destroyed. Typically, 
the sculptures are thrown into the waves of the Pacific Ocean, waves that lap 
the shores of the north-west coast of North America where high mountains 
reach down to the sea. 
The potlatch ceremonies hold peculiar importance in the history of anthro-
pological theory. These ceremonial feasts on the north-west coast of North 
America commemorated the dead and established the power of the host, usu-
ally the senior chief of a matrilineal clan. At them, enormous amounts of the 
host's wealth were displayed for redistribution, but most of the wealth was 
destroyed. The early ethnographer of these events, Franz Boas, believed that 
the making of the feasts epitomized the activity of the human competitive 
spirit. His landmark ethnography discussion of the feast of the Kwakiutl, a 
language group of the region, describes the competition between chiefs to 
overwhelm each other with displays of generosity (Boas 1897, 1966). 
At a potlatch the chief gave away ceremonial blankets, money, furs, food and 
copper sculptures. As legend had it (no doubt some of this was interlaced with 
the fears of the time) the event included the disposal of slaves to the control of 
others, and sometimes human sacrifice. Although the verity of the legendary 
suggestions of sacrifice does not hold up to scrutiny by historical evidence, at 
the least, the folklore contributed to a general sense of terror about the event. Is 
the contemplation of death the end result of the day in which a chief staged a 
display of his power by conspicuously giving away wealth? The events stirred 
the imagination of many people; even D.C. Scott, the head of the Department 
of Indian Affairs in Canada, wrote poetry about the disturbing events. Boas's 
student Ruth Benedict wrote more ironically of the comparison of the power 
displayed in cannibal feasting and in nationalist propaganda in Germany. 
Later, Eric Wolf (1999) returns to Ruth Benedict's interests in power, but he 
does so differently. Instead of exploring its psychodynamics, he pursues the 
relations of power under the colonial circumstances created by the Canadian 
government, whose officers in British Columbia worked to contain and 
restrict the excesses of the potlatch ceremonies. The earliest descriptions of 
potlatch recorded by Boas and his assistant George Hunt were made at the 
time of the colonial administration of the territory (then province) of British 
Columbia (1895). The Kwakiutl presentation of potlatch ceremonies terrified 
early settlers and administrators of the region. They could not comprehend 
the displays of power in the feasts, and some complained about the cere-
monies as pathologies. Boas considered the possibility that potlatch emerged 
as a failure of society, as evidence of a Kwakiutl world out of control. The 
feasts disturbed local white residents so much that they banned the potlatch 
in 1908. 
In the potlatch, Godelier finds the fuller discussion of power that Mauss's 
account lacks. Most often, competitions between Kwakiutl chiefs made 
reciprocity almost impossible. Chiefs often kept back the most sacred copper 
relics and circulated false ones in their place. A sacred one is given to the gods. 
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Godelier argues that a comparison between Kwakiutl potlatch, Maori hau and 
Trobriand kula can significantly advance Mauss's theory of society. Godelier 
hopes to contribute a discussion of power to Mauss's work. He accomplishes 
this fascinating but difficult argument by thinking much more carefully about 
the wealth of potlatch. He argues that these gifts to the gods, which is what 
Kwakiutl chiefs claimed they were making, were more than sacrifices that 
established the community's common humanity, and their dependence upon 
and close connection to the ideal spirit world. Going beyond the analysis that 
Mauss's colleague Hertz might have given, Godelier argues that the key to the 
potlatch lies in the fact that the copper sculptures destroyed were copies of 
sacred objects that remained with the chief's clan. In the potlatch there always 
remained a degree of uncertainty about whether the wealth lost was sacred 
wealth or copies of sacred wealth. At the heart of the potlatch persisted the 
possibility of keeping while giving. 
Godelier argues that Mauss never solved his problem, largely because he 
lacked an important insight into the nature of exchanges. That insight could 
be better drawn from Weiner's assessment that some things could be kept at 
the same time as they were given. She calls this keeping while giving. Godelier 
abstracts an insight from Weiner's work. He takes this to mean that humans 
held the coppers to be sacred, which for him is a communal or social trust in 
things which expands the self beyond the economic, as Mauss once insisted. 
It is our western societies who have recently made man an 'economic 
animal'. But we are not yet all creatures of this genus. Among the 
masses and the elites in our society purely irrational expenditure is 
commonly practised. It is still characteristic of a few of the fossilized 
remnants of our aristocracy. Homo oeconomicus is not behind us, but 
lies ahead, as does the man of morality and duty, the man of science 
and reason. For a very long time man was something different, and he 
has not been a machine for very long, made complicated by a calcu-
lating machine. 
(Mauss 1990 [1925] 76) 
Conclusions: gifts to gods and gifts to humans 
As I have outlined in this chapter, the account of social life given from the per-
spective of human motivations quickly degenerates into fantasy about the 
contents of the mind. This kind of analysis is to be avoided. In parallel, 
another failure would be to begin with the analysis of the individual person. 
This assumes the separation of the person from the world of material objects 
and from other people. This approach also falters on a number of difficulties 
in ascertaining the possibility of understanding that world wholly. 
Does the gift to humans differ from the gifts to gods? If I ask that with the 
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ghost of Mauss looking over my shoulder, then is the gift to gods the same as 
the gifts to humans? What is the spirit of the gift, this immaterial aspect of 
human social relationships, which Mauss grasped so willingly from the Maori 
explanation of the Taonga? The problem so far has different answers: Sahlins 
thinks it is 'Bush spirits', Weiner names it the father's generosity, and Godelier 
finds it to be 'the greatness of the human spirit'. These are replies to the ques-
tion: what inspirits the gift as an object? 
What if the question of the spirit of the gift lies in the human relationships 
rather than in the object? How would the question of the spirit of the gift then 
appear? The comparison of different forms of gift giving across cultures shows 
that the gift can be differently inspirited in each cultural context. This is nei-
ther straightforward as an anthropological analysis nor is it a worthy account 
of the workings of culture. It is better to distinguish between cultural processes 
of inspiriting of the gift as a sacred object in a specific cultural context, and 
enlivening human relationships to their ethical concerns within a given situa-
tion. The first is a religious act, the second the act of secular humanists. These 
are different aspects of the gift's animation, and creating categories of objects 
that are more or less spiritual does not illuminate the puzzle of different forms 
of power. It helps to separate spiritual and secular humanist answers to how 
the gift is enacted in social relationships, in order to think about the different 
implications of giving and receiving across cultures. 
Strathern (1994) offers a secularist approach, somewhat different from Gode-
lier's re-orienting towards the sacred in Mauss's comparative study. Strathern 
focuses on 'the relation', rather than the object, as the central unit of analysis 
in the exchange of gift. I think that Strathern's suggestion that anthropology 
should proceed with keener attention to the relation, rather than the person or 
the thing, keeps clearly in view Mauss's question of why people feel the obliga-
tion to reciprocate the gift. She insists that people, being fundamentally social 
(rather than primarily psychological) individuals, are moved to keep relations 
(rather than things). I take Strathern to be advancing Mauss's basic anthropo-
logical project of ascertaining the total social fact and analysing it across 
societies. 
Strathern (1988) can show that it is possible to work closely to the compara-
tive project Mauss first set out, but only if the academic researcher abandons 
the idea that the analysis of society must begin with any separation between 
person and things. Strathern grasped Mauss's key observation about gift 
exchange as a total social fact. People cannot be understood as isolates; they 
live entangled in each other's lives. Their work cannot be separated from that 
of others, in the same way as an analysis of individual things or persons 
cannot grasp the totality of social experience. Anthropologists cannot focus on 
the person alone in the effort to understand the totality of the person's experi-
ence. Similarly, they cannot understand mapula from the perspective of the 
individual and their motives. Instead, a full account of social life should focus 
on 'the relations' in which persons make their lives. 
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Summary of chapter 4 
The question moving the essay The Gift is: why should people feel obligated to 
reciprocate what they have received? Mauss was enmeshed in the obligations of 
career as an academic and kept his duty to give his energy to the publication of 
others' work. Although he does not explain motives to reciprocate, people keep 
their obligations by giving things away. The gift cannot be understood as a util-
itarian exchange of goods, rather it encompasses the total human experience. 
A case in point is dispute over the meaning of mapula, which Mauss reinter-
prets from Malinowksi's ethnography to be an example of reciprocal exchange 
between social groups, rather than a free gift from father to child. If mapula is 
not taken to be simply the transaction of an object, a thing, it can be under-
stood better as the establishment and confirmation of a relationship through 
exchange of wealth. This compares similarly with the Maori hau, which is gift 
giving motivated by spiritual interests animating the gift (distinct from other 
forms of wealth); and it contrasts with competitive potlatch ceremonies in 
which giving away wealth makes the hosts of the ceremony prestigious. Gode-
lier's thoughtful reworking of Mauss's thesis finds that some objects (withheld 
from circulation and destruction) hold a spiritual value and come to stand for 
the greater communal humanity. One might ask to what extent the spiritual is 
a version of the economic. Instead, when understood as a total social fact, gift 
giving concentrates many aspects of human relationships, but does not under-





After the Second World War, new maps and alliances were drawn across 
Europe and around the world. The period of war had ended, but a period 
of reconfiguration of new trade and political associations continued. The era 
heralded a new time of respect for social and cultural differences, but new 
problems too. In anthropology a new theory emerged that supported the com-
mitment to the commensurability of differences that would be necessary to 
modern times. The new theory, the structuralist theory of human variation, 
aimed to explain social variation without falling into habits of relying on evo-
lutionary differences and drawing on old paradigms of race. 
Structuralist theories of social difference make a major contribution to 
understanding the world in the era of a new modernity. Structuralism can 
account for both traditional and modern life, by explaining that these appar-
ently different ways of living in the world are deeply connected. The period 
after the First World War and after the revolution in Russia, the decades of the 
1920s and 1930s, ushered in a social revolution in which many people chose to 
depart from the old conventions of everyday life. At this time, many observers 
of social change remarked on the loss of traditional lifestyles. In Europe the 
industrial revolution had modernized agriculture as it had also in North and 
South America. In the new Soviet Union, and also in China, the creation of 
communal farming cooperatives ended the lifestyle of the peasant. Natural 
and social sciences aided the modernization of the village lifestyle. Following 
upon the popular inclination to think of the world as a transformed place, 
scholars began to mark the passing of traditional lifestyles of tribes, clans and 
villagers. A new doubt grew among anthropologists. Along with the sense that 
although a modern world emerged through the applications of scientific knowl-
edge about its operations, some people felt that another was on the wane. 
The years immediately after the Second World War may sound too much 
like today, when we have the restructuring of social life after the end of the 
Cold War and demands on people to adopt new ways of exposing information 
about their social relationships in the wake of a new war on political terrorism. 
Some of the older lessons might be carried forward to the contemporary situa-
tion, at least so that they can be examined for their value in answering to the 
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current dilemmas about how to deal with social differences across the globe. 
Structuralist theories of difference assumed that behind the social forms of 
modern life - the institutions, organizations, arts and family associations -
most societies operated similarly to the societies of the rest of the world. Struc-
turalist analysis reached behind the mask of modern times, and behind the 
masks, rituals and myths of non-modern societies, to describe a common 
knowledge of how to live. Structuralists took surface meanings to be manifest 
evidence of deeper significance. 
The contemporary anthropologist asks somewhat different questions 
because the world no longer divides so neatly into modern and non-modern, 
but he or she holds many of the same assumptions inherent to structuralism of 
the era immediately after the Second World War. It is commonly thought that 
the possibility of symbolic thought as written expression of literacy in Papua 
New Guinea, in Africa, or elsewhere does not change the basic concern with 
human communication across difference. Despite the best arguments by struc-
turalists that the capacity to think about the world symbolically might be 
shared universally, some anthropologists such as Auge (1995) and cultural the-
orists such as Clifford (1988) argue that the new contemporary world differs 
significantly from the older contemporary world. Now the anthropologists 
meet with the informants who might dissent in print or agree in collegial acad-
emic seminars. Is that a difference that matters? What is yet to be seen is just 
what will come of the network of collaboration between people who might 
not have shared professional insights two generations ago. People meet and 
work together who are as disparate in their interests and persons as Melane-
sian anti-colonialists, Fijian anthropologists, the university professor and her 
students. Their means for that conversation requires a new understanding of 
what remains reasonable about people's interchanges and exchanges. At the 
very least, what contemporary anthropologists share with the questions of the 
structuralist anthropologists in the past is an attempt to understand what can 
be a reasonable way to live. 
The subject of gift exchange in the structuralist theory of social difference 
assumes that it is one form of human communication, albeit non-verbal. It 
concurs with some of the fullest elaborations of structuralist theory which 
ascertain that communication is basic to social relationships. This would seem 
a reasonable claim, for is it not really the case that there can be no relationship 
between people who have said and can say nothing to each other? This might 
not obviously extend to people who are unknown to each other, but it does. 
Structuralist anthropologists argue that communication is the grounds of all 
social life, even if people imagine the possibility of communicating with an 
unknown person or group of people to be a problem rather than a pleasure. 
The possibility of communicating with strangers - with people whom you 
never imagined existed - arises because human beings have the capacity to 
think symbolically, that is to represent their experience to each other. In the 
1930s groups of adventurers went to the steep hills of the Highlands of New 
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Guinea with hopes of finding gold. Even in the early twentieth century, it 
was uncharted land on the maps of Australian, European or North American 
atlases. The explorers found people, numbered in thousands, in valleys they 
thought were empty of human life. Some of these encounters were recorded 
on film. A particularly fortuitous decision of the Leahy brothers to carry film 
to the central Highlands on their first expedition into the mountains produced 
the footage that made up the film First Contact which the Australian film 
makers Connelly and Anderson compiled with more commentary from the 
late twentieth century. The Leahy brothers surmised that the responses from 
the Melpa people they filmed showed that they were confounded as to whether 
white Australian men were ghosts or living humans. Is this fantasy of commu-
nion with non-humans possible? Later in the 1960s the anthropologist Roy 
Wagner made a record of his conversations with Highland New Guineans 
thirty years after another early encounter in the mountains at the northern 
boundaries of what would become Gulf province (then district), a different 
part of the Highlands of Papua New Guinea. Wagner met one of the Daribi, a 
group of New Guineans who remembered the shock on the faces of the Aus-
tralians when they first came over the high mountains and realized that the 
unknown valley was filled with people making a livelihood in its fields and 
trading luxury goods in its villages. It is hard not to smile as Wagner reports 
the story of his Daribi friend - who concluded its telling by saying that he 
should have seen the look on those Australians' faces when they realized the 
valley was full of human beings! But the force of the explorer's, and the 
anthropologist's, assumptions that it must be possible to communicate with 
these men and women soon made them forget the shock. It is recorded best in 
the memory of the New Guineans who witnessed it in the faces of their 'dis-
coverers', and not in the anthropological record describing the lives of the 
valley residents. The ability to think symbolically is taken to be a primary fea-
ture of social life because symbolic thought makes social life possible by 
making communication possible. Symbolic thought depends upon the ability 
of the human mind to make distinctions, to separate light from dark, male 
from female, wet from dry, or nature from culture. The point being that knowl-
edge of one entity is constituted in relation to its opposite; and in so doing the 
two constitute the terms of their association. The structuralist theory of soci-
ety shares with linguistic anthropology this same perspective on the capacity of 
thought to make oppositions as a means to know about the world. Much 
structuralist work ends in the study of myth, neither as misunderstood science 
nor as primitive unsophisticated philosophy. Instead, the anthropologist makes 
unequivocal judgements about the relations of myth and as a mature elabora-
tion of human thought. 
This chapter examines the structuralist theory of social difference by dis-
cussing the various critiques of Levi-Strauss's theory that focused principally 
on women, not as a biological substantive entity, but as the locus of social 
relationships and as a signifier of the interrelated ways people act with each 
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other. Some of the earliest endorsements of structuralism understood its asso-
ciations both with the linguistic theories of Saussure and with the theory that 
kinship forms alliances between groups. Many have criticized structuralism for 
giving too much attention to human thought processes over and above the 
substance of human relationships, as if these could be separate things. Instead, 
it would be preferable to unite the theory of kinship with the theory of myth 
and knowledge. In turn, I examine the substantive aspects of the theory of 
knowledge to address the matter of feminist ideology, a body of thought which 
the structuralist theory of difference engaged enigmatically. By focusing on the 
exchange of persons, particularly women, I will show that structuralism could 
not encompass theoretically the political and social project of analysing gender 
relations. 
Reason and society 
Understanding the inequalities of either substance or form in society begins 
with an early essay that speculates on the social and intellectual habit of classi-
fication. The earlier essay, Primitive Classification by Durkheim and Mauss 
(1963 [1903]), established many of the same issues as those of the structuralist 
theory of society. In that account, Durkheim and Mauss assess the character 
of social organizations. They seek evidence of the character of human knowl-
edge and its extensions in the organizations of social life. They consider 
whether the patterns of residence, arrangements of marriage (both its inclu-
sions and exclusions) and plan of social organization can be considered social 
expressions of human knowledge, and if so how they come to be different in 
different places. I think that Needham's introduction fails the bigger project 
that Durkheim and Mauss introduced because he proclaims the evolutionary 
argument as a dominant feature of their argument, when it is not. While 
Durkheim and Mauss make some claims for the evolution of human thought 
and human social organization, they also cast doubts on the general claims 
that societies evolve. Their deeper contemplations betray their argument. It is a 
study in hesitation and reconsiderations about the links between human 
knowledge and human social organization. One begins to wonder if a later 
editing introduced some revisions that exposed the doubts of Mauss about the 
evolutionary claims he first argued with Durkheim. In Primitive Classification 
it is possible to consider how people plan the world and live in accordance 
with a design of social life that nearly eludes them. They might certainly begin 
with how they classify the social world, the world of relatives as moieties, as 
clans, as kin. 
Sometimes society can be 'seen' in the formation and interaction of distinct 
social groups, such as the moiety or the clan which works together in cere-
monies. In the film Ongka's Big Moka, the Melpa people of the New Guinea 
Highlands stand ready to exchange the pigs they have prepared (Figure 5.1 ). 
The clans stand ready, each about to enjoin the other in the exchange of pigs. 
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Figure 5.1 The ceremonial exchange of pigs brings the clans together in one place and 
thereby establishes the great prestige of the host. Charlie Nairn took this still 
photograph in the mid-1970s at the time of the filming of Ongka's Big 
Moka (Granada TV, 1976), first reprinted in Disappearing World: Television 
and Anthropology, edited by Andre Singer and Leslie Woodhead (1988), 
Manchester: Granada TV and Boxtree. 
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A viewer can see how the social organization appears by reason of the work of 
ceremonial exchange, just as Durkheim and Mauss had discussed adroitly for 
the general cases of Aboriginal Australian society. 
Structuralists later would grasp at this underlying design of society and call it 
structure, eliding more superficial classification of the natural and social world as 
indigenous accounts. Godelier (1986) remarks on how structuralists gave their 
attention to the underlying knowledge rather than that local account. He pro-
posed that the structuralist theory of society, especially as elaborated by Levi-
Strauss in Elementary Structures of Kinship, depends on an intriguing innovation 
upon Mauss's theory of why people feel obligated to reciprocate what they 
receive. As I discussed in the previous chapter, Mauss answered his questions 
about the feeling of obligation to reciprocate the gift by illuminating the effects 
of the spirit of the person. According to the Maori interpretation, which Mauss 
accepted, the spirit animated the gift. A structuralist theory of society addressed 
the important observation that the gift could be a person, and took up a general 
question. What difference does the gift of a woman make to an understanding of 
social relations? I argue that these are not simply questions about kinship. They 
are questions about what people claim to know about what they do. 
Asking these questions leads to a reconsideration of human knowledge 
about social life and the grounds of that knowledge. But this is not a new con-
cern. Turning to Mauss helps a contemporary anthropologist to think more 
clearly about the definition of human subjectivity, with reference to the deep 
structures that delimit it. Mauss's work poses the possibility that the exchange 
of objects works as a system of communication by enchaining one person to 
another through processes that signified their spiritual or immaterial relation-
ships with material goods, given as gifts. The gift of an object signified the 
relationship. How does it make a difference then that the gift of a woman 
across clans would come to signify a relationship? How kinship could work as 
communicative system perhaps fascinated Levi-Strauss from his earliest 
research, which he published in 1949 as Elementary Structures of Kinship. 
In thinking about the question, what difference the gender of the gift makes 
to a theory of social relations, I have followed two different critiques of the 
structuralist theory of society. In making these critiques I have taken direction 
from the anthropologist Schneider (1970), who conjoined Levi-Strauss's work 
on kinship with his study of myth, rather than dividing it into separate topics. 
Schneider argues that kinship itself can be a system of knowledge, very much 
like a myth corpus. Reflections upon the social habit of naming or recognizing 
those people you know can be the most interesting starting point for research 
into kin and relations. In this way, kinship can be understood as a kind of 
communicative practice, laying out a network of meaningful association. My 
second guide in this is Strathern. Her feminist analysis of the exchange of 
women shows that women's subjectivity is more than a position within a social 
structure. Rather than describe structuralism directly, this chapter will analyse 
some of the theory's assumptions by drawing on these two critical perspectives. 
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What difference does the gift of a person make? 
Structuralist anthropology is introduced with Elementary Structures of Kinship 
(Levi-Strauss 1963 [1949]). In this text, cross-cultural examples of kinship are 
analysed in terms of the kinds of alliances that people make between clans and 
villages. In the example of the Amazon, Levi-Strauss shows that villages in 
conflict with each other can resolve their differences and agree to make a 
peaceful future. The agreement is confirmed with the exchange of women, 
demonstrating the alliance between the villages. The alliance is possible 
because the principle of reciprocity is understood implicitly. That is, the struc-
ture of social life flows from the acknowledgement that social relationships 
simply require the return of the gift of a woman, by the group who received it, 
underlying any kind of negotiation of how or why that might be right. 
Let me return to the New Guinea Highlands to illustrate this point a bit 
better. In viewing the film Ongka's Big Maka, students often find themselves a 
bit disturbed by the equation of women with pigs, in the exchange of bride 
wealth (Figure 5.2). While they quickly readjust their judgements so that they 
accept the custom as a significant and respectful ritual in the region, they 
sometimes ask how a woman might be given to one clan, while many pigs are 
returned. The mistake would be to think that a woman comes to be substituted 
with a pig, as if the pig was a form of currency for her purchase when it is not. 
The better way to grasp the ceremonial exchange of women, pigs and pearl 
shells in bride wealth exchange is to think of it as a form of communication. 
Women become a central point of concern in understanding kinship as a 
system of communication. The gift of a woman suggests many things to those 
who receive her and to those who offer her. Notably, the first arguments about 
this exchange begin with the observations that some men give a sister, while 
another man receives a wife. It is important to understand that the alliance 
made by marriage does not limit itself to the couple alone, but extends to the 
parties involved more broadly in the marriage. Most commonly the marriage 
creates relationships between the kin of the bride and of the husband, elabor-
ating more ties between the extended families that are now connected by the 
new marriage. In societies where the clan organizes everyday political life, such 
as in the Amazon or in Papua New Guinea (as is the case even at the time 
when I am writing this), the marriage creates relationships between clans. What 
does it mean to give a sister and receive a wife? What transpires between 
humans that shapes their understanding of the transaction? 
Levi-Strauss refers to this basic transaction of the gift of a sister as the prin-
ciple of reciprocity. He insists that, because the woman leaves as a sister and 
arrives as a wife, the exchange opens longer negotiations over the relationships 
between the two groups of men, who are now relatives by marriage. In sub-
sequent comings and goings, ceremonial exchanges, and political alliances 
between them, the men elaborate the 'pathways' of communication between 
them as kin. As to why a sister is given in marriage, he explains that people 
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Figure 5.2 A mature woman will raise and tend pigs that are used as a form of bride 
wealth to be given by her clansmen at marriage to the clansmen of a woman 
from another clan. Still photograph by Charlie Nairn, first reprinted in Dis-
appearing World: Television and Anthropology, edited by Andre Singer and 
Leslie Woodhead (1988), Manchester: Granada TV and Boxtree. 
universally honour the rule of exogamy and the prohibition of incest, even 
where those rules might be practised at superficially different degrees of rela-
tionship. The point is that it is the rule that marriage must be made outside 
the intimacy of the natal family, and it is the rule that offspring of sibling or 
filial relations violate social sensibilities in all societies because they give evi-
dence to the fact of an incestuous relationship. The reasons for the rule against 
incest can be various, and should generally be understood as the concerns of 
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any specific society; however, structuralists argue that the principle of exogamy 
is a human universal that can inform a general theory of how society is orga-
nized, works, and differs from other societies. 
How does the gift of a sister become significant in making society? Some 
would argue that asking about the significance of the gift did not concern the 
structuralists. Struturalists were interested in how the gift of a sister would be 
received and used. The gift of a woman is certainly negotiated, representing at 
once the fastening of agreements between men and the opening of new negoti-
ations between them. This becomes even more apparent after the woman gives 
birth to children and becomes a mother, as well as wife. When a woman and 
man bear children in the marriage, those negotiations take on new importance. 
The arrival of children shows that the woman possesses the ability to nurture 
the children, as well as to grow the clan to whom the children belong. Some-
times a series of subsequent gifts are made to assure the clansmen of the 
husband and of the wife that they recognize the children as relatives. Once 
again, gifts can be used to recognize the relationships among the clans, and the 
new relative of the mother's and father's clans. 
There are important differences to be understood from the gift of a sister, 
especially as the practice of marriage exists so differently in different societies. 
In many cases, when a woman marries, it is common practice for those who 
receive the woman to offer another gift in return. One possibility is to offer a 
sister in return. In some places this might be called a preferential habit of send-
ing a woman to 'marry back' into the clan of those who gave a woman. This 
habit might reflect the principle of reciprocity as 'restricted exchange'. This 
means that the gift of a woman can be remembered by many people, and will 
be honoured or reciprocated within living memory by creating another mar-
riage between the same clans. 
Another possibility is to offer bride wealth to the kin of a woman, out of 
respect for the gift that they have made of her as their sister. This wealth repre-
sents or signifies the marriage, and its dispersal among her male relatives 
makes the marriage secure, and perhaps very difficult to break. This unre-
stricted exchange makes the various uses of ceremonial wealth more complex. 
When men use bride wealth to supplant the gift of another woman in mar-
riage, back into the first clan who gave their sister to them, the significance of 
the gifts varies much more widely than in the case of restricted exchange. 
Whereas, in restricted exchange, men give women as sisters and receive wives in 
return, in unrestricted exchange, men give women as sisters and receive cere-
monial wealth in return. The uses, the significance of the ceremonial gifts, 
open negotiations between the men even wider than in the former case. The 
social values that inhere in gift giving in the latter example might be more 
negotiable and variable and possibly open ways for more exploitation between 
men. Transactions at marriage open the possibility, if not the necessity, of dis-
cussion and negotiation. In the smallest sense, the exchange of women in 
marriage can be understood as a communicative act, and a transaction that 
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makes social relationships into a matter of concern over which people a person 
might recognize as relatives. In the biggest sense, the exchange of women can 
be understood as a form of communication because a woman is a slippery sig-
nifier, both of the natural and of the social life. Jn receiving a woman as wife, a 
man and his kin understand that they have new political associations, as well 
as the ability to add children to their own daily lives, with the offspring of the 
marnage. 
What does a person give to another when making the gift of a sister to 
become a wife? Some scholars argued that women possessed capacities both to 
work for the domestic household and to bear children. These capabilities were 
exchanges with the women themselves, as if they were aspects of their person 
as much as skills they could use. Many scholars addressed women's work as a 
capacity of their persons that can be measured and valued for its potential to 
produce wealth in the forms of food, children and material goods. In feminist 
analyses of these, women's work was understood as if it were an object that 
could also be valued in material terms, or given a price. Those feminists criti-
cizing the concept of women's work as a resource traded between men argued 
that the attribution of the material value to women's work could never succeed 
in freeing them from the drudgery of homemaking. In this condition, women 
found out that men exploited women's work for its products of children, food 
and wealth. 
In Elementary Structures of Kinship (1949) Levi-Strauss describes woman as 
the supreme gift. Later feminist theorists find the comment inspiring, but in 
different ways than Levi-Strauss meant it to be. In analysing matrimonial 
exchanges, the efforts to identify the gift of a woman as the supreme gift led to 
the development of a general theory of society. Feminist critics took issue with 
Levi-Strauss's statement in order to clarify the ways in which women were 
objects in ceremonial exchange. Further, this also opened a discussion of the 
subjectivity of those women, and the extent to which the exchange of a person 
compromised the woman's subjectivity. 
Are women the supreme gift for social reproduction and history? 
Both the followers and the critics of structuralism find Levi-Strauss compelling 
on the same point, that 'woman is the supreme gift'. The followers of his argu-
ment agree that the gift of a sister in exchange for a wife establishes the centrality 
to society of the principle of reciprocity, rather than the repression of Oedipal 
desires. Women remain luminous in the imagination of the exchange partners, as 
if a man looking at a woman sees her as a manifestation of and reference to the 
principle of reciprocal exchange. The critics follow two different pathways of 
thought. One avenue leads through the problematic question of inequality, social 
reproduction and history; the other pathway opens up the enigma of inequality, 
social reproduction and gender (which I will turn to later). 
One point might be raised in the defence of structuralist theory; that is. 
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anthropologists did not approach the study of social change as a concern of 
special interest because they worked to create a different kind of account of 
human variation than did the evolutionist historians of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. To criticize structuralism for its failure to address his-
tory is to ask it to do something it cannot, or to take up different questions 
than it is prepared to ask. 
There is a puzzle or an enigma here because a structuralist theory of his-
tory is played out in the reproduction of social relations in one of two ways. I 
think Gell is correct to say that structuralism did engage with the question of 
history, and did so in a rather interesting and sophisticated way in order to 
dismiss the false history of evolutionism (Gell 1992b ). The distinction between 
hot and cold societies remains useful for understanding history and social 
reproduction most generally. The terms hot and cold distinguish those soci-
eties on the basis of how people understand themselves against their past. 
Cold societies live out the continuities with the past. Hot societies live out 
changes with the past, and thereby come to know it. Historical or 'hot' soci-
eties are those societies in which enduring values seem to reproduce while 
social changes escalate. These societies tend to take social changes into con-
sideration and regenerate old values to hold the changes. Mythical or 'cold' 
societies are those in which myths elaborate and ideologies complicate human 
knowledge, while society remains much the same as it always has been. Such 
societies tend to keep social forms intact as the social expression of the logic 
of society, while allowing the efflorescence of myth, knowledge and legend 
throughout years of interaction. It is as if feet, hands and minds ran fast, 
while staying in one place. 
These ideas about the way in which people perceive the passing of time, 
which are expressed beautifully in The Savage Mind, can also be found in 
another form in Elementary Structures of Kinship. In the earlier work Levi-
Strauss shows that societies which practise generalized exchange of women 
over the long cycles of reciprocity play out their mutual obligations over a long 
period of time. This habit has an enormous effect on the importance of social 
reproduction, and localized understandings of it. I hope to demonstrate this 
argument differently than did Gell, by focusing on the gift of a woman between 
clans. 
People in some societies exchange women over the long cycle of reciprocal 
obligations, and these extend over generations. The people of these societies do 
so with the awareness that ambiguities are introduced to the relations of pres-
tige or of equality between the clans. This is done with the sense that over time 
the differences will be equalized because the underlying principle of reciprocity 
will endure. In the other case, where women are exchanged for women, egali-
tarian relations endure across clans; but this is not true in all ways, as we shall 
see. How people assess their relationships with each other affects the ways in 
which they keep or sustain an egalitarian society. The obligation to return a 
woman remains self-evident in men's memories, especially when they must 
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keep that obligation in one generation. The capacity to account for the differ-
entials of the transaction lies within human memory. 
Godelier has discussed elegantly much of the complexity entailed in the 
restricted and generalized exchange of women. He emphasizes that the 
exchange of women for wealth and the exchange of women for women simply 
imply contrary dynamics of historical consciousness. The compelling argu-
ment holds for examples of contemporary societies that practise different 
forms of matrimonial exchange. None the less, I remain uncomfortable with 
the idea that some forms of society have evolved from the other. The authors 
of the compilation of arguments in Big Men and Great Men (Godelier and 
Strathern 1991) have wrestled with this idea and abstracted core concepts of 
use to the creation of a better theory of society, at least one that focuses both 
on the strategies by which men create their own prestige and on those by which 
they create equitable relations with women. 
Feminist critics try to develop a better analysis of processes of creation of 
social reproduction. The friendliest of these tried to make the terms of social 
reproduction clearer and therefore chose to examine the logic of society in 
detail. Critics think that the work of exchange of women might provide an 
insight into wider processes by which inequality works in social life. I address 
this in the next section. 
Woman as subject, woman as object 
What difference does the gift of a person make? In answering this question, 
anthropologists came to elaborate more fully a structuralist theory of society, 
and extend important reflections on that theory in their work. Alliance theory 
could answer the question of what difference the gift of a woman made, for 
any given society or at least in the ethnography of the Amazon. But the ques-
tion has grander implications than this for the development of structuralism. 
The exchange of women between men, the giving of a sister and the accepting 
of a wife, necessarily must be understood in the round, both ethnographically 
and conceptually. If I am to understand kinship, then I must also understand 
the nature of women's experience as objects and, by implication, their subjec-
tivity. Structuralist anthropologists did not aim in the first instance to address 
women's subjectivity, nor did they propose a feminist project. But women's 
subjectivity is inseparable from understanding the objects of the exchange. I 
think that by interrogating these limits of the structuralist's ability to address 
subjectivity it is possible to expose some of the most interesting assumptions 
of the theory. I pursue a deeper understanding of structuralism's assumptions 
through a review of the feminist critiques of the theory. These remain some-
what closer to the structuralist understanding of the problem than they first 
appear. 
Some anthropologists understand society as a system of communication 
where ·women' represent different social capacities than do men. The exchange 
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of women did create channels or means for communication between men, 
quite literally enabling them to make agreements with each other about con-
temporary and future conduct between their kin, clans and villages. But, in 
even more sophisticated understandings, transactions of bride wealth and 
women are considered as signs or as signifiers of the social relations. Women 
could both represent the social relationships between clans and be the medium 
through which the relationships could be made. 
I make intentional comparisons between women in exchange systems and 
signs in communication systems. I want to emphasize that in either case, of 
exchange relations or of communicative relations, it is not so much the women 
or the image that is important to the analysis. Structuralism seeks the deep 
structures of relationships. In kinship the woman simply represents them; in 
communication the image represents the cognitive structures that make it pos-
sible to create meaningful utterance. 
By considering society as similar to communication, structuralism created 
grounds for thinking about human action as the expression of social values; 
that is, the exchange of women enabled the discussion of what people believed 
about social life in general and the ways in which people should live. Other 
scholars considered women's subjectivity and their objectification of the prob-
lem. It is hard not to address immediately the ideological concern that 
subjective experiences can be objectified, and lost or misunderstood by the 
individual. Instead, if we first address where women stand as subjects and as 
objects, it might provide a clearer understanding of women's position in soci-
ety. Then a better account of how women's experience is objectified can be 
made before discussing the limits on their subjectivity. 
When exchanged as an object between men, many critics raised doubts 
about women's subjectivity because the woman seemed muted. The anthro-
pologist can be left unable to understand why women accept subordinate 
positions, or why they believe they are compelled to enter into relationships 
that can be oppressive or become increasingly exploitive over time. Yet, when 
an anthropologist asks questions about women's subjective understandings of 
their experience in matrimonial exchanges, the answers can be confusing. What 
women say might not be indicative of what a feminine or even a feminist point 
of view might entail. As much as in any other circumstance or with any other 
subject, it is likely that the meaning of her answers and commentaries will 
remain inscrutable. 'Giving voice', as later cultural anthropologists came to 
say, to the woman in matrimonial exchanges will not expose a better under-
standing of the nature of subjectivity. 
A critical review can be made of the status of women when women are 
viewed as the subject of the exchange. Here, as I have already shown, a number 
of anthropologists addressed women's work and the alienation of women's 
labours in exchange of bride wealth gifts to their brothers from their husbands. 
These analyses begin by confirming the basic fact of women's subjectivity as 
inherently valuable, but proceed by analysing the transformation of subjectivity 
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into her objective value to other people. Women then become nothing more 
than the value of their labours to others. 
An anthropologist might ask a question of both sides of the problem. If 
women are given as objects, then how does giving a woman for marriage cause 
and sustain social relationships? The answers to these questions differ greatly, 
and take anthropology into different directions. That is because the concept of 
woman vacillates between objective and subjective definitions. If marriage 
alters a woman's subjectivity from the time she leaves her clan as one of its sis-
ters to the day she marries into another clan as a wife, then what is the 
significance of the act for her and for those around her? The important matter 
here is this: in structuralist theory a considerable ambiguity exists in the cate-
gory of woman, the woman can be subject or object. The category shifts 
around in different anthropological analysis. Just as the play of woman in 
structuralist theories of society opens the thought to different possibilities for 
society, so too does the play of the sign - as when the word can mean several 
things at once - it opens thought to critical insights about social conventions 
of communication. 
What difference does the gender of the gift make? 
Asking about the gender of the gift becomes an enormous task. Some people 
analysed exchange as if women could only 'signify' social relationships and 
they thereby establish society as communicative practice. Others analysed 
women as objects of exchange, marrying models of production and models of 
exchange into comprehensible wholes. Women were at once producer and 
product, exchange object and the subject of exchange. The exchange of 
women could open a wider discussion of the whole of social reproduction into 
more provocative and wider reaching analysis than had existed before. But 
these were feminist questions as well as anthropological ones. 
A further, and more provocative, line of enquiry focuses on the fact that it is 
a woman (and not a man) that is the gift made at marriage. Accordingly, the 
most important fact of social life lies in the recognition of gender difference. 
That recognition enables discussion of the facts of life in more abstract forms, 
allowing informants to talk as they did in Malinowski's day about a 'father's 
love' and 'the rule of the mother's clan'. This is similar to the anthropologist's 
efforts to recognize gender difference by addressing the facts of life as 'natural 
symbols' of fatherly love and the jural authority of the men of the matrilineage. 
Alternatively, the recognition of gender difference can work as a symbolic 
expression, or symbolic operator. That is, the gender differences work as a 
marker of meaning across different societies, and across different eras of our 
own society in quite different ways. Gender does not mean the same thing in 
all circumstances of its use. One of the simple cases might be the situations in 
which to be womanly might mean to bear up to social responsibility, whereas 
in other circumstances it means to be feminine in frivolous and decorative 
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ways. Media images often show these differences rather graphically, but one 
might also consider how the role of the wife or mother differs from one family 
to the next. The current BBC reality television show, Wife Sirnp, while sugges-
tively titled, does more than suggest. As a programme based on the exchange 
of women between households, the dynamics of the plot simply unwinds with 
a little time, ten days to be exact. In that time each woman learns the rules of 
the other's household, the families expose and come to terms with the under-
lying assumptions about those 'rules', and the implied capacities of women as 
subjects are re-addressed in each marriage as the importance of the woman's 
beliefs and personality. Wife Swap makes explicit the full load of extra associa-
tions that might be borne by women in their capacities as wives and mothers. 
The reality television genre engenders real discussion about women's work as 
housewives, as the viewers continue to analyse the implicit assumptions that 
the TV families held about women's work. Conversations about the work of a 
wife continue on radio commentary, on television, in casual office conversa-
tions and among neighbours. But the debate points towards a different kind of 
question about the substance of exchanges. 
Can there be a danger in making over-rigorous divisions between the 
domestic world of women and the public world of men? Is it more appropriate 
to analyse historical transformation by addressing the changes in social repro-
duction as they might be exposed in the private spaces of the home? Does 
Levi-Strauss's structuralist theory of social variation permit a fuller under-
standing of human history, one that does not assume that the great events of 
any society are made by men in wars, public policy and government, and in 
international trade? Does the exchange of women turn attention to the most 
important locations of social transformation in society? 
Feminists have doubts about all of this 
Levi-Strauss's attention to the exchange of women by men appears to address 
the matter of how to think about gender inequality in society a bit more fully 
than earlier anthropologists had done, in so far as he discusses directly women's 
role in ceremonial exchanges. This arises from a change in emphasis in theoret-
ical orientation. Functionalists considered the rules of social life, whereas 
structuralists examined principles of society. For example, Malinowski had 
focused on the Trobriands by thinking about the trade-off between the rules of 
the relationship between the natural affection men regularly held for their chil-
dren and the customary law of women's matrilineal concerns for the clan; but 
the structuralists addressed the gift of a woman as a reflection of the principle 
of reciprocity in kin relations. 
The claim that the gift of a woman can be the supreme gift causes some con-
cern especially among those who see this as an ideological claim. Of course, to 
claim the gift of a woman as a supreme gift was ideological, but structuralism 
aimed to reach past the mask of ideology to deeper social knowledge. The 
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structuralists argue that the gift of a woman expresses a pre-ideological posi-
tion; the grounds of knowledge that makes the world work as it does makes 
women into the supreme gift in many instances of matrimonial exchange. 
Feminists contemporary with Levi-Strauss's structuralism take issue with his 
claim about women and his claim about the grounds of belief about women. 
Most famously, Gayle Rubin (1975) recorded her dissatisfaction with the ways 
in which structuralism understood 'deep' knowledge. She believed that the 
capacity to make oppositions, to distinguish and divide entities knowing light 
from dark, did not determine human reasoning. Rather, she argued that the 
nature of the unconscious mind propelled particular versions of reality to con-
sciousness and so found expression in human social relations. She asks what 
the role of repression is in the unconscious knowledge which shapes social 
action. This is an intriguing alternative to Levi-Strauss's work, and it is worth 
returning to Rousseau, as much as to Morgan and Marx. 
Rousseau believed that gender inequality was different from inequality 
among men who marked their differences according to their degree of access 
to enjoy private property. He claimed that women were substantively different 
from men by nature, but men were different from each other because of the 
inequalities they formed. This first judgement, perhaps this first error of judge-
ment, invited further critical analysis by subsequent generations of scholars, 
especially feminists of the mid- to late twentieth century. In particular, the 
claim met criticism by those scholars seeking to understand the relationship 
between the powers of the state in the generation of class as a social hierarchy 
by comparison with its power in the generation of patriarchy. In this section 
we will discuss the way in which feminist anthropologists used their legacy 
from Rousseau, the concept of the Noble Savage. 
Many anthropologists of the mid-twentieth century tried to redress the eli-
sion of the analysis of gender inequality from the rest of social and political 
life. Some took seriously the claim that the kind of inequality suffered by 
women differed from the kind experienced in class relations. Others insisted that 
women's deep implication in their work in the everyday economy inextricably 
tied them into the processes of class formation and reproduction, such that 
women's inequality could not be uncoupled from socio-economic differences. 
One question pressed forward some of the best of this early work; that is, how 
did women come to be considered the property of men, bound in marriage and 
subject to the authority of the head of the family? The pervasive use of dowry 
and bride wealth across most marriage rituals confused the issue even more. 
Was marriage everywhere a form of exchange of commodities, with money and 
goods going to the family of the woman in exchange for her reproductive 
capacity and her potential contributions of her labour to the new husband's 
household? By contrast to such arrangements that subordinated women's indi-
vidual interests to those of the husband and his wider family, the earliest 
feminist anthropologists described the limited powers that a woman could 
express in non-state society. Some challenged the idea that women held inferior 
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status to men in such societies, and argued that women's sphere of power in the 
non-state society complemented men's domains. Leacock's historical study of 
the Cree of northern Quebec suggested that men and women held separate and 
complementary spheres of power, mutually dependent upon each other in non-
state society (Leacock 1953). She discusses the power of women shaman to be 
intermediaries with the supernatural world and thereby threaten men's control 
of social life. But, most importantly, she described the ways in which women 
could organize their own work to limit the actions of men. For example, Cree 
women could refuse to plant and harvest the crops that warring men needed 
in order to go into battle. Women's inequality to men could be measured only in 
relation to men's capacities to act in their own sphere of influence; outside that 
sphere women exercised kinds of power substantively different from men's. 
The earliest work questioned how women lost their complementary powers in 
non-state society to become men's subordinates in state society. 
Ortner, much later (1974), insisted that men's domination of women 
occurred universally, whether in state or non-state society. Just how women 
could be universally dominated remained something of a problem for anthro-
pologists. Ortner answered this by declaring that women's sphere of influence 
generally included the domains of procreation, nurture, and food production 
and preparation for the household. These activities put them in close proximity 
to the natural world, and more importantly emphasized the natural capacity 
of women's bodies. She argued that women's power lay in affinity with nature. 
By contrast, men's power belonged to the social and cultural spheres of experi-
ence. Men sought to control and dominate nature by establishing and main-
taining social institutions and culturally acquired habits. Men enjoyed 
superiority over women, because they exercised male power in the social and 
cultural world to dominate and shape the natural world. These powers might 
be better balanced in non-state society, but state society built itself upon men's 
domination of women. Here, Ortner comes to a different conclusion than earl-
ier feminists; inequality between men and women was the same as inequality 
among humans. Gender inequality predicted the extensions of that inequality 
to relationships between men made according to social and economic hierar-
chical distinctions. 
Ortner's conclusions suggest that her reader consider how women's lives 
might be different without the corruptions of patriarchy in state society. Revo-
lutionary change to gender relations entailed revolutionary changes to the 
state. Anthropologists swallowed this heady cocktail of analysis with ideologi-
cal prescription for change because it echoed the political arguments of the 
generation of feminists who sought a total and full transformation of social 
life, but they took it with disquiet if not alarm. Ortner's argument challenged 
feminist anthropology to reassess how it might work across cultures. Should 
anthropologists assume that women's subordinate positions could be the same 
everywhere? If so, did they understand ( even recognize) how men dominated 
women in the field site, whether in Morocco or Melanesia? Were men's actions 
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towards and against women always best understood as domination, even when 
they appeared to be like gender domination in American and European soci-
ety? In Ortner's hands, the generation of forms of inequality by which men 
came to dominate other men came to be only one version of the substantive 
inequality by which men overpowered and dominated women's lives. 
A radical analysis of men's domination of women needed a fuller apprecia-
tion of what a woman is. In the first instance, Marilyn Strathern challenged 
Ortner's claims that over history men weld women's power into the natural 
world, extolling women's reproductive capacities. Strathern argues, first, that 
nature differs across the world, being 'wilderness' in the New Guinea High-
lands, and the frontier in the nineteenth-century American west ~ each land-
scape suggests different associations of power. Hence, to be associated with the 
powers of the natural sphere did not predict that a woman should hold a sub-
ordinate position to a man. Second, society did not always harness the natural 
world in order to produce new people, wealth, or material forms of prestige 
and power. In some locales, the social and natural spheres of power comple-
mented each other and the social did not subordinate the natural to its cause. 
Third, Strathern reminded other feminists that people used the language of 
gender to accomplish other kinds of social and political outcomes. People in 
many places could speak and think about gender differences among them, as 
did many people across state and non-state societies in initiation and puberty 
rituals. The anthropologists could use gender as a code or a language for under-
standing how people analysed social differences among themselves. 
The legacy of the Noble Savage in arguments about gender inequality com-
plicated Rousseau's old assumption that women suffered inequality under men, 
differently than men suffered inequality under other men. In Strathern's hands, 
the legacy of the Noble Savage enabled her to make a breakthrough in an old 
question about substantive inequality and formal inequality. Women's substan-
tive differences from men appeared to be substantive only if the anthropologist 
did not analyse the ways in which people used gender to explain power relations 
to each other. Strathern's call for cross-cultural analysis of the generation or 
perhaps the cultivation of gender difference posed the possibility of a new era 
of social and political anthropology, enabled to describe and explain gender 
inequality as a culturally constructed form of social relationship. 
Conclusions of the critics of structuralism 
Consider the social value of structuralism to its times, whether in Europe, 
North America or the Amazon and Melanesia. Structuralist anthropologists 
explained the problem of social difference within society and across different 
societies by exposing the deeper grounds for their common similarities. In most 
of the world this scientific argument reinforced the efforts towards a reasonable 
response to modernity, or at least the social processes which people defined 
and interpreted as modernity. 
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The feminist critics of structuralism anticipate the limitations of the theory's 
value for explaining the world of the post-Second World War era. Some criti-
cism both from the postcolonial intellectual movement within academic life 
and from the feminist movements can be heeded, but not in order to pursue an 
ideological project as these movements suggest. Instead, the critics of struc-
turalism reframe several larger questions about the nature of society. These 
concerns are first, power; and second, subjectivity. By power, I mean the histor-
ical conditions in which society is made and regenerated. By subjectivity, I 
mean the concepts of being human and human being in which people in any 
society come to act out their hopes as agents and as persons. Theorists com-
mitted to the anthropological project continued to find the way forward by 
reflecting upon many of the primary assumptions of the theories of modernist 
anthropology. I address these two concerns over four chapters in the next sec-
tion of this book. 
Summary of chapter 5 
As an attempt to grasp the totality of social life, some anthropologists have 
examined giving gifts as evidence of deeper social structural principles of 
human association. Consider how the very possibility of cross-cultural under-
standing depends upon the acceptance that the other person, otherwise a 
stranger, can communicate meaningfully with you because they assume you 
understand how social relationships do work. Earliest works, especially Primi-
tive Classification, cannot show that the social life flowers from reasoned 
thought, or vice versa. It is a chicken and egg question that links deep struc-
tures of communication to social structure. Ceremonial gift exchange is 
considered a kind of communication between groups of people. Consider then 
how the substance of ceremonial gifts affects the constitution of society more 
widely. What difference does it make that the ceremonial gift is a person, espe-
cially a woman as in matrimonial exchanges? Levi-Strauss called the gift of a 
woman a supreme gift, combining both natural and social capacities of repro-
duction in the same event of exchange. If that is considered further, then the 
woman is at once the subject and the object of the exchange. The 'supreme gift' 
of a woman is at once a person who is related to one group who give her away 
as a sister, and related to another group who receive her as a wife. The gender 
of the woman is not a matter of her nature, or her substance. Instead, gender is 
created as a kind of relationship created with the gift of a woman because men 
come to know themselves as siblings or as marital partners through such 
exchanges, just as do women. What difference does recognizing the gender of 
the gift make? It raises a feminist debate about what is the feminine. In that 
ensuing debate a number of Euro-American ideological assumptions are 
exposed in the study of matrimonial exchange about women's work, about 








DEBT IN POSTCOLONIAL 
SOCIETY 
Postcolonial exchanges 
Postcolonial anthropology analyses the debts that societies owe each other as a 
result of their shared history. This is an awkward proposition that anthropolo-
gists cannot explore fully within their own discipline. It requires historical 
investigation to complement ethnographic insight. In the case of the Pacific 
Islands, Thomas, the scholar of postcolonial society, observed how the anthro-
pological object was entangled in historical and cultural processes of the 
exploration and colonization of the region. An interdisciplinary approach to 
postcolonial history was needed if anthropologists were to assess how those 
historical and cultural processes created alienation of wealth from societies 
there. How did misunderstandings about gift exchange become a fulcrum from 
which to lever out wealth from Pacific Island societies? While some anthropol-
ogists have described the history of colonial and postcolonial relations in 
terms of specific transactions, many other anthropologists study the context of 
those postcolonial transactions. The language of debt and the idiom of indebt-
edness pervade much of the writing about the postcolonial world. By 
examining several cases of mutual misunderstandings about debt and obliga-
tion in colonial and postcolonial encounters, I outline the various ways that 
anthropologists have used 'historical context' as a concept. Historical context 
in each of these case studies provides a motor that turns the processes of cul-
tural transformation: sometimes with brutal force, sometimes with good 
intentions directed towards bad ends, and other times to codify living processes 
into meaningless forms. 
Living in a postcolonial world is part of shared conventional knowledge, but 
not easily or transparently so to everyone. Even while people remember the 
colonial past, significant features of the postcolonial present can be forgotten, 
including a cosmopolitan city's powerful ties to distant places in a wider post-
colonial world. It is possible to analyse the nature of contemporary exchanges 
without acknowledging the contexts in which they are made. For example, the 
destruction of the World Trade Center in New York City as a symbol of inter-
national business transaction is differently understood in the context of the 
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wider network of relations between American capital and the rest of the world 
than it can be understood in the context of a single violent interchange between 
acquisitive capitalists of the American business world and a terrorist group 
acting in the name of Islam. Not clarifying the context, leaving it vaguely as 
postcolonial dissent, makes it more difficult both to understand power rela-
tions within those exchanges, and to explain why history takes the course that 
it does. How anthropologists analyse the postcolonial context matters to their 
understanding of the relations made across society, especially when those rela-
tions are misunderstood for what they are. 
Alienation typifies the postcolonial condition: not only the alienation of 
land from people, but also the separation of people from their past and their 
present. If alienation is the condition in which humans came to see their cre-
ative capacities falsely turned into substantive forms, then they can only be 
deceived into believing in those entities as valuable accounts. The perception of 
loss, whether material or spiritual, inheres in such discourses of alienation, just 
as it does in the postcolonial condition. I address these questions by looking 
into three cases in which shifts in the relations of gift exchange seemingly lead 
to the dispiriting of the collective interests of the different peoples involved. 
Those cases are the uses of wampum (bead money) in the Iroquois confeder-
acy, the substitution of rice with money in the votive gifts to Asian landlords 
in colonial countryside near Calcutta, and the habit of 'begging' in Fijian trade 
relations in the nineteenth-century Pacific. 
Anthropologists who examine the colonial legacy by focusing on the 
modality of interaction known as gift exchange have to address particular 
problems that enlighten broader disciplinary issues. The basic problem is how 
to describe the colonial encounter as more than an unfair deal cut between 
trading partners. A solution to this rather limiting analysis would be to take 
seriously Mauss's critical claims that Europeans accepted only recently the 
idea that humans were first and foremost economically minded beings. Analy-
ses of the exchange of gifts in the early colonial encounter give a broader 
insight into the issues. 
In this chapter I address the work of anthropologists in the postcolonial era, 
asking how their arguments use a critical theory of gift exchange. First, I point 
to an error that can be easily made by conflating European or Western 
common wisdom about the primacy of economic rationality in everyday life 
with the analytic approach to the exchanges made in the early colonial 
encounter. Then, in the rest of this chapter I outline the approach that assumes 
that the exchange of gifts in early colonial encounters is more than an eco-
nomic exchange. This opens the analysis to the wider problem of assessing the 
colonial encounter: namely, how did it lead to the condition of alienation? The 
conclusions assess what the anthropologist working in today's postcolonial era 
can say about the history of colonial relations and the role of anthropology in 
creating the postcolonial legacy. 
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The transfer of Manhattan 
Any school child in the United States can tell you that the Manhattan Indians 
sold the island of Manhattan for the contemporary equivalent of 24 US dollars 
in wampum. They may present the story mythically. The Indians received 
wampum beads for the transfer of their claims to residence on Manhattan 
Island to the white community, and the transfer of their name to the land area 
that is bounded by the Hudson River on the west coast and the Atlantic Ocean 
on the east coast. A wampum is a coloured shell bead woven artfully into pat-
terned necklaces or belts. It was common to the north-east seaboard region 
because it was used as currency in fur trade and in tributary payments among 
English, French, Dutch and Indian groups in the area. Part of the story's inter-
est to most people in North America comes from the fact that New York 
City spreads wholly over Manhattan Island, which now hosts the head offices 
of many multinational corporations. During the autumn festival of Thanks-
giving when families congregate for feasts with their kin and their friends, it is 
common to reflect whimsically on the story. Sometimes people reflect on the 
contemporary social conditions of the island, and comment on the different 
fates of the Manhattan Indians, the Iroquois Indians and the early white 
settlers on that island. It is hard to say why some people recall it at this time 
and what it means, but that is another story. 
The anthropologist Graeber (2001) looks closely at the north-east United 
States to analyse how the transfer of Manhattan Island put both the Iroquois 
and Algonquin-speaking peoples into debt with the white settlers. Is there a 
kind of duplicity on the part of the purchasers, or at least a misunderstanding 
on the part of both parties about the nature of the transaction? As Graeber 
notes, although the Europeans may well have thought they had bought the 
land by contractual agreement, the Manhattan Indians probably thought they 
were confirming the peaceful arrangements for a beneficial association with the 
Europeans that would continue into the future. That may be so, but how does 
it lead the indigenous people of North America wholly into indebtedness? 
This story offers a sage insight into the events of the colonial past for the 
postcolonial present. For some, perhaps the poets, knowledge of that tragedy 
fosters humility about the contemporary period. And in the postcolonial time, 
the history foreshadows the end of the progress of political and economic 
expansion by hinting at the possibility of apocalyptic change. The postcolonial 
situation often finds more intimate terms of expression. Postcolonial ramifica-
tions are felt in the face-to-face relationships that challenge humans to recon-
sider the terms of their existence. A poet uses the postcolonial to express an 
intimate experience of loss by drawing on the image of the colonial conquest 
of North America that exists in common knowledge. 'Man who fears death, 
how many acres do you need to lengthen your shadow under the endless sky?' 
(Duffy 1987). The school child's history class gives her reasons to believe con-
ventional wisdoms about the history she shares or does not share with the rest 
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of the region or country. Somehow early encounters lead people into more 
than they bargained for. The school child and the poets' empathetic insight 
into the early encounter of European with the indigenous community share a 
common wisdom that exchanges between European and the American Indian 
engendered their difference. This chapter examines how exchange in early colo-
nial encounters ~ whether capitalist market exchanges or honorific exchanges~ 
exposes the process of alienation that created misunderstandings about human 
relationships. As we shall see, the kernel of the problem for understanding 
alienation in the postcolonial era is that exchanges made to open new relation-
ships open each party to 'more than they bargained for' in the trade. 
The legacy of the Manhattan purchase (an example of an inequitable 
exchange) poses at least two conceptual issues for anthropologists before they 
explain what happened in the colonial encounter. These two issues are culture 
and value. Indians and the early Americans misunderstood who and what they 
were looking at, as they peered at each other through different viewfinders. 
Graeber presses his fellow anthropologists to consider the assumptions and 
logic used by all parties to the trade in determining the value of the objects 
used in it, such that each believes that they made a fair trade. A collaborative 
effort to analyse alienation in the colonial encounters provides an opportunity 
for anthropologists to work with historians. Historians persuaded anthropolo-
gists to consider wider questions of historical change as they occur in social 
relationships made and unmade between very different people. And similarly, 
anthropologists encouraged historians to acknowledge that colonialism 
entailed more than an economic relationship between peoples or nations in 
which one group forced the other into subordinations. Together, researchers in 
the disciplines of anthropology and history can address the problem of 
explaining human alienation in the colonial encounter. 
So, how do colonial relations alienate human beings from each other? The 
documents remark on the lifestyles of the indigenous communities in extraor-
dinary detail. Historians record the decline of the communities, destroyed by 
warfare and disease. I check my own understanding of their analysis as I read 
through the well-documented history of colonial America in the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
writings of the Jesuit Relations, published from the discussions of the missions 
in the region of the Great Lakes and Quebec, or as I can check on the details 
of the archaeological record of the Huron Indian communities in the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries (following the historian, Trigger 1969). Finally, an ethno-
historian can research more deeply into the world inhabited by the Huron, or 
Wyandot as they called themselves, until the disappearance of their villages in 
the eighteenth century. 
Writing of the wars of the Iroquois, the early anthropologist Morgan (1878) 
tells us of the extraordinary conflict that damaged the matrilineal clan system 
by destroying the process by which the Iroquois transferred names across the 
generations. War erupted with the need to replace the dead into the names 
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of the clan, and the captives would be adopted or captured as to the wish of 
the clanspersons. The early reports carry disturbing details about violence and 
torture as aspects of the custom of the Iroquois and the Huron. Recently, an 
anthropologist has highlighted the visceral images of the indigenous custom 
throughout the ethnography. 
Some of the most interesting reports of the peace made at the end of war-
fare refer to the uses of belts of wampum. The wampum belts are beautifully 
beaded and bear the marks and pictures that refer to the history of agreements 
between the giver and the persons who receive the belt. For example, one 
beaded belt marked agreements between the Huron and the Jesuit Fathers that 
a mission named St Marie should be built there. The markers and pictures, in 
this case the pictures of the church steeples, work as mnemonics for the events 
at which people gave the belts. They work as aids to the recollection of memo-
ries about the history and agreements. 
More than anyone else, Graeber made the aesthetic value of the wampum 
and axe heads the central problem of his reports. There are two sensibilities for 
decorating the body with material objects. One is the expansion of the spiritual 
life with the gift of the wampum belt, like a shawl around the neck and back to 
the prisoner of war adopted into the clan. The second sensibility complements 
this. The second is the contraction of the body; a physic of the loss of life 
as when war prisoners found a torturous death with strings of red-hot axe 
heads around the shoulders and breasts. Without the colonial European pres-
ence, the two sensibilities seem to work like a thermostat, a dynamic control on 
the swings between peace and war. 
That thermostatic control between expansion and contraction should have 
been effective, had there been harmony between Dutch, French and English 
interests in the region. But attempts to control the fur trade complicated the 
treaties made between the Iroquois and the colonists. Graeber writes confi-
dently about the confused and violent encounter of the American colonies 
with the Indians of the region and particularly with the split of the Iroquoian 
confederacy. Graeber's account of the sale of Manhattan explains the alien-
ation of the Indian nations in the story of violent oppression and conflict. 
Understanding the value of the beads, we learn of an interesting dynamic 
between the contraction of the body into depression, death and violent anger 
against the outward expansion of human vision into peace, treaties and the 
afterlife of the spirit. 
This case only partially answers two questions of concern to postcolonial 
anthropologists. Despite Graeber's best attention to aesthetic dimensions of 
the value of wampum beads, this analysis of aesthetics does not explain how 
humans came to be alienated from each other in the colonial period. Instead, 
violence itself became the mechanism creating social and material alienation, 
the means of expressing alienation of spirit. An anthropological account that 
took seriously the role of aesthetics in creating values that alienated humans 
from each other would potentially discuss violence as the outcome of such 
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forces. Graeber resorts to an aphorism, or a common folk wisdom to ground 
his anthropological theory of alienation through the colonial era: 'the boot 
always comes down'. 
There is another concern that somehow the move to model the colonial 
administration and government upon indigenous political structures enabled 
the further destruction of the Iroquoian nations. The confederacy, as it was 
called, constituted itself a council to negotiate a system of treaties that the dif-
ferent nations or bands held among them. As a system of government, it 
substantiated a more egalitarian model that used negotiation and discussion of 
the history of agreements that kept the peace. The story shows us that the early 
American colonists first admired the confederacy in which Iroquoian political 
treaties made up their 'system of government'. Early American colonists 
admired it so much that they adopted it for their own federal system. But, per-
haps their admiration proved to be more dangerous for the Iroquois than the 
earliest record of the most sensational violent aspects of their lives. Once they 
abstracted and copied the ideal form of the confederacy for their own pur-
poses of independent government, the colonists then fought a number of wars 
against its living members, and moved some tribes to the regions to the north 
of the United States borders. Other Iroquoian nations fell into warfare with 
each other. The confederacy no longer existed, except on the paper that out-
lined the confederate system. 
In Graeber's final analysis, European economic interests in acquiring capital 
destroyed the Iroquoian confederacy. In the light of later developments in the 
protection of trade and democracy through warfare, contemporary readers 
might think these events a bit ironic. The desire to control the trade in furs for 
the financial benefit of the European settlers and trading companies led early 
Americans to send armies against the Iroquoian tribes. Seeking control of 
trade from the hands of the French and the Indians, American colonial gov-
ernments thus destroyed the complex chain of treaties that made up the 
peaceful Iroquoian confederacy, the idealized model for the federal system of 
democratic government in the new United States of America. 
What then is the role of anthropologists in the pacification of the Great 
Lakes and north-eastern seaboard region of the North American continent? 
How did those carrying out anthropological research contribute to the colonial 
powers that dominated the Iroquois? These are hard questions to answer in this 
case, largely because the discipline of anthropology came to these issues well 
after the destruction of the Iroquoian confederacy and in the period of Iro-
quoian cultural revival in the nineteenth century. Morgan's researches into 
Iroquoian kinship, and those of Wallace who tried to construct a theory of the 
ritual life of the Iroquois, presented a rich picture of the cultural life of the 
communities at the end of the nineteenth century. They aimed to fill in the pic-
ture or close the gap of understanding about the confederacy by getting into 
the inner details of the political and spiritual life of its members. Because their 
ethnographic studies presented the last remnants of a disappearing world, they 
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completed full studies to the best of their abilities. Whereas the earlier writers 
addressed the most spectacular and exotic aspects of the Iroquois, Huron and 
Algonquin life, later writers portraying a pacified and conquered people 
described them with textbook-style clarity. Certainly conventions of anthro-
pology had changed by this time, and the styles of the later age matched with 
the growing status of the new discipline as it sought recognition as a science. 
Graeber, or any analyst who finds out that American colonial communities 
overpowered the indigenous American tribes by force, warfare and violence, 
does not incriminate anthropology too easily in its accounts. 
The democratic experiment that built a government on the relations between 
the Iroquoian confederacy and the federal system in the early American 
democracy misunderstood the wampum belts as a kind of contract, an 
abstract document to which people attach no history. The contract depends 
upon a complex set of assumptions about the natural rights of a natural man; 
it is as if the image of the Noble Savage appears to haunt the formation of 
democratic government. The founders of the federal system of American 
democracy used the abstract model of the Iroquoian confederacy in ways a bit 
more akin to a contract, rather than the treaty system that it was. Graeber 
shows that people exchanged wampum beads in order to make a treaty rather 
than a social contract, using the aesthetics of the beads as a way of recalling 
the history leading up to the treaty. The beaded images woven into a belt and 
worn around the neck at the time of the agreement keep in the foreground 
of everyone's minds both the reasons for violent conflict and those for the 
making of a peace. The treaty works because signatory parties can recall a his-
tory of events leading up to its writing and agreement among them. The 
contract fails when the memory of the treaty's history is erased by negotiations 
for future action. 
South Asian indenture 
Success and failure in colonial administration became lessons to the work of 
empire. Most famously, Macaulay's notebooks from the administration of 
policy in British India show that he and others aimed to prevent a repetition of 
the earlier failures of colonial administrators elsewhere (Said 1977). They 
agreed that the misanalysis of cultural relations has deleterious effects on the 
livelihood of people who live with the after-effects of policies developed from 
misunderstandings about cultural practice and from mistakes made in imple-
menting the policy. 
Take the example offered by Prakash (1988) of the colonial administration's 
attempt to erase debt bondage at the beginning of the twentieth century in 
the countryside near Calcutta. Throughout the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, British colonial administrators worked to free the farmers from 
relationships with landowners, which administrators believed were funda-
mentally abusive because farmers were trapped by relationships of debt to the 
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landlords. The action to interfere in local politics departed from the conven-
tional habits of the administration, which sought to let people rule locally 
while the colonial administration managed wider business interests. Histori-
cally, British colonial administration aimed to respect or preserve the different 
traditions rather than eradicate them. Most interventions had aimed to modify 
cultural habits towards a better quality of life in the future; that is, a lifestyle 
enabled to meet the challenges of a changing economy across the empire. 
In the countryside landlords collected a tax from farmers in exchange 
for protection. The farmers gave the tax as part of their offerings within the 
'Jajmani' system, in which the gifts made to people of higher caste helped to 
establish a hierarchy of social order. Many administrators felt that the social 
hierarchy of the Jajmani system enabled the long-term functioning of politics 
in the region; but they were increasingly uncomfortable with the excesses of 
privilege that landlords chose in the later decades of the empire. 
A new relationship between landlords and farmers developed with the wider 
extension of business opportunities across the region. With business employ-
ment and the rise of international trade that affected the area, money could be 
used for the purchase of a number of different things, including the payment 
of taxes to the landlord. Landlords delighted in the farmers' gifts of money 
because they could use it to buy prestige goods. Farmers who substituted 
money for the gifts of rice from the crops were freed from the obligations of 
farming and maintaining the land, and from the anxiety of working against 
crop failure. Throughout the nineteenth century, the landlords had substituted 
money as payment for the normal collection of rice because it created agree-
able relations between the two groups. The traditional use of a tariff on rice 
could no longer be used against the landless farm-workers. Administrators' 
economic plans had disrupted tradition, but had created a better livelihood for 
the majority of the population. 
In order to break the debt cycle between landlord and farmer, the adminis-
trators persuaded landlords that farmers should have the possibility of buying 
the land. They agreed, but by the last decade of the nineteenth century a new 
development changed the impetus of the original policy. An agricultural 
depression which lasted from the 1890s through to the First World War cre-
ated an alarming new situation. The value of rice increased dramatically, while 
the purchasing power of money fell. Landlords now appealed to customary 
habits of paying fealties in rice, not money. Some farmers could not meet the 
landlord's demands. Other farmers sought other means of paying the landlord 
for the land and thereby escaping the changing demands of fealty offerings. 
They entered into labour contracts away from the countryside, so some left 
with the intent to return with cash to pay off the landlord or buy their land, 
and others left with the intention to find a new start. 
Some people left to enter into a new kind of labour relationship, that of 
bonded indenture. The flow of labourers from the countryside into Calcutta 
presented an awkward social and economic problem to the British administra-
104 
DEBT JN POSTCOLONIAL SOCIETY 
tion in India. The colonial administration had facilitated the end of 'feudal' 
systems of land tenure in the countryside, for the benefit of freeing the Indian 
peasant from unjust taxation by feudal lords. The end of the system of votive 
offerings and feudal taxation also eroded the symbolic aspects of precolonial 
status in the countryside. Now, in the countryside where old feudal lords finally 
gave way to the rule of colonial social and economic policy, the offer to work 
abroad on a fixed contract made it possible for people to escape otherwise 
insurmountable hardships. The historian Prakash (1988) tells us how a system 
ended, and how most colonial administrators thought it good that it had 
because they believed (somewhat erroneously) that it entailed servitude and 
bondage. The problem remained: what could the former farmers and workers 
do now that they no longer could depend on the regional lord for the organi-
zation of social, economic and political life? Obviously many of the lower 
caste farmers found themselves readily employed in making a better life, but 
others chose to work in the Pacific for a few years in order to make some 
money to return to India. The indentured labourers chose to sign on with 
companies who supplied workers to plantations in the Pacific. These were the 
labourers who came to develop Fiji's sugar plantations. 
Early Fijian trade 
The third case through which I examine the modality of gift exchange as con-
stitutive of the processes of colonization is that of Fiji. Fiji's violent exchanges 
happened in the early twentieth century on plantations, and the events of open 
violent conflict came just over ten years after independence, in the postcolonial 
period. None the less they bear great similarity to the history of the North 
American conquest. 
The Fijian islands became a territory under British control only in the twenti-
eth century. Kelly tells us that colonialism was very much an economic project, 
undertaken on behalf of the Fijians so as to make the financing of a govern-
ment of the islands possible. This would give benefit by creating political 
stability in the region which had suffered from the competitive rush by Euro-
pean and American nations to control it. Several West European countries 
rushed to own colonies in the late nineteenth century and the United States 
entered the early twentieth century with a plan for economic development and 
military control of the Pacific region, especially after establishing new relations 
in the small islands of Micronesia, including the Philippines and Hawai'i. The 
British plan had been to develop a local sugar industry for the export trade, so 
that the Fijian islands might have sufficient finances to support their own 
administration. It is possible to say that self-government, if not independence, 
was already in the minds of the early policy makers working in Fiji. 
This period must be understood as the end of the imperial era of global 
control. The administration of the Fijian colony followed upon the changing 
plans for the south Asian colonies. Each colony's administration drew upon 
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the lessons of the past, trying not to recreate the mistakes of the previous 
administrators. The corrections cast much of the political landscape into a 
confusion of ideologies and beliefs about what the value of the administration 
might be. Coming under control so late in the colonial days, the Fijians per-
haps benefited from wisdom learned from the mistakes made elsewhere, but 
the administrators inadvertently infused layers of policy with misconceived 
ideas and ill-hatched theories about the nature of indigenous politics and the 
possibility of indigenous rule. This monstrous postcolonial bird comes home 
to roost in the administration of Fiji and in its postcolonial politics. 
Things came apart first on a decision to find labour for the plantations from 
outside Fiji itself According to Kaplan, there were two reasons for this. One 
lay in the fact that many of the administrators wanted to protect the integrity 
and nobility of the Fijian lifestyle, its chiefs and systems of honorific gifts. The 
administrators argued that this lifestyle would be corrupted and wholly under-
mined by the plantation work. Further, some administrators argued that 
Fijians already held responsibilities for the garden work that supported cus-
tomary life and therefore should not be busy with plantation agriculture where 
it cost clans and families the labourers and work needed to support the pro-
duction of their own food. 
The second reason for the use of labourers from distant India was applied in 
a more hopeful rather than protective spirit. Administrators believed that the 
development of the Fijian colony could be undertaken as an effort to solve the 
labour problem in the Calcutta countryside, which I described in the previous 
section. 
Does the history of trade across other cultural groups in other areas, in Fiji 
for example, predict that conflicts in understanding should lead to alienation 
and violent conflict? What is the story of alienation where violent and oppres-
sive warfare does not explain the whole of the conflict between the trading 
partners? Does trade in Fiji, for example, hide different violations of trust of 
spirit and of obligation that lead to the same end? Sahlins, Thomas, Kaplan 
and Kelly can speak at great length about how to assess the exchanges between 
Fijians, European traders and South Asian migrants in the early colony. What 
they aim to describe remains a subtle cultural practice. In each case of the 
Fijian and the Indian, the anthropologists are confronted with the importance 
of assessing a habitual or ritual activity, undertaken in new contexts or with 
new people who might not understand it nearly as well as the practitioners 
hope. Getting the descriptions right can mean everything to the way in which 
the story unfolds, and if the earlier anthropologists had it all wrong then the 
postcolonial anthropologist must not only get it right but also expose the 
record of error and the implications of others following that record. 
Perhaps history does imitate myth and legend. Or perhaps certain structures 
of colonial power resonate through time and in different places because 
they are adapted and used to fit new locations. The contemporary conditions 
of life in the Fijian islands echo the mythic story of the colonial relations 
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between the Iroquois and the Thirteen Colonies. Here, first the colonial admin-
istration, and then later the independent national government, provided the 
same legal arrangements to the citizenry. Indigenous Fijians emerged as the 
rightful property holders on the basis of their long-term residence on the islands, 
whereas the immigrant community of labourers from India could not claim 
ownership of the Fijian land. In the second half of the twentieth century this 
half of the population of Fiji, whose ancestors came from India only two and 
three generations ago, could not buy land and had restricted rights in eco-
nomic activity in the nation. How does the Fijian government continue to 
insist on the propriety of such arrangements for democratic rule, especially 
after the Commonwealth of Nations ousted the small nation of less than a mil-
lion people in the late 1980s as a new democracy failing to keep its obligations 
to protect good government? 
Assessments of Fijian Kerekere Vakavidi (or begging) 
In order to understand the habit of begging in Fiji, I will turn to the many 
descriptions of the practice that are provided in the colonial record. In the first 
instances, the record of begging in Fiji seemingly invited the reader to enjoy 
the somewhat raunchy-sounding terms used to describe it. 'Kerekere Vakavidi' 
is a Fijian term that the European traders learned to use in order to describe 
the plaintive and ingratiating approach made to them when they arrived in the 
harbour. If I understand the practice correctly, the traders felt a bit uncomfort-
able with the forthright manner in which most Fijians approached them. The 
trading began with a request for the sailor to give particular objects to the 
Fijian person. This initiated trade because the sailors and traders then could 
express a liking for what they felt were equivalent objects of value, particularly 
objects of the luxury trade with east Asia and back home in Western Europe, 
objects such as bcche-de-mer (sea cucumbers which were highly prized in 
China for their medicinal and invigorating qualities) and sandalwood. There 
emerged a small trade in a local shell currency and sharks' teeth, both of which 
had uses in the ritual exchanges of the Fijians. Most Fijians and Europeans 
entered into these exchanges with good will and lively excitement at the 
process. If there could be a complaint on either side it simply came from the 
European sailors who felt that the Fijians did not really have very good trade 
goods, and the sailors often gave currency for goods that they could find else-
where, where the goods would be of better quality and in greater quantity. 
These accounts by Sahlins relied upon his reading of both missionary texts 
and sailor stories. 
What then can anthropologists know about such kinds of trade prior to the 
colonial encounter? Sahlins uses the science of archaeology and of linguistics 
to answer that question to his satisfaction, but we will see that his answer did 
not satisfy everyone! As for the archaeological record, he tells us simply that 
the region had been a crossroads of trade for centuries, including times before 
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the European colonization when Pacific islanders used the Fijian islands as a 
stopping point in their gradual migrations into the eastern Pacific, where they 
first settled as recently as 600 years ago. Sahlins shows his readers that the lin-
guistic record is somewhat more complex in interesting ways. As speakers of 
an Austronesian language, the Fijians enjoyed the ability to communicate with 
many other island peoples who were involved in similarly far-flung journeys for 
ceremonial trade in different parts of the Pacific. The word 'kerekere' means to 
request (something). 'Vaka' is of the (Fijian) people and 'viti' is a suffix that 
designates the conventional form of the noted practice. Hence, the word that 
the Fijian traders taught to their European counterparts simply meant to ask 
(for something) in the manner of a Fijian. I am tempted to imagine that the 
Fijian trader bore the same skills of flexibility with translation and cultural 
styles that an experienced anthropologist might develop. 
The assessments lead Sahlins to propose that Fijian culture might be some-
thing as simple as these codified forms of it, but that would understate the 
significance or power of such a thing in human life. He reckons that anthropol-
ogists should be attuned to the devices by which indigenous people come to see 
themselves as possessing cultural institution and social forms in need of inter-
pretation to strangers. This would bring them closer to the project of 
understanding how culture can be transformed in the process of colonization, 
and how it comes to be thought of as something that exists outside the social 
relationships in which people make it. But for Sahlins this is a creative process 
of shared and mutual transformations, affecting the colonizer and the colo-
nized equally. 
Critics of Sahlins (and the structuralist school of anthropology that they 
claim he represents) argue that his anthropological project is confused. Thomas 
understands these creative processes by which people reflect on their cultural 
practice and name it as a code of practice as alienation of people from the 
roots of meaningful life. Instead of understanding custom as an innovation in 
practice that allows for its codification, they see it as a failing of the discipline 
that colludes with the colonial power to apologize for the triumph of adminis-
trative control. In the strongest claims of his argument, Thomas (1992a) makes 
the claim that most of the description of the gift exchange errs in the direction 
of assuming that it could ever have been a practice untainted by European 
habit or thought. 
Sahlins makes an equally extreme response to this. He argues that the flour-
ishing of indigenous cultural practices need not be seen as a failing of the 
imagination. Instead he argues that the inventive capacities of social relation-
ships sustain humans in making cultural life, albeit somewhat differently, but 
still driving towards a meaningful expression of their regular daily experience. 
For Sahlins, especially in his later work (1992, 1994, 1995), the study of cultural 
life led him deeply into how people practised it innovatively to the end of find-
ing meaning in vicissitudes and hope in its alterations and transformations. 
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Assessments of Indian votive sacrifice: 
Holi to Diwali 
Sahlins's insights into the processes of making cultural life meaningful in new 
ways resonate through many circumstances of postcolonial politics, but one 
significant development has been addressed by his student Kelly. Kelly writes 
of the rituals of the Indian labourers in Fiji, the labourers whose lives changed 
irrevocably when they left India for the sugar plantations of the small colony 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The departures from India 
created new difficulties among the Hindu community who wished to maintain 
the habits by which caste might be sustained and remade. They made some 
attempts to renew and purify caste relations with ritual celebrations, especially 
after the ship's passage to Fiji and the work on the plantations made the obser-
vance of caste and the pollution of social life almost unavoidable. Early in the 
years of the colony, the Fiji-Indians (as they then called themselves or the 
Indo-Fijians as others more politely came to call them in later years) practised 
the ritual of Holi, a renewal ritual that sought to lift the rigid status markers of 
wealth and caste for a short period of time. In days of licence and celebration, 
the community tore apart and rebuilt the status system they sought to regener-
ate in their lives away from India. 
Later years altered that story. After the Second World War, the Indo-
Fijians bore different allegiances. No longer certain that they would leave 
their colonial bosses and return to a newly independent India, they sought to 
make a life in the small Fijian colony. The decision to remain in Fiji led them 
into a series of decisions: to leave the countryside for the town, to quit planta-
tion work and to open small businesses, to plan marriages with each other 
across the country. This meant that they found new release to create religious 
life in the new context where their future did not mean returning to their past. 
They abandoned many distinctions of caste, enlivening only the differences of 
Brahmin and 'lower' people in their daily lives. But, more than before, they 
practised a daily life infused with rituals of devotion, and many of the Indo-
Fijian community became practitioners of votive rituals in the Bhakti sect of 
Hinduism. Through these rituals they sought to purify life and thereby open 
their social relationships, and hence their lives, to new possibilities. With 
Fijian independence in 1970, the Inda-Fijian community made a show of 
commitment to the new nation and showed its solidarity with it by naming 
the ritual of 'Diwali', the festival of lights, the national ritual of celebration. 
Kelly observes that the festival of lights, like the votive rituals of daily life in 
'Bhakti', suits the new lives of urban dwellers with small businesses, a kind of 
work ethic and devotional practice that wholly supported the new relations of 
labour and capitalist enterprise. 
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Conclusions: postcolonial history as the context for 
the study of exchange 
I have approached the study of the colonial encounter, and what it has meant 
for the people described by the anthropologist, by examining the nature of 
trade and exchange in the early period of anthropological research. It is 
common enough to consider that anthropologists travelled with other Euro-
peans to distant places, but the nature of their relationships to the colonial 
project varies greatly. The problems of understanding human history make it 
wholly necessary to deal with what people understand about what they are 
doing when they encounter each other and make an effort to open pathways of 
trade between them. One way of explaining the impoverishment of the villages 
and clans that anthropologists describe in their early monographs would focus 
on the commodity exchanges between Europeans and people living on the 
periphery of state society, in colonized territories. The wisdom taken from 
careful histories of these encounters could point out the mutual misunder-
standings between the two. If anthropologists made this kind of assessment, 
then they could focus on the cultural elaborations of a basically economic 
encounter by giving primary importance to the social values of the figure that 
Mauss once called 'Homo economicus', when describing the economic ratio-
nalist whose decisions are informed by self-interest in maximizing wealth. But 
this judgement would be wrong. 
I can recall an older warning from Mauss, introduced in the section about 
the limits of using economic man as a modern term in all societies. Is it dan-
gerous to assume in all colonial encounters that the persons involved share a 
belief in the primacy of homoeconomicus, of the rationalist economic person? 
This assumption that all individuals work towards maximizing material 
wealth, in their own self interest, sometimes led early anthropologists to mis-
understand the world around them, and more often led traders to err against 
the best interests of the people with whom they were trading. The examination 
of the history of trade makes that clearer. 
Here, I looked at an example in which it can be shown that while it has been 
important to underline that many anthropologists first assume a common 
humanity with their research subjects, it remains the case that assuming that 
all humans are primarily concerned with economic well-being leads to a mis-
understanding of just what can be transacted between them. The effect of 
assuming that a common wisdom about the nature of humanity prevails some-
times leads to error, when the specifics of that theory might be informed by the 
subtle ideological preferences of anthropologists. 
Anthropology, as the discipline that made a virtue of difference and theo-
rized social variation among humans, now finds itself with doubts about the 
effects of that project on the lives of people around the world. A history of 
misunderstanding is blamed, but surely that begs for better understanding? 
One of the points of departure must be a re-conceptualization of historical 
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context. Some new efforts to understand context are already under way (see 
Dilley 1999), and they point to the need to think of anthropology as an inves-
tigation into the totality of human experience and exchanges as evidence of 
the total social fact. The analysis of anthropology in the postcolonial period 
could begin by assuming that humans were fundamentally social people, rather 
than simply economic beings. If so, it would be possible to explain how alien-
ation creates and regenerates misunderstanding, rather than originates in it. 
That will be the focus of my attention in the next chapter. 
Summary of chapter 6 
Postcolonial anthropology explains how inequality emerges in colonial encoun-
ters through misunderstandings ( often mutual) across different societies. Often 
anthropologists aim to describe the colonial context of historical encounters in 
order to clarify that domination and exploitation begin in the earliest days of 
the colony and continue to the present. This chapter examines three different 
early colonial encounters to investigate how some societies become indebted to 
colonial powers. First, we look at the alienation of the society of indigenous 
people of North America from their land by early American settlers who mis-
understood the trade of wampum as something like a social contract and a 
political constitution, when in fact it was neither from the Manhattan Indian 
point of view. Second we examine the alienation of the labour of farm workers 
from their wider role in the south Asian religious and economic system by 
allegedly well-intentioned colonial administrators who sought to free them 
from economic exploitation likened to 'enslavement' in caste relations, but 
instead separated them from the jati system of society and the means to make a 
life in the subcontinent. Perversely, the migration and economic dependence of 
south Asians on the sale of their labour indenture contracts became complete 
as a result of colonial policy. Third, we examine the case of Fiji, the destination 
of the same labourers from south Asia whose caste relations and social identity 
had been destroyed by misplaced administrative policy. The mutual misunder-
standings between early English traders and indigenous Fijians seeking 
exchange relationships with them do not explain the creation of indebtedness 
and poverty without accounting for the misperceptions of resident south 
Asians who remained concerned with the sacrifice of their labour. In summary, 
the Fijian case exposes best the analytical assumption underlying all the cases, 
namely that the 'colonial context' is defined as a background of forcible action 
by colonial powers, thereby reducing social relations to pre-social dominating 
forces. A better analysis of the 'colonial context' is required to expose how 
egalitarian relations across different societies are lost through negotiations and 
transactions of specific social relations. 
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WHEN TO GIVE 
In the last decades of the twentieth century, anthropologists began enquiries 
into how to account for the ways in which human history was played out 
through the practices of give and take, especially as used in the everyday lives 
of people. There had been increasing concern in the last part of the twentieth 
century to reflect upon the ways in which routine habits were weighted with 
meaning. It was especially the case that the habits of everyday life seemed 
inflected with the experiences of the past, even when those experiences might 
have held only small meaning to the immediacy of the present. The American 
anthropologist Margaret Mead wrote in an article for the popular journal Red-
book Magazine about how the habits of a woman's domestic work in the 1960s 
household often imitated patterns set by her grandmothers. For example, rou-
tine tasks that would have been necessary with the household technologies of 
the early twentieth century - such as ironing linens to dry the faint dampness 
and to smooth them - did not arise out of necessity by the late part of the 
twentieth century when new household heating technology removed the worry 
of finding mildew forming in the laundry closet. By the 1970s a generation of 
suburban women proclaimed that they did not iron linens and thereby voiced 
some part of their freedom from domestic drudgery! Mead and her colleague 
Rhoda Metraux, with whom she wrote many articles, argued that dramatic 
modern social changes against the past might occur with the alteration of 
everyday and conventional practices, even among isolated groups of people. 
She proposed a more provocative alteration to American marriage practices, 
suggesting that marriage might be contracted for companionship and eco-
nomic collaboration prior to child rearing, for the work of child rearing and 
even for companionship and social support after child rearing - a kind of two-
or even three-step marriage would be arranged with the purpose of the union 
clearly in the mind of all the participants. Habits and laws of matrimonial 
transactions would thus move within the ken of the times. While many would 
dispute the 'real' revolutionary force of Mead's proposals for lower-middle-
class women readers of a popular fashion and lifestyle magazine, they remain 
good examples of the new awareness of the widespread testing of habits and 
conventions of social life in the late twentieth century. Like marriage and 
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household work, the habits of give and take are especially interesting for the 
anthropologist seeking to understand the force of historical experience in 
everyday life. The problem in all of this has been to describe in what ways his-
torical experiences can lade habitual social action as non-conscious expressions 
of the past. 
How are gifts given and received and what does the analysis of the practice, 
rather than the rules or the deep patterns of reciprocity, tell about social life? 
The answer to that question requires a theory of social action that goes 
beyond the analysis of ceremonial exchange to encompass small personal 
exchanges, thereby offering an even more broadly defined theory of exchange. 
A practice theory of gift exchange claims that anthropologists can raise a his-
torical critique that would trace the legacy of powerful relationships through 
to the immediate era because analysis focuses on the 'how' of giving; that is the 
modes, strategies and deployments of gifts. The basic aim of practice theory is 
to expose the human subject's agency as aspiration that is demonstrated in 
hopeful social action. This is how the gift works to create the social agent in 
the matrix of a relational social hierarchy. Practice theorists' aims to expose the 
ambitious agent are fundamentally modernist: however their efforts to launch 
a new kind of historical critique that reflects back upon its own premises move 
them beyond modernist social theory. Practice theorists' effort to develop a 
reflexive sociology raises the potential for practice theory to escape modernist 
assumptions that might underlie or encage the theory, thereby pressing it into 
the creation of social hierarchy. 
The sociologist Bourdieu, and somewhat differently the anthropologists 
Sahlins and Ortner, and even more profoundly differently, Strathern (who 
would reject the label of practice theory) argued that gift exchange was more 
than the transaction of objects: it was a knowledge practice. By calling gift 
exchange a knowledge practice, anthropologists understood that people under-
stood both ceremonial exchange and little acts of give and take to be social 
acts that expressed conscious and non-conscious belief, and made social rela-
tionships at the same time as it recreated social structure. For the most part 
these anthropologists, especially the sociologist Bourdieu, focused on the work 
of culture as the playing out of non-conscious processes in everyday life. Bour-
dieu named this constellation of non-conscious social action 'habitus', using 
the label first developed by Mauss for routine behaviour, which has been shaped 
over years of experience as habits might be. Habitus is a mnemonic device for 
encoding generations of historical experience within a single person's body and 
acts, or within the shared acts of a number of people. 
What difference does it make to think about the practice of gift exchange, 
'the how of the gift', as a kind of argument about the shared human experi-
ence of history? How does thinking about the practice of giving and taking 
expose the work of reconciliation that people do in order to make sense of 
their experiences of the past? What memory or knowledge does the exchange 
of gifts hide from the consciousness of the participants in the exchange? 
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Power and misunderstanding in modernity 
Passing time is an idiom that people use to let others know that they are wait-
ing for more important matters which will be decided in the future. A person 
might wait for another to arrive, thereby passing the time; but the sense of the 
terms suggests that getting the time correct does matter to the effectiveness of 
our actions. When used idiomatically, it suggests that the actions of the present 
do not matter so much to what is yet to come. The timing of the gift changes 
everything about human exchanges because it makes people reflect and act 
upon their reflections. What people understand about the gift changes as they 
reflect upon it, and in turn changes the way they create their relationships with 
each other. The timing of the gift alters the power as it is played out in human 
relationships. 
What does the study of the gift contribute to any analysis of power in 
human relationships? Of the ways in which power relationships can be estab-
lished through giving gifts, perhaps the most significant would be the sense of 
timing that people use in gift giving. Although I have already described some 
uses of spiritual power in the example of the hau, there may be other ways to 
discuss power in the exchange of gifts. In this chapter, I will discuss how the 
timing of the gift changes everything about its implications for establishing 
power in human relations. 
Careful timing serves the best ends of the giver of the gift, even if that is 
an anxious kind of situation. To be the host of the feast, or to be giving the 
dinner sets a claim or an obligation over the guests either to return the hospital-
ity and keep the relationship, or not. You might think about the feasts that you 
might participate in at different seasonal holidays. Often there can be con-
siderable consternation about where and with whom a holiday feast might be 
celebrated. In a different example, as in shared student households, it can be 
common for housemates to share the cooking, alternating responsibility for 
cooking dinners. If one housemate brings a spontaneous gift of wine to 
the table, others will think of responding with a gift of a similar kind. Unfor-
tunately, if they mistakenly give a bottle too soon, perhaps the next night, the 
gift smacks of a 'pay-back' or an insult to the friend who made the first gesture 
of generosity. 
In the largest picture, a question arises: How do people mutely play out the 
continuation of traditional habits into modern times? This question introduces 
the central problems of practice theory: How do non-conscious beliefs play 
out in society? How do human agents reproduce society? How does the use of 
knowledge succeed in creating the power dynamics of social hierarchy? How 
does misunderstanding contribute to the continuation of social relations? 
Some of these questions expose the failures of modernity; that is, they show 
how the problems of the older more traditional society continue into modern 
times. The description of continuing traditional beliefs in modern times poses 
the possibility of a powerful criticism of modernity. However, another contri-
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bution of this work arises. That is, the opportunity to reflect upon the nature 
of unconscious and unspoken knowledge in social relationships. Here, the case 
that Bourdieu elaborates for Algeria becomes interesting for what it can tell 
about the character of unspoken knowledge in the social imaginary. 
The Berber case 
Throughout this chapter, I will draw primarily upon discussions of the gift in 
North Africa. Although the history of exchange in the region had been exam-
ined carefully in the work of Polyani, who drew attention to the local (and 
internal) mechanisms of capital formation as they surfaced in cultural idioms 
of exchange and barter, I take his work to be largely historical, and not ethno-
graphic except for his argmnent to give attention to cultural features of history. 
Although North Africa famously presents anthropologists of law and religion 
with the compelling example of the differential force of rule in the practice 
of Islamic belief (for early work see Gellner 1973, 1981 and more recently 
Messick 1993), some of the most interesting concerns for anthropological 
methods and ethnography come out of research into marriage customs and 
feasting in the region. My concerns here will be with everyday practice and 
belief, and the extents and limits of its flexibility in the region. Most of my ref-
erences in this chapter are drawn from anthropological work conducted in 
Algeria and Morocco. I examine the research of Bourdieu (1979), Geertz et al. 
(1979), Rosen (2002) and to a lesser extent, Gellner (1973, 1981) for what it 
explains about the relationship between power, the conjectures of belief, and 
the dissemblance of exchange practice. Bourdieu, more than the rest, 
addressed directly the practice of giving and receiving gifts in North Africa, 
and also made the most extensive commitment to the people of the region, 
especially the Berbers who lived nomadically throughout the different nation 
states. By comparison, Gellner, and the collection edited by Geertz et al. ( 1979) 
made the character of rationality the matter of concern. These anthropologists 
found that disentangling economic rationality from philosophical rationality 
would prove enlightening, not only for the fuller understanding of the region, 
but also for the process of doing anthropology. 
North African anthropology holds the attention of the ethnographers of 
gift exchange, as well as the regional ethnographers I have mentioned, because 
in that cultural region economic rationality can seemingly overwhelm all other 
explanation of human transactions, and at the same time efforts to establish 
the rule of that rationality can turn quickly to farce. There always exists a 
double or triple or quadruple level of understanding to which all social rela-
tions turn. Bourdieu describes this as misconnaissance. His translator names it 
'misrecognition'. Social relations are not governed by the rule of recognition; 
instead, misrecognition generates the social life of the group. But, in general, 
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Figure 7.1 The Kabyle house plan shows the routine organization of household space 
through which men and women move every day. Bourdieu shows that the 
space works as a mnemonic for the history of men and women's shared 
experience and identity. From The Logic of' Practice by Pierre Bourdieu 1980 
(1990), translated by Richard Nice, copyright Polity Press, Cambridge, UK; 
Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA. First published in French 1980 by 
Les Editions de Minuit as Le Sens Pratique. 
The historical record of Bourdieu's research work in Algeria shows him to 
strengthen his commitments to understanding how people reproduce social 
inequalities, even while they aim for social equality. Consider first the honorary 
feasts in the Berber communities, which Bourdieu described during his sojourn 
there as a French soldier in the period of the Algerian wars on the eve of inde-
pendence. Most commonly the feasts celebrated the marriage of a woman and 
man from the same region, creating relationships that could be consolidated 
with the rhetorical language of 'blood' and honour. These marriages of cousins 
and close acquaintances sustained community sentiments as they shared simi-
lar values and beliefs. Speeches addressed the history of trade, exchange and 
alliance between the different families, sometimes envisioned as well-worn 
pathways or roads of exchange along which women and wealth flowed rou-
tinely. Reinterpreting Bourdieu's concern with social reproduction and power 
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into a concern with the sentiments of the collectivity, Hildred Geertz explained 
that the event of the wedding feast and the speeches in honour of the hosts 
served to create a sense of felt community that reproduced its interests and its 
futures in well-travelled pathways of exchange relations. 
Berber households located the sensibility of order in everyday life, dividing 
men's and women's labour to different purposes for the social and economic 
sustenance of the household. Berber households included extended kin and 
the women worked together ( and not as a single housewife as in the nuclear 
family). Women exerted considerable power in the choice of a wife for the son. 
This wife would be a member of the household for some years, and the women 
claimed that they did not want to tolerate an individual who could not share 
the domestic work and routines of the household. Perhaps it is not surprising 
that Bourdieu had been able to show the design of a Berber house as a blue-
print for the organization of memory and the regulation of social behaviour. 
His illustration of Berber households becomes a model of the non-conscious 
practice and belief, made all the more apparent in circumstances in which the 
rules of its operation might be threatened. The organization of the Berber 
house is illustrated in Figure 7 .1. 
On occasions when women married into the group from greater distances, 
the very presence of the newcomers and their undisciplined habits posed a 
problem to the community's sense of well-being and cohesion. At marriage 
feasts, the arrival of a bride from a more distant place required the recognition 
of an honourable history of association across that distance, and speech givers 
recalled longer pathways of exchange over a deeper history. Distant or foreign 
women marrying into Berber households posed considerable concern, such 
that it became necessary to create stronger claims for the honour of the match. 
Conversely, with the more powerful claims to honour came more serious 
injunctions against the defamation of that ideology. For example, the regula-
tion of women's sexuality became a matter of wider societal concern, rather 
than the concern of the women of the household alone. 
Bourdieu aimed throughout his career to create opportunities for reasonable 
discussion between North African and European scholars, by establishing a 
journal for intellectual collaboration as well as study and research positions for 
students from the region. In the first years when Bourdieu lived in Algiers, he 
spent his days in the rural villages in order to describe the political life of the 
community as it was made and reproduced in ceremonial feasts as well as in 
everyday life. In later years, he took a post at the university as a young man, 
and continued to support Algerian researchers and students throughout his 
career. Much of Bourdieu's work supporting the North African community 
was not made public, yet his interests in these people did move him into a new 
development in his scholarship overall. At the very end of his career, he wrote 
about the suffering in the livelihood of the poor and the immigrants who had 
been excluded socially from the normal pathways and moved to the hidden 
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Figure 7.2 Bourdieu's model of challenge and riposte shows the dynamic structure of 
feasting. A Berber leader wins prestige by demonstrating his ability to be 
generous by giving the most wonderful feast of recent memory, at just the 
right time. From The Logic of Practice by Pierre Bourdieu 1980 (1990), 
translated by Richard Nice, copyright Polity Press, Cambridge, UK; Stan-
ford University Press, Palo Alto, CA. First published in French 1980 by Les 
Editions de Minuit as Le Sens Pratique. 
His biographers tell us that as a soldier of the end of the colonial period, 
Bourdieu became an ethnographer more by accident than by plan, although 
he long harboured a fascination for the contemporary debates in anthropol-
ogy. Bourdieu's intellectual biographer, Jenkins (1992), reminds us that as a 
researcher of social hierarchy and power in France and in social life most gen-
erally, the Algerian experience disturbed Bourdieu and changed his overall 
career dramatically. Recd-Danahay (2004) in her intellectual biography argued 
that these years radicalized the young Bourdieu, but in personal ways that had 
remained unexpressed until the end of his career when he theorized just what 
autobiography should be (see Bourdieu 2004). While in the Berber village 
Bourdieu recorded the means by which the Berber leaders established power in 
the community simply by wining the respect of the rest of the villagers. The 
festive events follow one upon the other, enhancing the reputation or prestige 
of those hosts of each feast who surpassed the last. Often, these were marriage 
feasts which all of the village attended. Not only did the feasters celebrate the 
marriage of the couple, but they also enjoyed the speeches, jokes, banter and 
displays of generosity by the hosts. On these occasions a host could establish 
his reputation as an honourable man, well able to treat his guests in grand style. 
Leaders could draw others together with them in acts of generous hospitality; 
yet, Bourdieu's analysis shows that hospitality could also be a suitable modality 
for the generation of powerful new alliances and the creation of dominant and 
subordinate partners across the households of the village. Consider Bourdieu's 
model for the competitive exchange and competitive hospitality of feast giving, 
shown in Figure 7.2 above. 
To ask about the timing of exchanges is to consider that giving the gift 
might not be a straightforward act of generosity, but a self-conscious and self-
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interested act of power. Of course, there has been ample evidence of the way 
in which a person can enter into competitions or tournaments of giving wealth 
away. It allows for the deploying of the gift in many different ways: as a chal-
lenge to another person to respond in kind, a request for future relations with 
a new partner, and perhaps the pacification of raw feelings. But the timing of 
the gift opens up different meanings for its use. The timing of the gift changes 
everything about its significance, just as when a gift of appreciation is given too 
soon. How do people misunderstand each other? If an anthropologist gives 
attention to the timing of exchanges, then how does that enable better argu-
ments about how to live? Anthropologists did that by making a distinction 
between what people said they knew and what they did. 
A comparison between Bourdieu's and Levi-Strauss's 
timing of gift exchange 
Chapter 6 examined the importance of alliance theory in the period after the 
Second World War by thinking most carefully about the substance of the gift. 
This chapter looks at a complementary approach that builds upon alliance 
theory and critiques it by examining the role of time in either of the theories. 
I compare practice approaches with structuralist ones to show that the work 
of time in the two cases is remarkably different. On the one hand, time either 
collapses or unfolds in the structuralist project. On the other hand, in 
approaching the study of practice, anthropologists did not give much attention 
to its ambiguities, mysteries or uncertainties of social relations. First, I will go 
back to concerns raised in the previous chapter because so much of what fol-
lows here criticizes some basic concepts and explanations worked out by 
Levi-Strauss in his structural theory of social variation. While Levi-Strauss's 
alliance theory aimed to expose the principle of reciprocity underlying all of 
human society, other scholars aimed to explain the implications of mistaking 
the grounds of social life for ideology and belief about society. 
Levi-Strauss explains that the course of time passes in two different forms of 
reciprocity across the generations: the short cycle of exchange between clans 
and the long cycle of exchange. In the short cycle, clans gift back the gift of a 
woman within a generation of time. The clansmen whose sister leaves them to 
marry a man of another clan will receive the gift of a wife from the women 
who are sisters of the other clan. That is, a Clan A woman leaves her brothers 
to marry a Clan B man. Soon, within the same or in one generation, a Clan B 
woman leaves her brothers to marry a Clan A man. This preferential marriage 
rule, or the principle of marrying back into the other clan, mirrors the short 
cycle of reciprocity and the marriage of cross-cousins. For a man in a patrilineal 
society, that would mean he would seek to marry one of his mother's brother's 
several daughters. Levi-Strauss diagrammed it as shown in Figure 7.3a. 
In other marriage arrangements, a longer time passed before a clan recov-
ered a bride from the same clan to whom they had given a bride. These longer 
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(a) Cycle of reciprocity. Marriage with the mother's brother's daughter (long cycle). 
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(b) Cycle of reciprocity. Marriage with the father's sister's daughter (short cycle). 
Figure 7.3 Cycles of reciprocity (long and short) over several generations show that the 
passing of time is marked from one generation to the next by each moiety. 
Men of one moiety return a sister for a wife received from the opposite 
moiety in an older generation, thereby preserving the structure of social 
organization over time. From Elementary Structures of Kinship by Claude 
Levi-Strauss 1967 (1949), first published in France under the title. Les Struc-
tures elementaires de la parente in 1949. A revised edition was published 
under the same title in France in 1967. Translation copyright by Beacon 
Press. Reprinted by permission of Beacon Press, Boston. 
cycles most commonly included a preference for arranging a marriage with a 
cross-cousin. For a man in a patrilineal society, that would mean he might seek 
to marry one of his father's sister's daughters. Levi-Strauss diagrammed it as 
shown in Figure 7 .3b. 
I am fascinated by Levi-Strauss's uses of the alliances made across clans, as 
they spell out over several generations to achieve the literal accomplishment of 
the reciprocal exchange of women between clans. This accomplishment within 
living memory of the clans (that is, within five generations) allows them to 
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observe their own success in keeping reciprocal relationships. Often the ritual 
event could be diagrammed to show the success of the work. 
Other anthropologists, for example Leach and Godelier, each argued this a 
little bit differently in their attempt to understand social inequality within sys-
tems of reciprocal exchange and marriage alliances. Leach tried to show the 
complexities of an ideological political system with a sociological reality of 
marriage alliances. Godelier demonstrated the alternative forms of inequality 
generated in those societies in which wives were welcomed and reciprocated 
with bride-wealth, and those societies in which men reciprocated with other 
women, usually their own sisters and clanswomen. 
Leach's (1954) study in Burma showed that alternative systems of marriage -
a system of keeping reciprocity in short cycles and a system of keeping it in 
longer ones - might co-exist within the same villages. He argues that hierarchy 
in Burma becomes a very interesting problem because the exchange of women 
succeeds in differentiating men to greater and greater degrees of hierarchy over 
several generations. In a frustrating attempt to explain how reciprocal exchange 
in marriage alliances could foster hierarchy rather than equality, Leach ulti-
mately surrenders to the older argument. The social differences collapse as the 
interaction between the two systems of marriage leads to the point where the 
simplest work of alliance making succeeds: giving your sister to men from 
whom you have received a wife. At this point, the structural principle becomes 
the same as an ideological conviction. 
Godelier's (1986) study in Highland New Guinea looked at how men used 
knowledge to establish systems of prestige based on the differentiation of 
expertise in warfare, sorcery, or ritual and cosmological knowledge. In this 
research, Godelier compared the ritual exchanges at marriage. He pointed out 
that in many New Guinea Highland societies, such as that of the Kawelka Big 
Man described by Andrew and Marilyn Strathern, when a man married a 
woman he gave away bride wealth to her brothers. By comparison, in some 
New Guinea Highland societies, when a man married a woman, he immedi-
ately gave a sister to his wife's clan's men in order for her to be a wife to one of 
them. The simple focus for Godelier's analysis is the fact that bride wealth 
could represent, or signify, a woman in some societies, whereas in other soci-
eties a woman represented, or could stand for, nothing else but another 
woman. Again the simple focus for Godelier was that a woman was exchanged 
for a woman. A very neat and tidy paradox emerges: where wealth can signify 
the gift of a woman, the extremes of variation of hierarchy among men could 
be achieved through gift exchange and ceremonial feasting; but where women 
can only signify the need for another woman, men's hierarchy emerges more 
fixedly. 
The researchers each address the larger problem of this chapter: just what 
is the relationship between ideology and sociological fact of relationships? 
Each of them addresses the problem of inequality as a function of timing of 
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Figure 7.4 Matrimonial exchange 'misrccognizes' the central importance of the ideo-
logical purpose of the marriage (shown as the dotted lines) thereby hiding 
the structures behind the union (shown as the solid lines). From The Logic 
of Practice by Pierre Bourdieu 1980 (1990), translated by Richard Nice, 
copyright Polity Press, Cambridge, UK; Stanford University Press, Palo 
Alto, CA. First published in French 1980 by Les Editions de Minuit as Le 
Sens Pratique. 
The principal theorist to address the timing of exchange is Bourdieu, but in 
order to think about his argument more clearly, I will turn again to the Berber 
research on the eve of Algerian independence. 
The kinship diagrams drawn by Bourdieu (Figure 7.4) trace the explanation 
for the marriage and the history of exchanges between the clans. What he out-
lines better than most is the ways in which patterns of marriage emulate basic 
rules of exogamy, even where the households involved do not hold the prin-
ciples by which they plan marriages up to scrutiny and discussion. The claims 
for the work of marriage might run ultimately in the same direction as the 
claims for the honours of marriage, but a more superficial analysis would have 
assumed that other arrangements for marriage would prevail. For Bourdieu's 
analysis, it is helpful to recall the new illustration of the genealogical chart in 
Figure 7.4. The illustration provides the reader with a visual image of Bour-
dieu's argument that the reciprocal exchange of sisters in a marriage alliance is 
misrecognized as the outcome of histories of men's honour. 
Intriguingly, this 'marriage' of principles of exogamy (to parallel cousins) 
with ideology of honours and households and their overt alliances leads to the 
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elaboration of a new theory. The conjunction of local explanation and acts 
with the regulating rules and habit of interaction draws attention wholly to the 
work of how people practise their social relations. Bourdieu argues that by 
giving attention to the timing of exchange, rather than seeking the hidden 
principles of it, the anthropologist can give a fuller account of power. 
Pathways of exchange 
Practice theorists show that the exercise of power in exchanges coerces people 
into gradually altering the habits of generations into new forms. It remained 
common enough for all present to realize that the long-term habits of marry-
ing women from adjacent villages could gradually change to include marriage 
with other women. Over years the agreements between kin came to include 
consultations with the new wife's kin, and thus new ways became routines. As 
people told and retold the links and connections that made them relatives, they 
learned the stories and genealogies very well. New pathways through the 
memory of associations soon became habitual pathways. It is this play of 
power, strategizing and association that fixated Bourdieu's attention to the 
lifestyle of the Berbers. Although Bourdieu pays little obvious tribute to either 
Durkheim 's or Mauss's work, he undertakes a new elaboration of Mauss's 
claim: that the gift constitutes and concentrates social processes and thereby 
uses the analysis of gift exchange as an instance of the total social fact. He 
does this by examining the dynamics of the uses of time in exchange relations 
in ceremonial life, in the everyday life of the household, and in the small per-
sonal exchanges of daily life. 
In extending the work of ceremonial exchange to everyday life, Bourdieu 
notes the uses of small gifts to mark how the personal exchanges of the Berber 
household move its members to fuller realizations of the orthodoxy of their 
relationships. In this, his study underlines the exhaustive role that exchange 
plays in daily life. Although he does not conceptualize his problem following 
Mauss's concepts, his careful empirical description of the pervasive habit of 
give and take in everyday life sustains the claims of Mauss that some habits 
constitute a total social fact. 
How do people exchange small gifts, or even ceremonial ones, to make 
social life more hazardous or challenging? Could there be pleasure in agonistic 
exchanges, such as the competitive feasting in North Africa? It might be wise 
to doubt the clarity and order of Bourdieu's account of the Berber lifestyle, 
given other studies of the region that emphasize its fluidity and peripatetic 
knowledge structures. Perhaps Bourdieu's emphasis on embedded tradition of 
everyday life resonates throughout the book. This is a virtue in many respects, 
because finding the details of life to bear out some sense of meaning has been 
the hallmark of much anthropology. 
The difficulty of accepting Bourdieu's account as an account of the totality of 
life arises from a number of other ethnographic accounts that make duplicity 
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and dissemblance the problem of the day. Theft and trickery remain one of the 
more common details of transactions in the Berber social networks. A debate 
about the importance of conjecture and theft emerged. No ethnographer would 
claim that sheep stealing is a definitive characteristic of the Berber villages, but 
the question is how to reconcile this habit with the routines and traditionalism 
described by Bourdieu. 
Second, it is important to consider how the disruptions of daily life under 
colonialism might be considered more fully in the account of how Berber vil-
lagers exchange gifts with each other, and how they exchange across villages. 
Bourdieu certainly takes criticism for isolating his account of Berber life, as if 
it were a kind of pre-modern existence. I think that this claim needs scrutiny 
under fuller consideration of the problems of dissemblance and disruption of 
meaningful communication in the early or late colonial period. 
Translation of customary and colonial trade law 
Geertz retells a joke shared with him by a Jewish informant (notably after the 
expulsion of the Jews from Morocco), recorded in his field notes in 1968, to 
illustrate just how difficult it is to record empirical examples of the extent to 
which historical knowledge is shared among a group of people and the record 
of an informant's commentary can be indicative of a system of belie( The fact 
that the joke has disturbed later generations of anthropologists because it pre-
sents the manipulations of social memory and stereotypes as indexes to 
collective memory makes it all the more compelling as an example of the com-
plex problem of how to translate fieldwork experience into anthropological 
knowledge. Geertz tells the story from the early colonial period of 1912, of 
how a Jewish trader named Cohen uses and manipulates Berber law and colo-
nial French law in order to win back legal compensation for his loss of trading 
goods in a house raid against him during his visit to Berber territories. After 
an initial failure to rob the armed Cohen, the Berber thieves (who came from a 
tribe different from that tribe with whom Cohen had his trading agreement) 
dressed as Jewish women in order to enter the house by trickery. Cohen's com-
panions die in the raid, but he hides and escapes with only his life, to avoid his 
death in the house fire that the thieves planned to set. Cohen secures the agree-
ment of the French captain that he may seek compensation under customary 
law, but at his own risk. Cohen does seek his "ar', the customary compensa-
tion, with the help of armed Berber Marmushans, of a different tribe to the 
robbers. They kidnap a shepherd of the robber tribe and take the tribe's sheep 
as their compensation. This theft is recognized by the robber tribe as judicious 
appropriation under the trade-pact system, and they ask Cohen to make a fair-
minded selection of sheep to meet the demands of his 'ar against their earlier 
theft of his goods. Cohen makes a selection and returns to the colonial fort to 
show the success of his journey. The incredulous French captain in charge of 
the fort imprisons him as a suspected Berber spy and impounds his sheep. 
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The story shows that the early attempts by colonial authorities failed to 
erase a customary trading law that gave access by Jewish traders, especially 
those fluent in Berber, like Cohen, to Berber tribes. Cohen, entering into trading 
with Berber tribes under the system of trade pact, 'mizrag', also had recourse 
to compensation, 'ar, if the system broke down. While colonial law would 
respond normally with punitive action against the Berber thieves who made 
the house-raids on Cohen during his trading journey to Marmusha, in this 
case the militia could not protect Cohen or find him justice because the terri-
tory fell beyond their reach, as a geopolitical area, its people out of the control 
of colonial administrative forts. Customary laws of political and trade rela-
tions remained effective where new colonial laws could not be enforced. But 
success in customary trading law brings Cohen no joy because it does not 
make sense to the colonial officials. In the imagination of administrative offi-
cers the success of customary law appears as collusion between Berber and 
Jew, an impossible situation in a Berber area where the French military worked 
in order to protect the Jewish residents. 
The story also shows that the irreconcilable stereotype of deep conflict 
between Jew, Berber, and French does not apply to the event. The anthropolo-
gist records explications of other people's explications. As Geertz writes, 
Here, in our text, sorting out would begin with distinguishing the three 
unalike frames of interpretation ingredient in the situation, Jewish, 
Berber, and French, and would then move on to show how (and why) 
at that time, in that place, their co-presence produced a situation in 
which systematic misunderstanding reduced traditional form to social 
farce. What tripped Cohen up, and with him the whole ancient pat-
tern of social and economic relationships within which he functioned, 
was a confusion of tongues. 
(Geertz 1973: 9) 
These contingencies in the work of exchange, especially the deployment of cus-
tomary laws of exchange, can never escape the work of ethnography. Code is 
not conduct. The event might have unfolded in so many different ways, per-
haps with the Berbers resisting both the motive to continue the trade pact and 
the subjection to French colonial law. Perhaps they would have murdered 
Cohen and his friends instead of negotiating over the cull of the sheep. Geertz 
would remind Bourdieu that ethnographers must struggle to keep ethnography 
alive to the gist of the events, to the sense of the communication, or risk reduc-
ing it to a private joke. 
Geertz provides readers with an interesting conjunction between the vague 
and misunderstood: ambiguous uses of customary trade law within Berber 
social relations converge with the confusion of colonial relations. Geertz con-
siders the events as a farce, generated by a 'confusion of tongues', not by the 
imminence of orthodoxy of knowledge practice. Past madness is bound up in 
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the figurative Jew, becomes reasonable as told by the Jewish Cohen. It is retold 
as a fable for the present, but it is a fable told as a joke. In this case the joke, 
albeit a poor joke, suggests that anthropologists might be a bit suspicious of 
the orthodoxy of colonialists' knowledge. He shares notes from his field book, 
which show readers how sheep stealing is also a kind of law. 
Geertz's story poses an unusual question about relations of power, exchange 
and debt by reference to an example of sheep stealing as a case in which a 
man's exchanges are easily misunderstood and affect the plans for his timely 
delivery of the wealth of sheep as legal compensation into the hands of the 
rightful recipient. Deeply agonistic exchange appears as collusion between ene-
mies in this difficult and unpleasant joke from the earliest part of the century. 
Yet more than 50 years later, informants remember the shambles of colonial 
relations and the strange playing out of power within them. 
Consider Geertz's claim that it matters that people mistranslate different ver-
sions of how to exchange. Here, the story might make sense of past madness 
by exposing it. The misrecognition of Cohen who has been robbed by Berbers 
disguised as Jewish women; as a Berber who has recourse to action through an 
exchange relation known as 'mizrag'; as a legal plaintiff who can appeal to the 
French colonial soldiers, presents a problem to practice theory's claims. What 
evidence shows that there is intentional miscalculation in making a virtue of 
confusion in power relations? Fifty years after the earliest colonial occupation 
of Morocco, what distinguishes misrecognition from camp humour and from 
social farce? 
A question to pursue for better understanding of misrecognition might be: 
How does a person recognize the historical and structural limitations on their 
habits and change them? Practice theory can claim that history repeats itself as 
farce because the misrecognition of power in social relationships can certainly 
lead to continuities of inequality in society. But Geertz's example suggests that 
history repeats itself as farce when people know that they make a travesty of 
those relations as a means to setting a different course from the one authored 
by events of the past. 
Conjecture, strategy and misrecognition as problems of 
collective memory 
A consideration of deception and conjecture in social relations can help 
anthropologists to clarify the ways people make social relationships work over 
time. Some of those working in this new approach followed the projects of 
those philosophers who argued that there was no structure to society. Further, 
they proposed that human society was a historical product and not informed 
by deeper meanings than those that pertained in the present. They argued that 
a person was no more than the sum of his public social acts. Of course, the 
rejoinder to this included the complaint that a person could be deluded about 
the structures that moved him or her to act as he or she did. One of the con-
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cerns raised in this critique must be whether the focus on immediate daily exis-
tence actually raised new questions about the importance of agency in shaping 
social relationships. 
Recalling three decades of research experience in Morocco, and reflecting 
upon movements of people across North Africa more generally, Rosen (2002) 
poses a number of important questions about the nature of collective memory 
in the region. It might be judicious to say that in his reflections on the ways in 
which people come to shared understanding of the past, he has posed an 
important contribution to the problem left unsolved by Bourdieu's practice 
theory: namely, how do people make explicit and change the assumptions and 
beliefs by which they live? Rosen recounts how when 'asked to relate their own 
historical memories people would often refer to moments when the existing sets 
of dominant relationships were in a state of uncertainty or upheaval' (Rosen 
2002: 90). Taking the work of the timing of power relations as a kind of social 
game that people played, Rosen tells us how people understood change as a 
reconfiguring of social relations, a recognition that a possibility existed for 'the 
board to be swept clean' so that 'a new round of the game could begin' (p. 90). 
The costs of that reconfiguring of collective memory can be intriguing for 
scholars. Anthropologists might ask how memories of whole groups (not 
simply individuals) disappear from the collective history. Here's one example. 
What does an anthropologist make of a collective history that insists on a 
memory of a past that has no continuing connection with the present? He 
takes the case of a public garden built by French administrators in the colonial 
period, which continues to be accessed intermittently by the public and 
admired for its 'pathways, plantings and benches' (p. 94). As a physical space, 
collective concern for it gives it a conceptual significance to felt relationships 
that could be made through it as a location of memory. Does it underscore the 
fact that the possibility of a shared public space existed once in the past, but 
cannot exist again with any certainty? In a second example, Rosen asks us to 
consider what precisely does an anthropologist make of the absence of the offi-
cial memory of the Jews in shared narrative of Moroccan history? Or more 
difficult still, what does an anthropologist make of a collective memory of 
Jewish folksongs, sung by Muslims (some of them Jewish converts to Islam) 
with nostalgia for a people who are all but gone? 
Conclusions: history as misrecognitions of exchange relations 
In this chapter, I have examined the ways in which gift exchange engendered 
misunderstandings, by showing how competitive individuals used the ambigui-
ties of the meaning and reason of exchange to differentiate people into 
hierarchical relations with each other. I have also examined two cases in which 
the participants in exchange knowingly submit themselves to playing with 
ambiguity in the games of establishing themselves in differential power rela-
tions with each other. What does it mean to recognize that all the tricks in the 
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game are being played against you, or that you are using all the tricks of the 
trade to establish your prestige vis a vis your exchange partners? 
In an assessment of the playing out of gender ideology (rather than men's 
hierarchy) in the Pacific, Marilyn Strathern offers respect and caution for Bour-
dieu's theory of knowledge in the coining of the term misrecognition. 
In Bourdieu's practice theory she reminds us that he offers an important insight 
that humans bear a double consciousness. It is Bourdieu's fundamental insight 
that people give great importance to the overt discussion of their agency within 
the conventionally accepted terms of their lives, at the same time that they 
operate with conscious awareness of less overt reasons for being. 
If the system is to work, the agents must not be entirely unaware of 
the truth of their exchanges, which is made explicit in the anthropolo-
gist's model, while at the same time they must refuse to know and 
above all to recognize it. 
(Strathern 1988: 304) 
The relationship between the different orders of knowledge, the openly dis-
cussed account and the hidden knowledge receives my attention here because 
Strathern makes important points about practice theory in general, but not for 
Melanesia alone. 
In Strathem's terms, the hiding or purposeful refusal to recognize the knowl-
edge makes potent use of its role for determining action. But she points out 
that yet another situation occurs. Sometimes people aim to make clear the 
basis of what they know; for example, Melanesians aim to expose the gender 
of things and presumably know when they conceal it. This would fit with 
many aspects of Bourdieu's model of misrecognition, if there were not yet 
another kind of problem of misunderstanding that deserves discussion. Strath-
ern writes, 'the habit of finding the generative dynamic of relationships in the 
gender of things remains important. People cannot hide what they do not 
know' (1988: 304). Such a statement opens the possibility that a total coherent 
system remains a fantasy of the social scientist, rather than of the informants. 
Do informants remain less concerned with the efforts to explain life in its total-
ity and more concerned to acknowledge the relational basis of what they know 
and do? 
The history of anthropology in the modern period provides few answers to 
the question of whether the informant's perspective on their history can ever 
be a total one. Many scholars claim that only the anthropologist carries the 
distinctly total view, and that is a critical project in its best forms. The evolu-
tionists examined the environmental adaptations and the technological 
innovations made by societies allegedly made in transition to states of more 
advanced civilization. Functionalists rejected the false history of the evolution-
ists for its privileging of European values. They described the uses people 
made of their social institutions in creating specific, holistic understandings of 
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the world in which they lived. Comparativists sought insights from the juxta-
position of local understandings with European interrogations. Some of these 
analyses, Mauss's included, suggest a return to evolutionist accounts but do 
not fully embrace the evolutionary model of history. Structuralists sought a 
general theory of social variation that opened out the possibility of explaining 
social variation across the world, without resorting to false history or racist 
ideology. But the analysis of the structuring principles of society did not 
account for how people might change the conditions in which they lived. That 
entailed envisioning their subjectivity at the nexus of many social relationships. 
In the next two chapters, I will examine the ways in which people visualize who 
they are and how they should keep relationships to each other through 
exchanges of wealth. 
Summary of chapter 7 
Practice theorists argue that a total account of social relations within one soci-
ety can be made through analysing the ways in which both ceremonial and 
small everyday gifts are expressions of a shared historical consciousness. This 
shared consciousness is complex, being a product of forgetting the conflicts 
and negotiations of the past so that it is empowered to work non-consciously 
in the present. Bourdieu called shared consciousness 'habitus' because it 
embraced actions and beliefs that non-consciously shaped daily bodily behav-
iour and social actions, but he also made misrecognition a central aspect of 
habitus. Misrecognition is a shared mistake of understanding about how the 
social processes of one society work to reproduce social differences. For 
example, some people manage the passing of time in manipulative strategies to 
create prestige and power. A comparison of the work of time in the kinship 
diagrams of Levi-Strauss and Bourdieu aims to clarify the way in which it is 
differently bound to structure by theories of practice and by theories of struc-
turalism. A question is how do people recognize the sleight of hand in the 
workings of habitus and change them? A comic and provocative example 
comes from Geertz. Working in North African society, as did Bourdieu, 
Geertz asks what sense should anthropologists make of the meaning of past 
events retold as a self-deprecating ethnic joke that intentionally points up the 
confusions of exchanges as theft and as customary compensation payments? 
Strathern, hailing Bourdieu's self-assessment, points out that misrecognition 
works to reproduce social hierarchies only if people know at some level that 
they should expect to be duped by others. The challenge to anthropologists 
would be to provide a total explanation of social processes in one society that 
describe how people hide some relationships from themselves even as they 











In this chapter I ask what the bourgeois subject knows as a result of visualiz-
ing his or her subjectivity in and through acts of exchange with other people. I 
continue an enquiry into false consciousness that I began in the previous chap-
ter; here I ask how people come to see their relationships with each other 
through the practice of exchanging wealth. More than that, I ask how the visu-
alization of the subjectivity of the participants can change the meaning of 
their gift exchange. In tum, I ask what is perhaps an unpleasant question: how 
far is it possible to claim that the bourgeois subject is alienated from full 
knowledge of his or her conditions of existence? 
In the introduction to this book, I discussed anthropological argument in 
connection with the Enlightenment fascination with human reason. and further, 
its testing or its trial in the essay. In this chapter I will discuss what visualizing 
subjectivity might mean for understanding the human subject as a reasoning 
person. How does a reasonable person make moral decisions and exert judge-
ments about the obligations he or she keeps and does not keep, if that person 
can visualize the different kinds of relationships he or she holds with other 
people? 
There are numerous models for the human subject as a thinking and reason-
ing being. In the most common sense in west European scholarship humans 
are sentient beings, and therefore different from animals, but the difference 
between humans and animals (or between the brain and the mind) is not my 
concern here. In the first part of this book I wrote about the legacy of the 
Noble Savage in anthropology, the attempts to understand the world directly 
through experiencing it, the ways in which comparison made it intelligible, and 
the principles that anthropologists enlisted in a social science of human varia-
tion. Sceptical understanding is common to all of these developments of 
modernist anthropology. For its intellectual inspirations, the discipline owes a 
great deal to the philosophy of Descartes, who showed scholars that they pos-
sessed both minds and bodies. His philosophy has helped anthropologists to 
see that because they were both minds and bodies, they could know things by 
either medium of intellect or sense. The two capacities for acquiring knowl-
edge led people to question what they perceive through their body and senses, 
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or what they assume to be true by calculation. This constitutes a modernist 
project in anthropology, which affirms the importance of reason as a kind of 
rational argument expressed in language, especially writing. 
Maussian scholars critiqued the Cartesian distinction between mind and 
body by recalling that the individual is not natural, but social as demonstrated 
by the history of ways of being a person. Dumont, for one, discussed thought-
fully the various models or icons of personhood that emerged in the Western 
Enlightenment tradition (Dumont 1970). He addressed the idea of the posses-
sive individual, a concept distinguished in the Hobbesian and Lockean tradi-
tions. By possessive individual he means the person as the proprietor of the 
self (Macpherson 1963). For example, the possessive individual is a person 
who believes he or she possesses a self, or sometimes more explicitly a private 
conscience. The political theorist Macpherson showed that the concept 
endured and dominated for centuries because the education of the possessive 
individual becomes a matter of political and personal responsibility to the 
whole of society, even when the possessive individual emerged in Adam 
Smith's theory as the economic rationalist and champion of free trade. 
Dumont and later anthropologists draw on the insights of Mauss about the 
interpolated nature of the person, a category that emerges with the articulation 
of two aspects of human subjectivity to critique the concept of possessive indi-
vidualism. Mauss showed how the sense that the human subject holds or bears 
a private self emerged at the same time with the different sense that the human 
subject must also enact a public persona. Mauss made an early and important 
contribution to this debate, one that might go unnoticed because it depends on 
analysing a very brief and convoluted essay written close to the end of his 
career. His essay on The Category of the Person (Carruthers, et al. 1985) stimu-
lates further discussion, at least because it remained incomplete at his death. 
His notes for the essay remained, but the essay itself had disappeared into the 
ether of the classroom. Although he lectured to his students on the essay, there 
had been no copy. As a gesture showing their regard for their teacher, Mauss's 
students and colleagues brought together the various bits of notes from 
lectures to construct a text that outlined his thoughts. Consider what an extra-
ordinary thing this is then, a personal essay written by the people who heard it! 
Mauss, the person who delivered it as a lecture, is long dead; but he is recon-
structed as the category of the person, as the lecturer who spoke on these 
matters. Even when delivering a lecture, even in the moment when a person 
might be most clearly a focused singular reasoning subject, Mauss's ideas 
become the material of what others make of those thoughts. 
Postmodernists accepted the arguments posed by anthropologists, that his-
torical and cultural processes constituted the human subject. On the one hand, 
they agree with the many anthropologists who argue that there is nothing 'nat-
ural' about human reason, yet they do not know how to advise a scholar about 
the choices ahead of him or her as they submit to the vicissitudes of the social 
construction of reason in their work. Many anthropologists feel that the post-
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modernist critical project is successful in exposing the baseless claim that 
human nature is rational, but nihilistic because it cannot carry forward a polit-
ical project in which others join (Hutcheon 1989; Yeatman 1994). In order to 
make that critique work effectively to the ends of political change, new 
researchers argue that the postmodernist needs to return to the anthropo-
logical project. In order to show the importance of this, I discuss the bourgeois 
individual, as a concept critiqued differently in the visual or literary arts. For 
example, it is helpful to consider what images of the bourgeois individual come 
to us from the arts and literature of the mid-nineteenth-century industrial city. 
The Counterfeit Coin 
The example of the gift of a counterfeit coin might be considered a bit more 
deeply than I have examined it to this point. There is a story by Baudelaire, 
which Derrida exhausts for its teachings on the gift. It tells of an encounter of 
two friends with a beggar on the street in the late nineteenth century. The 
events take place after the gentlemen friends buy tobacco from a tobacconist to 
enjoy for the afternoon, a privilege of a middle-class individual. The commod-
ity exchange complete, the two friends hold the change from their purchase of 
tobacco, and in Baudelaire's day the transaction is already marked by moder-
nity ~ the shop, the gentlemen, the fresh tobacco. The entire issue develops 
because they encounter the beggar with change in their pockets. 
The dilemma arises because one of the friends holds a counterfeit coin of a 
high denomination. It is a coin that will be of no value to future transactions 
if it is found to be counterfeit. He passes the coin to the beggar, who is over-
whelmed at the generosity, but unwitting to the gentleman's mockery of largesse. 
At the knowledge that one of them has passed the counterfeit coin to a less 
fortunate man, the two friends confront each other in new ways. The relation-
ship is risked on the exposure of the knowledge of the deceit. 
Looking at more intimate or interpersonal aspects of pleasure and work in 
the creation of the bourgeois subject, it helps to change the focus to a 
common material transacted between people. Tobacco use is both personal 
and widely distributed. Its use transcends different social milieus and changes 
persons into individuals and friends. Baudelaire addresses this fully in his 
accounts of the uses of tobacco between two friends. Tobacco is a luxury gift 
in this story. The friends share it as a matter of course because they are peers. 
Tobacco is also a prestige gift. The friends give it in order to show charity 
and largesse. The beggar is not an individual, but an object of their attention. 
He is an event in their lives, not a person with whom they hold a personal 
relationship. 
The question at the end of the story would be: what has transpired in the 
human relationships? Two answers can be given. First, Derrida is concerned 
with the nature of altruism and the authenticity of the concept of generous 
free gifts, as introduced by ethnographers with hopes of finding moral fables 
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for better lives. Second, the reader of Baudelaire's story must question the 
ethics of exchange more deeply. Friendship is lost in the witting transaction of 
false coin in the place of charitable gift. Here we find an account of stupid cru-
elty; a gentleman passing a false coin to a beggar in the hopes of making an 
event in his life, and in hopes of achieving a measure of self-satisfaction that 
he had discharged his duty to demonstrate his charitable character. This is 
important. Derrida interprets Baudelaire's story as a meditation on the impos-
sibility of making a gift that costs nothing to the giver. Baudelaire's narrator 
continues to value altruism, but loses his relationship with his selfish friend. 
The narrator can sustain his friendship only if the gentlemen's selfish motiva-
tions remain unacknowledged and unseen. He cannot sustain the friendship 
once the gentleman makes evident his knowledge of his selfishness. The liter-
ary art of Baudelaire's short story about the counterfeit coin affects something 
more than Derrida discusses. Baudelaire exposes the fragility of friendships 
and human relationships in which people risk appearing as individuals to each 
other. 
Poststructuralists pose one of the most powerful critiques of subjectivity in 
anthropology. They do this first by casting doubt on scientific rationalism. They 
show the readers that the words that a researcher uses as signifiers of action do 
not adhere firmly to the reality that the anthropologist seeks to describe. Hence, 
the representative quality of written language fails the earnest scientist in the 
effort to describe the society in which he or she lives or studies. Poststructural-
ists argue that human words fail if they are meant to describe the reality of the 
world. In turn, these failures cast doubt on the powers of the sentient being 
facing the creative task of naming, classifying and describing the world. Curi-
ously, the poststructuralist critique does not end with an assault on scientific 
rationalism. Derrida seeks in his later work to extend his critique of subjectivity 
to economic rationalism. In Specters of Marx, Derrida conjoined ideas about 
economic rationalism with ideas about scientific rationalism to form an interest-
ing conclusion. This interesting marriage of different forms of rationalism in 
relation to the bourgeois subject appears to the reader as an even more prob-
lematic form of human subjectivity than the critique first suggests. 
The Manchester Man 
The Manchester Man is a nineteenth-century novel describing the human side 
of events of industrialization of Manchester throughout the eighteenth century 
(Banks 1876). It explores the division of society into men of privilege who win 
reputations and independence by their own efforts, and men of bad fortune 
whose well-being is compromised by poverty and hard blows of life. By the 
nineteenth century, when Mrs Linnaeus Banks wrote The Manchester Man, the 
middle classes hoped to understand the nature of their relationship to the grow-
ing number of poor people in the city. What is a reasonable man of character 
to do if he is to live in the same coenobium of villages as did the working poor 
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and those who had fallen on hard times and did not work? What charitable 
dispositions should he hold? What obligations to the poor should he keep? 
The Manchester Man belongs to the history of the north west of England in 
more ways than its place in a middle-class inspirational literature would indi-
cate. Any Mancunian (a resident of Manchester) could hold Manchester 
Man's virtues as his own moral values; integrity and industry, concilio et labore 
as the council adopted them for the motto of the city. And though the city 
adopted the bee as a civic image, the emblematic character of Manchester 
Man, obsequious throughout the city as Jabez Clegg, holds the values of the 
late nineteenth century fast in the time for the people of the present to under-
stand. His story follows a familiar narrative. As a foundling from the canals of 
central Manchester, he is raised in a humble home. He studies on scholarship, 
but finds his way in the world independently. He becomes a respectable citizen 
of Manchester and a man of influence and wealth in its commercial life. 
The figure of the self-made Manchester Man found its way into two differ-
ent kinds of scholarly debate about political economy. On the one hand, 
Adam Smith and later the advocates of the free-trade movement of the 1830s 
used Manchester Man as the figure of the ideal man in order to argue for the 
relaxing of trade restrictions on the transport of corn and cloth between Eng-
land and its colonies (and to link the ideal figure of the self-made man to their 
fragile arguments about Chartism and the need for parliamentary reform). 
Henceforth, Manchester Man is embraced by the Manchester School of Polit-
ical Economy, famous for its critique of the entanglements of early capital in 
pre-capitalist social relations and the need to extricate capitalist exchange from 
the older elitist and conservative political structures. In the examples contem-
porary to the late nineteenth century, Smith and others argued that capitalist 
relations should be extricated from politics. If traders were freed from politics, 
then too there would be changes to relations with the colonies. One example is 
the repeal of the preferential agreements for trade with colonial elites in 
Canada (before 1867, the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada) under the 
parliamentary bill of legislation that detailed the Corn Laws, a repeal made 
with the partial aim to thwart colonial revolution (such as that in the Thirteen 
Colonies). Colonial rebellions by disenfranchised farmers and businessmen 
against the political privileges of British colonial elites had made painfully 
visible the corrupt machinations of formal politics in the health of both eco-
nomic and social relations. 
On the other hand, the critics of emerging industrial capital relations under-
stood that the heroic values of the 'ideal figure' of the bourgeois individual 
could be a fiction. Critics of the middle-class ethos (which was shared through-
out the society of professionals and factory owners in the north of England) 
argued that great danger lay in mistaking the values that the Manchester Man 
espoused in relation to his poorer brothers for virtues held by his character. 
The Manchester Man could suffer the conditions of alienation as easily as the 
urban poor of the city because he misunderstood the grounds of his moral 
137 
POSTMODERN REFLECTIONS 
action. The danger lay in perceiving the bourgeois subject, the Manchester 
Man, to be a reservoir of moral judgement and thereby losing sight of the 
importance of the obligations to others as he kept them for the support for his 
thought, ethics and action. As an ideal construct, the Manchester Man needed 
to be turned upside down, not only to empty his pockets of the accruements of 
his lifestyle, but also to clarify the complexity of the relationships by which his 
image appeared to hang clear of the frame of his times. 
Envisioning bourgeois subjects 
Not everyone would entertain the idea that the poststructuralist Derrida intro-
duced anthropologists to a new critique of the bourgeois subject. Most would 
argue that he introduced the idea of the inventive 'play of meaning' across 
structures, rendering it impossible to isolate or define the truth of any repre-
sentation of the world. A few people might think that this slippery condition 
of meaning deconstructs the subject of anthropology, making the world of the 
informant forever elusive to the ethnographer. A very few now assume that 
deconstructive renderings of the subject ended anthropological science because 
they reduce subjects to the forms of their relations. These assumptions leave us 
with an old idea of mystification: that the condition of anthropological knowl-
edge is such that it serves to obscure the world from the eyes of researchers 
and informants alike. 
The deconstructionist's attention to knowledge forms that play with human 
sensibilities echoes a much older concern about the work of enchantment and 
mystification. An insight made by Marx in the critique of capital led him to 
expose the fact that humans alienated each other neither with money nor with 
capital per se, but in the ways in which they apprehended and misapprehended 
the relationships in which currency and commodities were exchanged. His cri-
tique extended deep into social life, and argued that people created behavioural 
conventions out of false knowledge of each other. Social interactions, such as 
manners, habits and informal social institutions, constituted an alienated world 
that challenged the possibility of direct meaningful experience. 
Bourgeois subjects misapprehend the world less as individuals, and more so 
as people enmeshed in alienating forms of relationships. Marx uses the illusory 
world of light projections of images as an illustration for his argument. He 
points out that the world around the person enlightens the person as much as 
the reflections of light on a screen. He argues that anyone who tries to under-
stand the festishization of commodities and vision of the bourgeois individual 
must grapple with the fantastic link between the camera obscura and the real 
world. The camera obscura is not so familiar to present-day readers, but it was 
a marvel of the nineteenth century. Not privileged to be part of a world of 
moving images, as most of the people born in the twentieth century have been, 
Marx wrote of the ways in which the vision of the bourgeois person could see 
only a world of fetishes, a world of refracted light on a concave screen. The 
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bourgeois subject had grown so accustomed to his or her world of images that 
he could no longer recognize the complex processes by which it appeared to be 
real. Thinking a bit about the camera obscura helps in this case. 
The device, the camera obscura, was itself something of a spectacle in nine-
teenth-century England and Europe when it appeared in exhibitions and 
public parks. I saw one renovated on Eastbourne Pier, and although I have no 
information to confirm it, I am tempted to consider that this is one that might 
have been viewed by Marx himself, on some unusual holiday excursion with 
the other educated Victorians of his era. Now, a hundred years on, in the centre 
of the tower room at the top of a spiral staircase I stood with friends to look 
at the concave disc bearing a reflected image of the pier stretching out below 
us. Through a very narrow hole, and reflected downward by a mirror, the out-
door light struck the concave disc. Quiet at first, our eyes adjusted to the 
luminous images on the curvature of disc lying in the dark grey light of the 
room. We learned to see the images, and awoke to the fact that we understood 
what we saw only after a few mute minutes while speechless viewers struggled 
to take in what they saw. The camera obscura showed us how easily we could 
construct a verisimilitude between the movements on the pier and the move-
ments on the screen; but that too deceived. The problem was that the screen 
looked real in ways in which the world was not, imposing a concave disc in 
such a way as to make us come away with the sense of having seen a flat image. 
All this worked, in spite of the fact that the viewer can certainly take in the 
world of the camera obscura, but neither as a two-dimensional space nor as a 
flat image stretched against a page or a wall. The idea is that we see the world 
as a painting or two-dimensional image, rather than as a summary of knowl-
edge won by rapidly scanning the eye across the curvature of the horizon, the 
same vault of sky imitated in the curvature of the concave disc. 
The bourgeois subject eludes researchers who live in a world of images that 
are mistaken for reality because it is easy to forget that the images are just that: 
the effects of processes of representations and misrepresentations of humans 
to each other. Unfortunately for anthropologists, the bourgeois subject has the 
odd habit of appearing reasonable, just at the moment when the researcher 
least expects to be thinking critically about it. This confusion lies in the fact 
that the bourgeois world is as much inside the mind of the researcher as the 
researcher dwells within the creations of that world. Deconstructionists work-
ing towards a critique of the bourgeois subject can show how that is so. 
The spectacle of the camera obscura displaces its opposite - that is, the grey-
ing or the paling of the conscious world or experience which is the world in 
which viewers learn to watch the refracted lights. In general, putting some 
aspects of experience into spectacular form causes the disappearance of other 
processes, which must be remembered if the network of meaningful significa-
tion is to be recalled. If the world of representation and spectacle obscures 
some processes - the mechanism of the camera obscura, a room darkened to be 
illuminated by a narrow beam of light that refracts on the wall, or the conscious 
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learning of how to adjust the human vision to the spectacle - then humans can 
alienate each other. 
Think of the relationship that many people have with their television, the 
programmes or 'shows' that are necessary watching, or the relationships that 
the watcher makes with the people of the screen. In the corner of many living 
rooms stands a television screen. It is a small space that transmits images into 
the private, even personal spaces of lives. Often people forget that television 
was called 'the box' when it first arrived to add to the panoply of objects that a 
middle-class home might contain. It is an aperture through which light arrives 
in the room and we find an image in front of us. Although the television seems 
light-years distant from the technological work of the camera obscura - an 
ancient effect of light in the dark, made into a nineteenth-century technologi-
cal mystery - we often forget that it shows us visions of our own lives, but as if 
at a distance. Recognizing the differences that exist between a lived world, a 
world of images, and a world lived with the real effects of images invigorates a 
critique of ourselves, and in particular of the bourgeois subject. 
Perhaps, as an example, I can note two different television shows currently 
being broadcast in Manchester. One is the long-running soap opera, Corona-
tion Street. It is set on a fictitious but typical street in the city, and details the 
daily lives of a community of neighbours whose problems are dealt with in 
daily episodes, many of which are situated in the local pub known as 'The 
Rover's Return'. Its changing story lines address concerns of the day in a kind 
of morality play that is watched by many people across the city. At the time of 
the writing of this, the working-class neighbourhood on Coronation Street is 
struggling to come to terms with the same-sex romance between two lads in 
the neighbourhood. The second programme, The Royle Family, focuses the 
camera on a series of conversations among a family sitting around a television 
set. Middle-aged parents, their daughter and her husband entertain the grand-
mother and other neighbours from time to time in front of the television. We 
do not know which programme is being broadcast on their TV, nor do we get 
any sense of it from their commentary. The camera views the family from the 
location of the TV screen, making the viewer feel as if they could be the sub-
ject of the programme that is always running on the Royle family screen. The 
name of the show - a pun on the word royal - already suggests that the sover-
eignty of the viewer's gaze should be questioned. On the screen, the characters 
in the programme seem to invite the TV viewers to see themselves as actors 
who play with real life as if it were artistic form. The aesthetic form of the pro-
gramme underscores its themes, which play with the odd convergence between 
the iron-grasp of family relationships in Manchester and, simultaneously the 
fragility of those relationships. Common wisdom and philosophy from the 
armchair flows from the set as the family tries to solve the same problems that 
every other family needs to address: for example, can the household budget 
sustain the extra expenditure for satellite TV programming? 
Tricks of vision and efforts to learn to see differently had as important a 
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place in the early anthropology of the nineteenth century as they do in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century. One example comes from the histori-
ans' effort to describe the social conditions of the working poor in northern 
England. Engels famously described Manchester streets with small diagrams 
of the bricks of houses to show the shoddy construction of the homes of the 
poor by contrast with those of the rich. In other passages he takes his reader 
to the Royal Manchester Infirmary to 'see' the waiting room, filled with people 
seeking medical treatment. In the midst of this account he writes of the uses of 
small pills to boost energy and vitality, pure medical quackery in the midst of 
modernizing practices. He asks his readers to learn to see the conditions of 
social life around them. Learning to see the poor, to see poverty and its causes, 
meant attending to the minutiae of life. In the ethnographic dimensions of the 
work of Engels, the ethnographer learned to expose what the participants 
could not. Here Engels the social historian championed the descriptive efforts 
of social science, in a common effort with the early ethnographer to create the 
foundations of moral reasoning. 
To compare this envisioning of social relations by Engels with the effort 
made by the anthropologist Rivers at a somewhat later time is most interest-
ing. Rivers aimed to expose how people visualized relationships. In the Torres 
Straits research undertaken in the 1890s, he undertook to sketch kinship rela-
tions, by drawing genealogies based on marriage and birth. His diagrams form 
the first examples of kinship systems. Most importantly, he provides the 
anthropologist with the extraordinarily powerful visual images of relationships. 
An example of the diagram used to map the relations of the Torres Straits 
people to each other shows the possibilities of organizing large amounts of 
knowledge, simply by writing down accounts of people's lives in relation to 
each other (Grimshaw 2001). 
Both Engels and Rivers raise questions as to how human subjectivity can be 
made in solitude, when it is evident that such complex cross-cutting networks of 
social relationships remain part of the individual's life, whether they are im-
mediately visible or must be exposed to sight. The end result is a document that 
can be used to establish the significance of the legacy in modern Australia of 
the residential claims of Torres Straits' people to the islands. In the well-
documented Mabo decision of the late twentieth century, legal officials in the 
courts could consult the diagrams of Rivers's work and find exact reference to 
the claimants' ancestors. The fact that ethnographic notes could be powerful 
also relied upon the visual power of the images. The images of kinship became 
the measure of the implicit ground of relationship in which contemporary Abo-
riginal people walked. Establishing a judicious claim to land depended upon 
making the relationships appear in the eye of the court. Diagrams of kinship, 
such as the ones I used in the previous chapter, became exposures of implied or 
otherwise hidden connections. Where Engels tried to make class relations 
appear in the details of a city, Rivers attempted to make relationships appear in 
his diagrams of the connections between people based on birth and marriage. 
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Flipping the image: the aesthetics of representation 
Can anthropology use the distinctions between the real and the imaginary suc-
cessfully in the critique of the bourgeois individual? Does this make it possible 
to expose the implicit connections, as if they were the ground of the existence 
of the individual? Earlier in this chapter, I discussed the camera obscura on 
Eastbourne Pier, and the way in which the people in the room learned to see 
the images of the world outside now reflected on the concave screen. Learning 
to see those images required us to talk and to teach each other about how 
to see the images. This included how to think about the images in relation to 
the 'real' world, the importance of the very narrow aperture for the light. In 
the machinery of the camera obscura at Eastbourne is a pulley that turns 
the apparatus 360 degrees for all of us to see. The image of the outside 'real' 
world can be viewed at any angle from where the person might be standing. 
The visitor is invited to consider an upside down world and to play with the 
presentation of the view. Given that some people learn to manipulate adroitly 
their personal view on the world, and to exchange their perspective for another 
person's, how should anthropologists consider the views that the informants 
might have of the conditions of their own times? 
Here is a comparison to consider, made by two men working in the same 
period and addressing similar ideas: George Orwell and L.S. Lowry. Orwell 
ignited the political imagination of British Socialists with the publication of 
his short book, Down and Out in Paris and London. The account of life as an 
impoverished and casual worker in both cities left an indelible mark on the 
minds of the radical vanguard. Until then, much of their efforts went to the 
organization of the worker, to making the factory worker and the miner 
understand the importance of collective work and collective argument. 
Orwell's book exposed another victim of the capitalist political economy, but 
this time it was the victim of the bourgeois capitalist whose pleasures were 
taken by consumption of finery and the pleasures of the world of theatre and 
entertainment. After a year as a dishwasher and helper in the restaurants of 
Paris, Orwell admonishes his reader never to eat without thinking of the fate 
of the worker who lives below in the kitchen. Showing how it seemed almost 
impossible to escape from such employment, given its hours and its irregularity 
of treatments and pay, Orwell exposes a group of people whose labour sup-
ports and is exploited by capitalist political economy; yet these people have few 
opportunities to meet to change it. The hotel workers are hardly attractive 
characters, and I do not think that Orwell holds too many fantasies about the 
romantic image of the worker in the hospitality industry; the bourgeois indi-
vidual comes out much less attractive still because he is the ignorant consumer 
of his pleasures of restaurant meals and stylish entertainments. Orwell, in a 
powerful Marxist tradition, used wit and personable story telling to write a 
realist account of the poverty of casual workers in two different cities. 
The effect of the book on the radical left was so great that the owners of the 
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Figure 8.1 a Miners' cottages at Coat bridge (photographer unknown). The photograph 
is reproduced here as an example of the many used in the first publication 
of George Orwell's The Road to Wigan Pier (1937), London: Victor Gol-
lancz Publishers. An extensive photographic report on northern working-
class housing had been made by socialist journalists of the time. I chose to 
reprint this photograph from that period as an example of the uses of the 
English documentary tradition in photography. All efforts have been made 
to find the copyright-holder of this photograph, but neither the original 
photographs nor the names of the photographers can be found. 
Red Press, decided to send Orwell to the north of England to examine the 
unemployed in the mining towns where the pits had been closed by the eco-
nomic depression. He shows the life of the unemployed miner in a number of 
photographs that cut bare the situation for the subjects. The Road to Wigan 
Pier takes its title from a jest; the miners call the structure that delivers coal 
across the heap of tailings by the name used for the broad walkways to the 
ships that come into a seaside town. The workers do not elaborate upon the 
picture they see, and it is possible that many had not visited a pier. From 
Wigan, an inland town, workers might be most likely to spend their seaside 
holidays in Blackpool with its carnival attractions. Who made it to the seaside 
from among the families that Orwell photographed is impossible to tell, even 
at a time when workers took opportunities for seaside visits when they could. 
But the hopes of a bourgeois lifestyle might include more frequent seaside hol-
idays, and walks on grander, more stylish piers than Blackpool. 
Orwell contributed realistic photographs of working conditions and family 
life in the north of England to a general knowledge of the region. His work is 
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Figure 8.lb Accommodation for mine workers and families. The caption from this 1937 
plate reads, 'Outside Newcastle: Whole families of miners live in these tiny 
and unsanitary dwellings, for which a rent of seven shillings is charged'. 
As with the previous photograph from Orwell's book, the photographer is 
unknown. 
part of the genre of socialist realism that sought to study everyday life through 
the visual and use the camera to see more honestly or more truly all those 
aspects of life that might otherwise be hidden. The realist photograph assumes 
that the real might be there, except that the eye had been trained to choose 
selectively between different sites of social life. The apparatus of the camera 
did not allow the person to exercise his or her preferences to view some images 
over others. The social context existed in the frame as much as the featured 
practices and faces. Take for example the details of the impoverished lifestyle 
depicted in each photograph (Figures 8.la and b).Not only do we have the 
faces of people who work in the mines, but also the nature of the household's 
composition, state of repair of the dwelling and the resources from which the 
family might make a home. The account is difficult to address here. Only the 
framing of each image could be considered important to limiting or defining 
the scope of the realist project, and that is a considerable issue of concern that 
I do not fully address here. 
By contrast, Lowry's paintings emerge from a different kind of attention 
than Orwell's photography. As one of the first serious landscape painters to use 
the urban setting in landscape painting, Lowry abstracts the impoverishment of 
urban lifestyles, and the mechanistic everyday routines of urban living. Consider 
the painting, Coming from the Mill, which is reproduced here in black and 
white in Figure 8.2. Although the original is in colour, Lowry greyed the shades 
of red brick buildings and low yellow light, so that the urban landscape 
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Figure 8.2 Coming from the Mill (L.S. Lowry) © The Lowry Foundation, The City of 
Salford. The painting shows figures walking as if in mechanized movement, 
even after they leave work. 
appears to be heavy with industrial grime. In Lowry's painting Mancunians 
walk in the same way on the street as they might move on the textile mill 
floors. Another painting, which is not reproduced in this chapter, currently 
hangs on the wall at Old Trafford, the football stadium that is home to one of 
the regional teams, Manchester United. Here Mancunians can see Lowry's 
representation of an earlier generation of football fans in Going to the Match , 
as it is titled. As with Coming from the Mill, Going to the Match shows the way 
the posture and movement of bodies records a memory of arriving at work in 
the textile mills, even at a weekend leisure activity. The artist's aerial and dis-
tant point of view unnerves the viewer into seeing themselves as the subject of 
the painting, and as a product of the historical processes depicted. Many 
people in Manchester commonly say that they do not like Lowry's 'stick fig-
ures' because they deplete the kind of life that is lived in the region. 
The significance of these paintings can be understood in their ability to por-
tray the effects of historical processes, and to effect viewers of the painting, 
better than in their representational qualities. Lowry painted people working 
in industrial Manchester, at a time when that period was ending or had finished. 
His works distil the sensibility of an age that had passed, and perhaps the 
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abstraction of the qualities of that life imitate the memories that Lowry had of 
the family elders, the men and women he recalled from his childhood that had 
been drawn out by the experiences he recorded. Was Lowry's painting a fan-
tasy of greyed colour and image that sought to recapture the processes that 
had made the people he knew into the images that they were? 
His critics express a certain kind of dislike for his stick men, a dislike that is 
difficult to name as discomfort with the themes, or as dislike of the aesthetics. 
This is not realist art in the way in which Orwell's writing composes the realist 
image of the worker. Instead, Lowry's art evinces an insight from the viewer 
that contrives a sense of the problem. If the art critic, the viewer, feels dimin-
ished by the viewing of Lowry's masterpieces of urban painting, perhaps this is 
because Lowry's painting has affected him or her in a way that Lowry intended. 
I am struck, when I compare Orwell and Lowry, by the ways in which they 
use the aesthetic of their art to evoke and portray the bourgeois subject's 
unconscious collusion with the oppression of the worker. Orwell writes to 
expose workers and unemployed men, hidden from the eyes of the bourgeois. 
He also exposes the workers to the eyes of the intellectual left who keep their 
own bourgeois habits as part of their radical lifestyle; they are a group whose 
motives he suspects. The respective imaginings of the worker bear shadows. In 
one sense the shadow of the bourgeois subject can be seen in the mechanistic 
lives of Lowry's workers. They are followers of routines designed by bourgeois 
persons, or designed to feed the interests of bourgeois persons. In Lowry's 
painting the world of the worker is not hidden from the bourgeois world and 
then exposed in the images. Instead, Lowry shows the shadows of the bour-
geois subject as they are cast in the world of the worker. 
I have focused on visual knowledge about the north west of England, includ-
ing the image or bourgeois figure of the self-made 'Manchester Man' and the 
record of two different attempts to depict his counterpart, the working poor. 
The relationship between these two figures can be explored further; that is, the 
relations between the self-made success and the less materially fortunate 
worker or even the homeless poor receive little mention in 'Manchester Man', 
or in the work of political economic theorists of the day. 
In order to think about the nature of the obligations between the bourgeois 
'Manchester Man' and the homeless, I can return to considerations posed by 
poststructuralist analysis discussed at the beginning of the chapter. I uncovered 
considerations of Derrida's work on the nature of the gift, but I do not take up 
Derrida's concern to interrogate the possibilities that determine whether there 
can or cannot be a free gift, a selfless gift. I think that to argue about whether 
gifts are or are not free requires the anthropologist to make some fundamental 
assertion about human nature, or at least presumes ontological concerns to 
underlie all giving. For example, to be able to give a coin freely assumes that the 
coin is already separate from the self and ready to be given away. This suggests 
that, to some degree, the alienation of the 'Manchester Man', or the 'Torres 
Straits Man' from this network of clan or personal relations has already taken 
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Figure 8.3 Business as Usual (Lucile Pardee 2002) © The University of Manchester. 
The street trader sells pamphlets describing the tragedy of the collapse of 
the two towers of the World Trade Center, at the site of the disaster where 
the iconic building once stood. 
place. I think that the question is less one of looking about for the absence of 
free gifts, and I will turn instead to the work that Strathern conducted on the 
problem of keeping obligations. In Melanesia the keeping of relationships cer-
tainly matters more than liberating oneself from social relations in order to give 
freely. 
Conclusions: envisioning bourgeois subjects 
In comparing the values of the bourgeois subject with the values sustaining the 
lifestyles of the workers and the unemployed, Lowry and Orwell provide a 
meditation on the problem of alienation, simply by exposing a visual subtext. 
When I turn to look at Derrida's treatment of alienation, I find that the post-
structuralist's account exposes the deceits of the bourgeois subject. In decon-
structing values, the poststructuralist critique of bourgeois subject echoes the 
concept of alienation in the Marxist critique of capital. Whereas for Marxist 
critics alienation entailed the loss of meaningful social relationships based on 
something like 'authentic' understandings of experience, for poststructuralist 
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critics the play of meaning across structures makes and remakes social rela-
tionships. In deconstructing value in economic rationality, there is no loss of 
meaning and economic rationality continues in another form - as business as 
usual. 
In deconstructing the meaningful matrix of symbol and structure there is 
no truth that becomes clear, except that it is possible to measure a critical dis-
tance from one image to its after-image. This is the 'difference that makes all 
the difference' to their respective criticisms of the bourgeois subject. Such a 
measure of after-images is a point worth considering before the end of this 
chapter. I have been fortunate in recent years to know and work with a number 
of students who study for Master's degrees in visual anthropology and ethno-
graphic film making in Manchester. In the summer of 2002, Lucile Pardee 
filmed the business conducted around the base of the destroyed World Trade 
Center (Figure 8.3). In her film, Business as Usual, she helps us to see that 
business continues as usual around the site of the destruction. The street ven-
dors who worked in the vicinity before the collapse of the buildings in Sep-
tember 2001, continue to work on most of the same street corners only a year 
later. 
The film exposes something we would not grasp quite so easily in speech or 
conversations. Pardee films what she can capture on film, and what remains 
after the buildings' collapse. She cannot film what is not there. The modern 
image of world trade, as represented by the twin towers as standing twin 
monoliths at the south end of Manhattan Island, is gone. Neither can she film 
what is there, the business with the vendors, except by negotiating her rights to 
film. It is an awkward film to watch because the negotiations of the film maker 
and the vendors must become transparent throughout. She engages in business 
as usual as a part of filming vendors around the base of the towers. Her own 
negotiations enhance the film's aesthetic effect. She shows us that the trans-
actions of business continue, and that street businesses flourish with the flood 
of visitors, mourners and tourists who come to the site of the destruction that 
was once the towers of the World Trade Center. It is grittier capitalism than 
that which had been practised in earlier years in the offices that stood high 
above the ground. Pardee shows us that business as usual at 'Ground Zero' of 
the World Trade Center disaster grows, in the rubble, on the street or in the 
after-image of the buildings as a symbol of world trade. 
Similarly, the early Free Trade movement of the nineteenth century finds 
new life in the twenty-first. In Manchester, the Free Trade Hall, the Italianate 
building of the Victorian era, was once a grand site for the exchange of com-
modities. In 1999 it stood with a 'For Sale' sign on its fac;ade (Figure 8.4). Do 
Manchester estate agents who trade in bricks and mortar (as well as in pal-
isades and gilt) now trade too on the symbols of exchange, creating a new 
value in rapidly escalating property prices for the image ( or the after-image) of 
the symbol of free trade? Is it 'Free Trade' or the building that is for sale? Busi-
ness as usual indeed! 
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Figure 8.4 'Manchester Free Trade Hall - For Sale' (1998 © Aidan O'Rourke). The 
Free Trade Hall was perhaps one of the earliest buildings to be named after 
a political movement. Members of the Manchester School of Political Econ-
omy and other followers of Adam Smith's theory led the Free Trade 
Movement throughout the early nineteenth century. Since its construction in 
1856, it has been used principally as a location for musical entertainment. 
Sometimes arguments about the bourgeois subject hit us in the face because 
they can be seen, as well as read and heard. Perhaps this insight comes from 
beyond the poststructuralist project that plays with the world of text, but 
makes room for the oral or the visual only as that elusive knowledge of human 
experience that can be brought fully into conscious discussion and speech. 
Does the visual medium help to expose how subjectivity can be unfolded or 
drawn aesthetically out of the conventional form? It has been my intention in 
this chapter to show one place where an anthropologist might begin. 
Summary of chapter 8 
Can an account of social processes, values and structure be given from the 
viewpoint of some members of society over and above others? Dumont, 
Macpherson and Mauss ask interesting questions about the social construc-
tion of the individual. One of these might be: what social processes enable the 
individual to assume insight into the workings of the whole, given that he or 
she is the product of that society? Does the individual ever have a privileged 
insight into the workings of the total society, as say did the free trader upon 
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whom Adam Smith modelled his economic man? This chapter has examined 
the case of Manchester capitalism. Here, common knowledge of the nine-
teenth century suggested that the allegedly self-made man understood perfectly 
how to live by values for the social good, and by processes of that bettered 
society, and so too his own situation. We might ask: how do members of one 
society come to envision that an individual might be the prime-mover of 
social change for them all? Understanding this entails an examination of how 
people hide the very social relations that made them from others and from 
their own consciousness. Critics of the bourgeois subject, including Engels, 
argued that this was bourgeois fantasy and showed how researchers could 
learn to see the city differently as the material effect of capitalist exploitation. 
Later, journalists' analyses of bourgeois subjectivity, such as George Orwell's, 
argued that the poor had privileged insight into the total society because they 
experienced the effects of the same processes that others had to hide from 
themselves. Artistic representations by Lowry can show the effects of capital-
ism in the city landscape and the bodies of individuals. Does capitalism 
submerge some social relationships only to privilege visual evidence of its 
effects in other relationships? Consider the recent history of the uses of the 
symbols of capitalism, in processes ranging from small enterprise to warfare; 
for example, the sale of the Free Trade Hall in Manchester for use as luxury 
accommodation and hospitality. To what extent can we say that people trans-
act primarily in a virtual economy by forming social relationships by 
reference to the fantasy or images of free trade? 
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This chapter considers how anthropologists have answered charges that gift 
exchange entails irrational behaviour. Whereas some people argued that 
largesse is rational because it builds the middle class person's prestigious repu-
tation (Veblen 1967 [ 1899]), other scholars ( especially Bataille 1967 in Bataille 
1994) insisted that some people acted with excessive generosity towards others 
in order to release fellow humans from the misery of poverty, and thereby 
return the totality of society to a moral and ethical condition of material and 
spiritual equality. Although many ( especially Wolf 1999) have criticized 
Bataille because he believed that habitually generous uses of material wealth 
would create an ideal and utopian social state, I will return to Bataille's argu-
ments in this chapter because largesse is common to many different places. 
Largesse is irrational only in so far as generous acts cannot be understood 
within the terms of self-interested giving. How can an anthropologist explain 
why some people give too much to other people? One way forward would be to 
ask what kind of sense other people in other societies make of those parts of 
social life that seem ambiguous, enigmatic and irrational. 
In this chapter I will go beyond the limits of the previous chapter, which 
considered the aesthetics of the 'bourgeois subject', to investigate how trans-
gressions of rational action and of rational thought constitute human subjec-
tivity. How does an anthropologist explain the excesses of emotion, action or 
thought in acts of gift exchange? Are some issues simply too dense to think 
about, or does focusing on the excesses of gift exchange enable interpretive 
analysis of the more irrational aspects of human consciousness? Can you give 
too much? What is at stake in giving it all away? This chapter explores further 
the problem of dealing with what the surrealist essayist Bataille once called 
'economies of excess'. 
In addition I will examine several attempts to explain why people do give 
too much, investigating answers to several questions about why people give 
beyond reason. What should an anthropologist do when the otherwise rational 
subjects of his or her research suddenly act with munificence - perhaps comic, 
perhaps violent, and indubitably excessive? For example. does parental love 
move adults to give unrestrictedly? If so, then what kind of 'motive' is parental 
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Figure 9.1 'Yam house' (Plate XXXVIII, Argonauts of the Western Pacific by Bronislaw 
Malinowski, first published in London in 1922, and under the same title in 
1978, reprinted 1991 © London School of Economics and Political Science). 
Malinowski tells us that Kaouta'ua, one of the chiefs of Sineketa stands in 
front of his beautifully decorated yam house, his lisige ( own dwelling) in the 
background. 
love such that affection belongs to kin relationships (rather than inside the mind 
of an individual)? If love goes without saying (as is the reported case when 
some Trobriand men give to their children), then what should anthropology 
make of it? What has been said of the social effects of such giving? If a person 
has been fortunate enough to receive such intangible gifts as renown or affec-
tion, can he or she ever give the gift away? Can people give too much, if the 
end of most relationships will certainly be physical separation from those 
people that they know? 
The beauty of symbolic exchange 
Some of the earliest efforts to address the habits of giving too much claimed 
that it made symbolic meanings for economic transactions possible. Consider 
the example of the Trobriand yam house; it has no functional purpose in sus-
taining the diet of men and women in the village. Summarizing Malinowski, 
the ethnographer Young (1979) reminds us that men and women in the Tro-
briand islands think that yam houses are beautiful, and that the gardens in 
which they stand are places of pleasure and works of art. A man builds a yam 
house for the purpose of holding yams that he receives from the brothers of 
his wife. The houses tower above the earth, great silos of agricultural wealth, 
and paradoxically the contents are seldom used. These houses hold more than 
enough yams for eating, and more than enough for ceremonial work. The yams 
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contained within them remain until they rot; so unhappy are their owners to 
actually give out yams from them that they will take yams directly from their 
gardens and go hungry themselves so that they can keep the abundance of the 
yam house at full capacity (Figure 9.1). 
Most importantly, the yam houses simply show that the man has relatives, 
men to whom he is related by marriage and upon whom he can count to look 
after him with food. The abundant garden wealth can be retained in a yam 
house as a mark of capacity and ability to respond in full to any request for 
food for feasting, or for kula transactions. They represent the capacity of a 
man to respond to the requests of his affined relatives. They represent the suc-
cess of a man's magical abilities to cultivate a garden. A successful Trobriand 
man, especially a chief, holds all these relationships together in good form. 
The yam houses, houses of excessive wealth in yams, are beautifully carved 
and imbued with magic. Do the yam houses, which hold such extraordinary 
wealth, stand as simple symbols of the power of men to hold all their relation-
ships together in one place? That might be a rational interpretation of such a 
fascinating symbol as the yam house, but I wonder if that grapples fully with 
the problem of understanding why men need to demonstrate that ability with a 
yam house as an artwork. More importantly, why should a chief be seen to 
hold too many yams for his own consumption? People give too much to some 
relatives or to some friends. How can we know when giving too much must be 
addressed as more than a rational act? Take for example the excesses of gestures 
of affection. 
Excesses of affection 
Take the example of the Trobriander father as an example of behaviour that 
has no rational explanation that can be grounded simply in self-interest. He 
simply gives too much to his children because he loves them, showing his affec-
tion for the child as a member of another clan, with the matrilineage of his wife 
and her brothers. I have written at length about the work of making mapula 
gifts, the work that a Trobriand father does in order to succeed in giving his 
child and wife a lifetime of small gifts. What seems most extraordinary of all 
of this effort to keep on giving the mapula is that a father can never exhaust 
his obligations to give. Weiner recorded the words of the Trobriander, pointing 
to his trees, which are evidence of his father's mapula. The man said that if the 
wind blows down the tree and it dies, then his father simply replaces the tree, 
unlike the trade storeowner who will not replace the kerosene lamp if it breaks 
while the purchaser has been using it (Weiner 1992: 25). The mapula is not 
exhaustible, and there is no point in time when the father can finally meet, 
once and for all, the obligations to give to his children and to his wife. At the 
father's death, the child, who is by now an adult, will give the fruit of the tree 
and an additional gift back to them. The gift made in acknowledgement of the 
father's work marks a lifetime of giving small gifts. The child acknowledges the 
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father's generosity with ceremonial gifts at his funeral, rather than calculating 
the value of his largesse during his lifetime. 
Fathers insist that they give small gifts to their children out of affection and 
fatherly love, although mapula gifts might exhaust a father. They press him to 
find the resources to keep the obligation, but he continues to give the mapula. 
Malinowski had been puzzled in his early work. Just what overt or manifest 
motives could move the father to keep the mapula gifts? It seems that only deep 
motives to connect with his wife and child, perhaps reasons of which the father 
remained unconscious, could cause him to give mapula continuously, gener-
ously and complacently. At this disjuncture of understanding, Malinowski 
introduced a theory of Trobriand unconscious that articulated with Freudian 
beliefs. The appreciation expressed by Parsons of Malinowski's struggle to 
understand the complex of social relations that psychoanalytic anthropologists 
refer to as the Oedipal complex grasped the nature of the kinship problem that 
lies at the heart of Malinowski's question: namely, how to account for the play-
ing out of power as an effect of the basic affectionate intimacy of brother and 
sister in matrilineal society. 
The surfeit of gifts from a father puzzles anthropologists, who ask how they 
should understand the excessive gifts that a man makes in the action of giving 
to children who will always be his children, although they will be supported 
jurally and customarily by men from another clan. Malinowski's version of 
Trobriand psychology turns most questions of the excessive generosity of 
fathers around into questions of personal power legitimated by jural authority, 
as socially defined by matrilineal society. He sidelines the questions of erotic 
'power' as the provenance of garden magicians and the shady world of love 
magic. In the example of Trobriand kinship, the mother's brother remains the 
person who holds jural authority over the affairs of the matrilineage. Children 
learn of the mother's brother's power, from an early age forward to the present, 
and the dismantling of the power and authority of the maternal uncle (the 
mother's father's brother) can be as intense as the undressing of the authority 
of the father. Parsons proposes that the Trobriand case insists on a twist on the 
classic schema: that a young man should come to envy the father as the symbol 
of authority and desire the mother as the embodiment of intimacy and love. A 
long debate ensues (Jones 1925, Parsons 1964, Spiro 1982) as to why it is that a 
youth should be moved to usurp the power from the mother's brother as senior 
member of his own clan and come to see that man as a block upon receiving 
his mother's affection. Malinowski's interpretation aimed to provide an accu-
rate account of the power relations of the Trobriand family and opened the 
way for Schneider and Gough in Matrilineal Kinship (1964) to propose a gen-
eral schema for matrilineal society; that is, where the bond between sister and 
brother is strong, then the bond between husband and wife could be fragile or 
weak. The nature of the bond is very much in question. 
In Malinowksi's appraisal, the question is how to understand the father's 
habit of excessive giving if the outcome of his actions amounts to the reinforce-
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ment of customary law. Let me recapitulate this point. Malinowski argues that 
the father aims to make the mapula work for his best interests. both as a father 
and within the customary law of the islands. He aims to secure his children as 
his own, and to limit the power of their mother's brother in the life of the 
family. He makes mapula gifts because by doing so he is recognized by custom 
as the parent and indebts his wife's brother to assist with reciprocal ceremonial 
gifts at his death, which in turn builds his reputation as a senior man in his 
own clan. On his own reputation he is able to make customary law effective in 
his own matrilineal clan. 
Anthropologists debated the many motivations for the mapula gift only to 
discover both a rational and an irrational cause for a father to give to his chil-
dren. A father participates in two forms of economy at once, an ideal or 
symbolic one that brings him prestige, and a material one that brings back to 
him the tangible effects of his affection. In his old age, he will reap the benefits 
of what he has sown. His material expenditure on his children's behalf will be 
rewarded. Children will acknowledge him as 'father' and will care for him in 
his last years. Beyond these two 'rational' motivations for a man to give exces-
sively to his children is another irrational motive; that is, his parental love for 
them, which is not irrational at all. 
Understanding excess in the case of potlatch 
Let me turn from the apparent inscrutability of the excesses of filial and 
parental affection because it is hard to analyse anthropologically just what 
people do with the excesses of affection. An anthropologist might consider the 
problem of the 'waste' and surplus of exchange by analysing what people do 
with the leftovers of their work, their trade, and the extraneous bits of what 
they know. Bataille focuses upon the excesses, the 'accursed share' that anthro-
pologists sometime mistakenly try to ignore. Instead, just as an archaeologist 
learns much from the middens, the refuse pits, used by the people of an ancient 
village, an anthropologist can learn a great deal by studying the knowledge, 
goods and actions that informants discount as unimportant. A society can do 
many things with its excesses of wealth. It can give its wealth back to the nat-
ural elements, as did the Kwakiutl of north-west Canada, who discarded 
embossed and decorated copper shields into the sea, or burned them into the 
air. It can create magnificent artistic creations at great expenditure of labour, 
time and care, as do the Melanesians of New Ireland who make funereal 
sculptures that must be displayed and destroyed. After the destruction, they 
remember the ephemeral beauty of the carvings and of the memory of the 
corporal presence of their deceased kin. It can expend its excessive wealth in a 
war of conquest, such as the wars of aggression waged by National Socialist 
Germany against its neighbours in the middle of the twentieth century. It can 
disperse this excess with a massive movement of non-production, such as the 
mortuary practices of Thai Buddhism, and thereby gamble with its future. 
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What do people do with excess? This is a first question for anthropologists 
to ask if they are to understand the economies of excess or the habit of giving 
too much. In some conditions, the uses of excessive wealth, or the displays of 
wealth and its literal destruction, succeed in challenging the spread of market 
social relations. The problem in all of this lies in recognizing that material 
excess represents a measure of exploitation, on the part of the person who 
holds it now. What does an anthropologist understand about excess in society 
that is neither capitalist nor fully transformed into capitalism? Recall from my 
description in chapter 4 of the ceremonial exchange known as potlatch. In 
British Columbia, the First Nation peoples (that is people resident before the 
arrival of settlers from European nations) of the Bella Coola, Coast Salish, the 
Haida, the Kwakiutl, the Nootka, Tlingit and the Tsimshian participate in a 
system of ritual exchange. Although each of these groups uses a specific collec-
tive name from their own language, rather than the colonial versions of their 
names, I will discuss the Kwakawaka'wakw speakers as 'Kwakiutl' to create 
coherence throughout the history of ethnographic texts written about them. 
What can an anthropologist understand about the display and destruction of 
an excessive amount of wealth without reducing the action to the judgement 
that it is simply irrational? 
How the chiefs of matrilineal clans disposed of wealth became important to 
just about everything in ceremonial and everyday life, and, despite the most 
insistent efforts of the Canadian government to ban it from 1885 though to the 
1920s, the potlatch continued. The earliest work on potlatch, by Boas, aimed 
to demonstrate that prestige of north-west coast chiefs was based on ideas 
about their largesse. Like many of their neighbours, the Kwakiutl acknowl-
edged that the receipt of a gift from a man in ceremonial exchange signalled 
the power of the man giving away all of his wealth. Each chief could win his 
prestige by giving too much, impoverishing himself of resources and capturing 
the imagination of the entire village with displays of selflessness. In the first 
investigations of potlatch undertaken by Boas at the tum of the century, he 
argued that these exchanges were driven by competitions for power between 
chiefs. The event of a potlatch grew out of a kind of personal desire to per-
form largesse better than anyone else in the village and imitated the 
competitive struggles of capitalists of the era. 
It is hard to rectify Boas's ethnography by referring to the rest of anthropo-
logical work on gift exchange because his work is resolutely descriptive, offer-
ing no larger claims for a theory or critique of political economy. His studies in 
the north-west coast (Boas 1897, 1966), which I described in chapter 4, were 
undertaken earlier than much of Malinowski's studies. He attempted to record 
the life of the indigenous people of the north-west coast in advance of the dis-
appearance of the lifestyles of the different language groups. With an enor-
mous amount of help from George Hunt, an anthropologist who was the son 
of a First Nation woman and an English father as well as having married into 
the north-west coast communities, Boas set about the work of recording the 
156 
GLVING BEYOND REASON 
life ways of indigenous people, which seemingly remained vital even with the 
advances of modern American society. The ethnographers provide richly 
descriptive work without the unnecessary explanation of the habits of the 
people whose lives they recorded. 
Boas's best intentions to free ethnographic descriptions from the corruptions 
of Western theory or philosophy left many puzzles about potlatch. After his 
death, Codere completed Boas's unpublished manuscripts and tried to fill in 
the gaps with a careful account of the particulars of history and belief concur-
rent with his research. Boas described the ceremony of potlatch, but never 
grasped the nature of the social totality. Did north-west societies organize their 
social relationships by kinship, or by degrees of differential access to material 
and symbolic wealth, by ritual performances; or what? 
If the extraordinary ceremonies of potlatch were to be understood in terms 
that mattered to the peoples of the north west, then an anthropologist should 
understand several key social terms of Kwakiutl life. First, each Kwakiutl 
person knew that he or she was a member of a matrilineal clan with a specific 
totem, such as the salmon, bear or eagle among others; but the clan member-
ship did not predict anything in particular about prestige. Birth order distin-
guished the first four children as 'elite', and subsequent children as 'common', 
but the birth order itself did not solidify the prestige of a person. If a person 
was born into the elite, then participation in secret societies brought prestige to 
the person. Some individuals joined secret societies to acquire a special 'name' 
but others joined in order to participate in the winter festival known as 
Hamatsa (which had been outlawed by the Canadian government in the nine-
teenth century.) If a person was born common, then he or she was servant to 
the elite and joined a 'house' as a satellite of the elite who led that form of 
association. Common people did not marry elite, and over time, the common 
people grew in number and became proportionally more numerous by far than 
the elite. In a later review of Boas's work, Levi-Strauss decided that north-west 
coast society was not based in any form of kinship that made clans, but 
instead in a basic form of marriage exchange that made the house and its trad-
itions. The house was a social form more similar to the medieval house than to 
the clan. In his assessment of Hunt and Boas's and Levi-Strauss's understand-
ing of the house traditions, Wolf (1999) assumes that only for a very few 
decades is it possible to view Kwakiutl life in its totality by examining the 
activities of the elite members of the house, who for a time organized the 
ritual, political, economic and social life of the rest of the society. 
Among the elite, prestige was won through competition, after it was first 
ascribed by birth order. The elite of each house belonged to one of several 
'numayn', that is, a 'group of fellows of the same kind'. The numaynjoined and 
organized potlatch rituals, and entreated the others of their clans, common 
and elite members alike, to aid them with the events. The numayn is the central 
form of association of Kwakiutl society, and its internal organization and 
structure is debated. The numayn is the social location of the most important 
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changes happening to the everyday and ceremonial life of the people of the 
region, and therefore is difficult to describe. Friendly, but intense, competition 
between members of the numayn escalated with colonization when some men 
(and women) found casual or part-time employment for wage in the settler 
towns nearby. As time passed, the numayn used wages to buy goods for pot-
latch, and the ceremony increasingly included gifts of blankets bought from 
trade stores, as well as the ceremonially decorated copper shields of earliest 
years. As common members of the clan increasingly found work in the settler 
towns nearby or joined in the wage economy by starting their own businesses 
in salmon fishing and canning, the elite increasingly entreated them to partici-
pate as individuals, rather than as clansmen. In the twentieth century, a 
potlatch succeeded because an individual man cajoled a network of acquain-
tances into assisting him. 
Consider what is left now of the material arts of the north-west coast. 
Copper shields were so highly valued in potlatch rituals because the partici-
pants destroyed them; few shields can be seen. Instead, the European imagina-
tion can play with the images of the totem pole, which was made to be a 
permanent installation in the forest or at the site of a house of an elite man. 
They stand in museums, as primary examples of north-west coast art, but their 
provenance is colonial. The totem pole is a distinct new artistic form that 
emerged as people drew increasingly upon the disparate associations of kin 
and acquaintances to create personal prestige in ceremonial displays of wealth. 
Each post records the totem of each participant in the host's feast, the loosely 
constructed network of matrilineal clans that came together for a few days to 
complete the ritual, often the burial of a senior man. The totem pole is an 
invention of the nineteenth century that records the failure of the numayn and 
the rise of the network of clan associations. Its presence depends on the partic-
ipation of the many clans, not on the singular host; and hence it is a multiply 
owned object as much as the post of a single prestigious man. 
Looking back on it all, many recent anthropologists and theorists believe 
that Mauss approached the potlatch as the greatest enigma in his theory of the 
gift. Certainly, in recent years more attention has fallen to it than to the hau as 
an indigenous form of gift giving. One reason for the discussion lies in the claim 
that potlatch valuables were not given away exactly as Mauss thought they had 
been. The distinction between ceremonial and everyday valuables matters a 
great deal to the analysis of potlatch. The ceremonial valuables, embossed 
copper images, can be seen at potlatch events only momentarily. For most of 
the time, a potlatch copper will be hidden away and not shown until it is time 
for it to be 'potlatched'. At the time when the copper is displayed it is then 
destroyed, usually by throwing it into the sea. Later ethnographers described 
some copper valuables as too precious to be given away, and so these were held 
back and not given away in ritual. 
I do not know if there are some copper images that are excluded from 
destruction because they are of a category of wealth that is inalienable, and 
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therefore too sacred to be destroyed; or if these are only being saved from 
destruction on this occasion because they are too sacred to destroy in a feast 
with these particular clans and leaders. Godelier and Weiner argued that the 
good is held back because it belongs to a category of sacred objects that never 
enter circulation among the villages and clans along the north-west coast. 
These valuables can only be given across generations so as to keep them within 
the same clan. If some ceremonial copper images are so special that they 
cannot be given away or destroyed, then people demonstrate such extraordi-
nary generosity in the potlatch ritual because they know they are keeping true 
to what that wealth symbolizes. Clans can own wealth among themselves, and 
it is sacrosanct and not given away without risking collective loss. Perhaps then 
the generosity of clan leaders appears rational if they keep their sacred valu-
ables, while enabling each other to give other valuables. The ethics of such 
giving confirms that the principle of the communal is sacred to human social 
life and the transactions that sustain it. 
Among the other more common interpretations of potlatch, that ceremony 
in which too much is given, anthropologists have argued that people exceed 
reasonable limits on potlatch because they are making gifts to the spirits of the 
dead, not to other living humans. Not just any gods, but simply the spirits of 
their ancestors. The chiefs sought benevolence from the ancestors so that they 
might avoid misfortune. They believed that the ancestral spirits might be jeal-
ous of the fact that they had bodies and lives. That fact, that the spirits are 
relatives, is the most important issue here. The spiritual and immaterial world 
does not exist apart from the living world. It is part of it. 
There remains the question of whether the goods were in fact given in gen-
erosity, or given for public destruction. If it is the latter, then potlatch raises 
some compelling questions about the nature of exchange when people seem-
ingly give too much. And more seriously it raises the compelling question of 
whether or not one can give too much. Does holding the most sacred potlatch 
copper images back signal that no one is fool enough to rid themselves of true 
valuables? Economies of sacrifice seem to be a misnomer for the depth or crux 
of the issues that the potlatch raises. There is no 'economy' about the potlatch, 
at least in so far as the common sense of economy means careful, cost-cutting 
measures. Potlatch hits the opposite of any common sense meaning of econ-
omy. Perhaps that shaking of the common sense of capitalist ideology explains 
the angst expressed over its practice in the earliest years of the twentieth cen-
tury, when the government of Canada aimed to remove the practice from the 
indigenous communities of the north-west coast and banned its performance. 
The ceremonial feast of the potlatch held the participants in a tight compe-
tition over who can give away the most. This means that the excesses of the 
potlatch extend into a kind of deep play (in the sense meant by Geertz, when 
he talks about the ways in which the person delves deeply into matters beyond 
the limits of rational economic practice). Potlatch is a test of personal prestige, 
and a way of making the hosts of the feast prestigious. Those who are giving 
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away so much risk more than the loss of their wealth, they risk that they will 
fail to give enough and thereby lose respect. 
This aspiration of potlatch, to evacuate wealth from all reserves, from the 
holds and storage rooms of a great house and clan, becomes the most frighten-
ing aspect of its practice because it leads to the kind of fantasy of power that 
Ruth Benedict described later as megalomania. In the case of the potlatch on 
the north-west coast, outside observers - government officials, settlers and even 
some anthropologists - believed that the competition endangered the well-
being of the community and clans. Chiefs' power to impress the feasters at a 
potlatch, that is to give everything away, coincided with their ability to per-
suade others to give all of it away against the best interests of the material 
well-being of the community. The danger lay in the potlatch cycle accelerating 
and claiming the entire livelihood of the feasters. If the potlatch consumed the 
participants, if the cycles of giving devoured the prospects of participants for 
their own future, then it had swung badly out of proportion to its ends of 
establishing the power of the chief, his clan and their mutual trust and respect. 
It is in this way that Benedict came to see the potlatch as comparable to an era 
of megalomania among the elite of the community, a psychological disposi-
tion informing a habit of association to the detriment of the entire society. 
Wolf (1999) tried to explain the excesses of human activity present in the 
potlatch. He argued that in north-west coast potlatch, people redistribute 
goods and burn ceremonial copper images because an idea about the way the 
world could be has taken hold of their imaginations, and made the actions seem 
reasonable. He argues that it is a feature of 'the gift' (both the act of making 
and that of receiving the gift) that a person might think through the signifi-
cance of actions in most personal terms, and reconcile the apparently 
contradictory motivations to give with a utopian myth. Wolf shows us that 
people often claim to be economic rationalists by acting upon ideas that bring 
them harm. 
How should anthropologists rectify Boas's ethnography of competitive 
exchange, made during the transformation of an entire society towards full 
participation in capitalist exchange, with Mauss's attention to the largesse of 
gift exchange? If in capitalist systems of value the gift becomes only a poor 
sign of itself, a shadowy phantasm of the life that values associations between 
people, then the gift as it is used among people beyond capitalist systems of 
wealth circulation is something different again. 
The work of Boas and Mauss puts an enormous challenge in front of the 
capitalist economy by arguing that individuals do not act with economic ratio-
nality, and by arguing that analysis of political and economic life can begin in 
the examination of the intimacy of social relations where the peculiar matter 
of human consciousness can be addressed better than through looking at insti-
tutions, or structures. That challenge continues, especially to the recent forms 
of neo-liberal ideology in contemporary capitalism that entwines the person 
into limiting or constraining social structural commitments. A human person 
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becomes only an individual with so much to risk and lose by going with the 
flow, thereby freeing him or herself to keep obligations. 
Giving beyond reason? 
Wolf (1999) argues that people give beyond reason in the north-west coast 
region in keeping with the response to the unreasonable effects of capitalist 
economic expansion into their social lives. This concurs with Gregory's interest 
in the flowering of gift exchange in the face of early intrusions of capitalist 
commodity transactions in Papua New Guinea (Gregory 1982, 1997). It is pos-
sible to consider potlatch as the efflorescence of gift exchange, in a kind of 
unusual activity that spreads as a shadow of the expansion of relationships 
shaped as commodity capital. 
Wolf evaluates the potlatch of the north-west coast in this way. He assesses 
the importance of the ceremony for the indigenous community, pointing out 
their increasing dependence on the market economy as they seek wage-paying 
jobs or small business ventures. None of this would be worthy of comment, let 
alone ritual redress, if the community thrived under such circumstances. 
Instead, social relations fell into doubt among some people with firmer and 
longer-term relationships in the market society, and with more social resources 
to generate wealth. What should the wealthy do with wealth? 
What can an anthropologist know about how others feel at the sight of ex-
cesses of ceremonial feasting? Wolf tells us that the colonial record shows 
something of this. The self-destructive feasting presented an interesting prob-
lem for the colonial government in British Columbia to solve. This government 
distrusted the intentions of large companies working to create large salmon 
fisheries off the coast and aiming to contract large acreages of land for logging. 
While clans held title on many of these, the companies said they did not. The 
provincial government aimed to keep those titles intact, dissuading the north-
west coast Indians from selling to the southern-based companies and 
persuaded them to develop small-scale projects on the land so that their future 
well-being was conserved. As the advocates of small business development on 
the north-west coast, and as politicians with more than a modicum of distrust 
for big business, their eyes focused on the problem of clan well-being. 
What can be learned from considering the colonial adminstrators' response? 
At the very least it could be an instance of how anthropologists should not 
respond to the events ~ that is, with fear and awe that exoticize what he or she 
fails to understand. Can the excesses of ceremonial display terrify some people 
while they enchant others? Bataille (1991) thinks so. He is writing at the time 
of the rise of fascism and finds the excesses of ceremony disturbing. Hutnyk 
(2003) suggests that Bataille might fear more than anything the possibility that 
profoundly human concerns can be lost to the ideals of the ceremony of 
nationalism. In such circumstances, the powerful displays of belief introduce a 
rigidity of action and a narrowing pathway of opportunities for changes in the 
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course of that action. Ruth Benedict describes this kind of fascistic activity 
as megalomania, and warns that the political game of potlatch, gone out of 
control in the venue of nationalist politics, terrified even the sternest of com-
petitors in the game. 
Building on Boas's ethnography, Benedict argues that at periods in the his-
tory of a cultural group there may emerge a kind of cultural disposition that 
favours particular human traits. Benedict uses the example of the Kwakiutl pot-
latch as an example of the cultural basis of the psychology of megalomania. 
She draws provocative comparisons between the Kwakiutl obsessions with the 
display of wealth and the performance of ritual and the Nazi obsession with 
similar ritualized performance and display of power, ironically suggesting that, 
'We have given scant justice to the reasonableness of cannibalism' (Benedict 
1935: 44). Her comparison of each of the Kwakiutl and Nazi performances 
suggests that the display of power can also make power, and that failing to see 
it leaves participants at the feast vulnerable to its deployments in the hands of 
leaders. 
The anthropologists Benedict and Hutnyk, different from Bataille the surre-
alist philosopher, might have shared their approaches had they met and 
conferred about it and had they been able to ask similar questions of the 
Kwakiutl. At the least they found that potlatch provided a mirror for examin-
ing excessive displays of power in Nazism, and a much-needed mirror too! 
Fascistic rituals of secular power were a West European political phenomenon 
of the twentieth century that overpowered its viewers with its own dazzling dis-
plays, suggesting the leadership-possessed charisma as a kind of intractable 
power. If fascistic ritual was a Gorgon monster that turned many thinking per-
sons' hearts and minds to stone, then the anthropologist could use the mirror 
of the potlatch from the cold and rainy coasts of the Pacific Northwest to see 
its dangers and overcome its daze of signs. Perhaps more anthropological 
approaches suggest the need to ask different kinds of questions. When does 
excess create terror? When does excess generate possibilities of insight? 
Consider how participants in other ceremonies talk about the possibility of 
a ceremony or a practice accelerating and going out of control, and thereby 
taking over the control of every action of their lives. In seeking to investigate 
this, during my own fieldwork I discussed the 'malanggan' complex in New 
Ireland with its hosts and participants. Malanggan is a funerary ritual, which 
is famous for its sculptures of strikingly complex beauty that are first displayed 
then destroyed as part of the ceremony. The word malanggan, which has no 
direct translation, describes both the sculpture and the feast prepared by 
mourners who come together to grieve the dead. The grieving at the ceremo-
nial feast could continue indefinitely if the mourners decided to let it. Men, 
and even more so women, spoke about the dangers of past feasts, when the 
malanggan 'swung out of control'. In order to satiate the guests, the hosts used 
everything they had: pigs, magic, dance and food. Sometimes the women 
complained, women and men would retreat to the gardens in the midst of a 
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malanggan feast in order to replenish the stacks of root vegetables used for 
feeding the guests. Young, mature and old crops would be uprooted until the 
feasters exhausted the garden crops. In times like these, women urged men to 
stop the festivities. 
In a different example, the surrealist essayist and poet Bataille (1993) argues 
that the poetic imagination of the ancient Aztecs escalated out of control, 
ending in the act of ceremonial sacrifice of youths. Bataille's fabled account 
describes sacrifice as an event that gripped the imagination of the entire 
ancient Aztec civilization. In an evocative, fictive account, he depicts the imag-
ined horrors of the Aztec sacrifice. He narrates those ceremonies fantastically, 
in order to show how wrong things can go. In a total society swinging out of 
control, because it was more in the control of a few priests, participants sacri-
ficed war captives, slaves and their own young people to make the sun come 
back to give its warmth to the earth, and asked the stars to sing the names of 
the victims eternally. If the beauty of the stars surpasses everything, even 
injunctions against human sacrifice, then the participants in the ceremony 
should fear the excesses of powerful display. Bataille suggests something more 
than some latter day anthropologists who argued that the Aztecs sacrificed 
humans in order to keep the community working collectively in the seasonal 
corn harvest. Similar to Wolf, he argued that the Aztec ritual beliefs prevailed 
over the human costs as long as the symbolic economy stirred people to act to 
make an increasingly irrational world seem more reasonable. 
Wolf and Bataille teach that it is a terrifying deceit of cultural knowledge 
that leads people to act inhumanely; and this is why anthropologists need to 
understand culture (and not just history) better than they do. The retelling of 
the account in fictionalized form allows Bataille to demand more of his reader: 
to consider deeply, without dismissing or putting down the book, what partici-
pants knew through the awe and fear that must be part of sacrifice. Taking this 
in, digesting the difficult image and the unpleasant experience with the human 
senses is necessary to an anthropological understanding of it. Knowledge of the 
event, of the ceremony, of the human acts can only be complete if it includes 
the irrationality of it all. 
Can you give too much? Apparently you cannot; and necessarily, yes, you 
must. The excesses of giving cannot be explained in terms of how to rational-
ize the amount of expenditure, or of giving. Nor can the excesses of giving be 
explained in terms of covert self-satisfaction as when someone appears gener-
ous with small things while holding back the most valuable goods. Instead, the 
examples of the excessive generosity of feasting, of sacrifice to the gods, of 
giving all you can in the name of virtue, all share a concern with human exis-
tence. These gifts are made in the face of death, gifts made to acknowledge 
human mortality. It is not possible to give too much in the face of death, and it 
is absolutely necessary to give generously at the moment of recognition of that 
existential fact. A person works hard to keep relations and to meet obligations, 
but the fact remains that at the death of a friend, no exchange of gifts could 
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rectify the loss. There is one certainty in all relationships: that they will end in 
separation of some kind. 
Living after excessive giving 
Elsewhere in the world across the Pacific, on the islands of New Ireland, people 
address the problem of what they have lost at the death of kin in a ritual in 
which they exchange food and shell wealth. The clan hosting the ritual will ask 
for support from the rest of the village, and request individual men and 
women to prepare by bringing taro and pigs to the feast. More spectacularly, 
the hosts invite a malanggan maker to assemble a team of artists. The team 
prepare for the ritual feast: they carve, weave and display sculptures for a brief 
viewing. After the short display the figures are destroyed. The malanggan 
moves people after they have seen it, after their departure from the feasting 
site. What they retain, in their mind's eye, is the image of the sculpture, so 
powerful that the German ethnographer of the turn of the last century wrote 
of how it came back to him in feverish dreams. No doubt it did, but Kraemer 
lacked the means to recreate the malanggan, a means that New Irelanders do 
have. In later years, a few who first saw it will aim to reconstitute the image 
that they saw. The malanggan glistens in the midday light, but its image 
imprints itself on the retina. A malanggan that carvers created for the tourist's 
eye does not capture the beauty of the ritual object. (This image is reproduced 
in Figure 11.1 on p. 201) 
Ghosts, images of the dead, are not scary, but living with the obligations to 
them is. How people meet their obligations to others is a measure of their 
humanity, and it is possible to fail. In New Ireland, I have been told that mor-
tuary custom is hard because it holds you in its grip. How that is so puzzled 
me, until I realized that there is no choice about opting out of customary 
work. Even those men and women whose religious conversion entailed 'giving 
up' custom eventually participated in it in later years. I recall one case in par-
ticular: a man whose years as a judge and whose conversion to the faith of the 
Seventh Day Adventists made him a very 'modem' man and unlikely to partic-
ipate in traditional rituals. As he matured to middle age, he kept his obligations 
to the clans and community to host his parents' funeral with a malanggan 
feast. He attempted a hybrid feast, making an effort to blend his commitments 
to the ceremonial work with the Christian commitments to the funeral. Within 
days of the final event, the host was racing about the region, seeking proper 
ceremonial pigs to replace the chicken substitutes he had planned. At the last 
minute he consulted a weather maker to ensure a sunny day. The participants 
grumbled that the food was in short supply, not good, and the day rainy. Get-
ting the aesthetic sensibility correct mattered in every way. They joked about 
the chickens when they should have been smacking their lips in appreciation of 
pork. The correct display of wealth in the funeral would have measured his 
success. Was this what malanggan feasting had come to be? It might have been 
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better never to try to host the event because the man's failure to present the 
ceremonial wealth created ill-will towards him, whereas before his guests bore 
him none. 
Learning to see the extraneous relations 
How does an anthropologist learn to see the relations that would be easier to 
ignore? In his ethnography of Thailand mortuary ritual, Klima recounts a dif-
ficult fieldwork incident ~ one that he hoped to forget but later rethought and 
reconsidered as necessary to his understanding of the whole fieldwork situa-
tion. He examines how his purchase of a packet of cigarettes in a corner shop 
exploded into a violent confrontation between the shopkeeper and himself, 
when the shopkeeper gave back the incorrect amount of change from the 
purchase and sold him fake cigarettes instead of real ones. 'Under other cir-
cumstances on other days, it might have been possible to ignore it.' Klima 
explains that he felt frustrated by the exchange because he knew that the owner 
had participated in other events in the street the days before, in events that 
had caused the injury of a number of protesters against the meeting of the G7 
countries to discuss trade. Was this the only reason for Klima's outrage? Could 
he really see himself as a victim of unfair trade while purchasing petty goods? 
ls anger the result of the ironic fact of being ripped off in a purchase by a 
local trader, while participating with him in an anti-capitalist demonstration? 
Is anger the result of irresolvable contradictions in the daily life of anthropolo-
gists with the extra burden of taking up an activist project as part of the 
period of fieldwork? 
What does the display of anger succeed in creating in those relationships? 
What we do not know is what kinds of relationships Klima made for himself 
that day as a result of excessive displays of anger in the shop. Then too, what 
kind of relationships are made and unmade by excesses of human expression in 
the social protest that Klima described as an anti-capitalist demonstration? Is 
this effervescence of emotion and sensual knowledge constitutive of new reality 
or regenerative of old ones? The answers could only come with what Klima 
calls the courage to live with those aspects of the world that seem irrational. 
A more complex event described by Klima has been the ceremonial work 
of setting up a gambling casino as part of the conclusion of his wife's father's 
funeral. The gambling edifice surprises him. At first the choice of ways to 
celebrate the work seems bizarre, so bizarre that the Western-born anthropolo-
gist admits that he cannot make sense of the importance of the ritual work. 
How could a time of grief and personal loss be addressed by such a frivolous 
activity? 
As an ethnographer, he invites the reader to find the same answers as he 
does in their activity. It is a social activity in which people concentrate their 
attention on the enormity of life in these small bids for good luck. As the 
wheel of fortune turns, time after time, people place larger and larger bets. In 
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the shadows of the funeral event they risk larger sums of material wealth than 
seems humanly wise. They participate in irrational behaviour, faced with the 
mundane fact of death and the irrational fact of its futility in human life. 
They have to risk that life counts for something, and that death means the loss 
of good friends and bodily pleasures of their company - sharing food at feasts, 
smelling the wind on the same day. This gambling is a form of deep play 
recorded by Geertz ( 1973), in which participants go well beyond the acceptable 
limits of rational economic choice because they stake more in the play as per-
sons than in the gambling as economic actors. The funeral casino presents a 
case of how people recognize and address their fears of contingency and death 
within life, by participating in ritual with excruciating commitment to gam-
bling it all away. Meeting obligations to ceremonial life is hard work because it 
puts celebrants face-to-face with each other and with the necessity of remain-
ing human. 
Of course mortuary ceremonies triumph the continuity of social relations 
in the face of loss and death. That is a rational response, which reasonable 
anthropologists can describe. But the experience of death is not rational and 
anthropological understanding does not grow from only reasonable experience 
of it. For all of an anthropologist's attention to the facts of social life and to 
the habits of transacting material goods with others in order to continue social 
life, one thing remains true. You will be at least physically separated from those 
whom you love. Recognizing this helps an anthropologist to make sense of the 
excesses of experience, the copious gifts of Trobriand fathers, the angry out-
burst at apparently unfair exchange, and the destruction of beautiful New 
Ireland sculpture in grief. Perhaps it is too easy to live an entire lifetime ig-
norant of the inevitable fact of the loss of the physical forms of relationship; 
that might be the case whether you choose to live in Manchester, Papua New 
Guinea or New York City. Perhaps that ignorance comes from simply denying 
the madness of mortality with the daily measure of small gifts made against 
infinity, as if death does not come in the end. Meditating upon that certainty 
of separation changes the anthropological argument, at least in so far as it 
makes all arguments about how to sustain human relationships a matter of the 
exchange of forms of gifts. 
Conclusions: a meditation on giving beyond reason 
Tying people into it even as it goes on, taking others along with it into the lives 
of others, the gift you take into your hands begs you to think of yet another 
person, maybe the one who gave it to you, or maybe another person you have 
not met. That is how the gift works. This is the hau of it, not bush spirits or 
spirits of the dead, but the spirits of living others that insist themselves upon 
you, the additional, unexpected share of the transaction that remains with you. 
Giving attention to excess - to figuring out what remains after a transaction 
appears complete - points to an unexplored anthropological concern for the 
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spirit of the gift. The gift is not sacred and therefore kept back from risks of 
circulation. Instead, it is in the spirit of the gift to recognize that exchange cre-
ates moral outcomes by leaving behind traces of other people with you, after 
you thought the relationship ended. In the balance between the completed 
transaction between several people and the traces of that transaction lies the 
complexity of moral reasoning. Moral reasoning entails freeing the self -
which is a complex act - to meet obligations. 
Anthropology has much to give to a student of it. Fieldwork brings experi-
ence and knowledge about how to be a human being, and does so in ways 
that surprise the scholar who assumes that the familiar will continue to seem 
familiar anywhere. In addition to understanding what seems familiar, it is also 
necessary to consider how fieldwork 'failures', researchers' mistakes and mis-
understandings are not barriers to anthropological knowledge. Instead, they are 
part of it. Perhaps, if anthropologists accept that gifts come to hand through 
unreasonable processes, then they can consider more fully the unusual, difficult 
parts of social life. 
When it comes to writing it all down, the first problem is how to rid yourself 
of what you know, given that you have received too much. The second prob-
lem is how to live with the rest of it. That second problem is a little closer to 
what Mauss meant by the hau of the gift than either what Derrida meant by 
the difference that the gift makes, or quite what Bataille meant by the 'accursed 
share', as that portion of wealth that exceeds the needs of people to sustain 
themselves. How to live with the rest begs anthropologists to consider how the 
intersubjective nature of exchange stretches the terms of the gift beyond what 
is reasonable into considerations of the spectacular, and then again beyond the 
surreal. In the last chapter, I discuss how that extension of relationship is not 
exotic; instead, it is a matter of ethical concern. 
Summary of chapter 9 
How can anthropologists account for the total human experience if they sys-
tematically exclude from their fieldwork any material that seems excessive to 
the explanation, any evidence that seems unpleasant to consider, and the 'ugly' 
aspects of human experience. According to Bataille, a theory of society cannot 
exclude the irrational and the erotic from its explanations of how people live 
together. In this chapter I have examined examples of the aesthetics and ethics 
of Trobriand gardening such that the father's mapula gifts might be under-
stood as expressions of affection as well as acts of reciprocal exchange. 
Further, I have examined the excessively generous acts of giving wealth away 
to be destroyed in potlatch feasts, considering what was made by giving too 
much and how people lived with giving too much. Critics of Bataille's celebra-
tion of the irrationality of excessive exchange, Wolf and Klima, point out that 
both colonial administrators and neo-colonial economic policy denigrate cus-
tomary ceremonial exchange as irrational. In turn, these anthropologists 
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expose that the belief that capitalist exchange for wealth accumulation is a 
pathway to individual freedom is founded in irrational belief in freedom out-
side social relations. While the studies also confirm Bataille's insight that 
capitalism is irrational in its inception, they raise a further concern too. Each 
of the case studies examines exchanges that take place at the time of death, 
and in the events of funerals and sacrifice. The problem that Bataille raises is: 
how can anthropologists understand death as a part of life when it is also an 
experience that exceeds rational explanations and exposes claims to know of 
powers and existence outside of social life? That people use ceremonial and 
everyday rituals to reproduce society in the face of death is a common anthro-
pological understanding. Ghosts, spiritual presences and the material and 
immaterial legacies of the dead do not terrify people, but living with the oblig-
ations to acknowledge their presence is difficult when it requires that not all of 
social action is grounded in rational belief 
168 
Part III 






Does technology change the way in which exchange operates in social relation-
ships? As people in the second half of the twentieth century came to terms 
with the possibilities of electronic communication, from music recordings to 
the internet cafe, some scholars suggested that the world had grown smaller 
and that intimacy remained possible across great distances creating what 
McLuhan (1964a) named a global village and later scholars theorized as 
'ethnoscapes' (Appadurai 1996) or as the 'traffic in culture' (Marcus and 
Meyers 1995). The global village is 'virtually' a village. It requires that everyone 
in it bear an image of their intimate collaborative participation in constructing 
the village through technological mediums, but at a larger scale than before. 
This chapter examines the exchange of knowledge in virtual reality as a form 
of interaction that suspends disbelief in the possibility of face-to-face intimacy 
across great distances. Virtual reality interfaces those forms of sociality with 
technology and cultural media, as common as radio and television and as 
'exotic' as cyberspace. In McLuhan's understanding of virtual reality people 
emphasize how their relations are meaningful, rather than what they mean, 
and so they convey meaning. 
My Aim is True is the title of a music album from 1977 and comes from the 
song 'Alison'. This song concerns a man who recognizes that love breaks down 
the exchanges between the self and another because the lines between partners 
become blurred. There is something of the irrational about love; images and 
forms belonging to persons beyond the couple's direct experience inhabit the 
relationship as when one misnames a friend in a sentimental moment, or likens 
the gift of affection to earlier experiences of parental love. None the less, the 
lyrics by Elvis Costello acknowledge love's disappointment and illusions even 
in its mutual loyalty. In love neither ideal nor material aspects of affection can 
characterize or give evidence to its reality. If love is virtually real, then its truth 
is out there, over there, and inescapably present in the relationship. 
I am writing about a popular culture song, making some comments about 
what might be commonly understood in mulling over the significance of it. 
During years of student life, it is common for people either to claim greater sig-
nificance for songs, films or popular images, or conversely to deny their power 
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to carry meaning as contrary to their seemingly over-determined significance in 
the popular art and music culture. That daily kind of reflection can be akin to 
thinking anthropologically, but what would an anthropologist interested in 
problems of the exchange of ideas or intellectual perspectives analyse in popu-
lar culture? 
I use the example of this song because it introduces the problem of describ-
ing popular forms of sociality that create a sense of 'virtual reality'. Here, I 
consider the possibilities offered to anthropological thought by such recourses 
following new configurations of subject/object pairings. In virtual reality, it 
is hard to understand the world with the Cartesian philosophy that separates 
the sentient human subject from the intransigent objective world. Instead, in 
virtual reality the sceptical subject suspends disbelief and reconfigures its rela-
tionship to the object. For example, love and friendship are common experi-
ences which might seem virtually real in the way in which other technologically 
assisted experiences seem real; the virtual reality of new forms of communica-
tion on internet and mobile telephones, the reality of social policy, the reality 
of development organizations. People experience virtual reality when placing 
their faith in thoughts and sentiments about the relationship. Common 
wisdom teaches that you perceive, rather than test another person's friendship 
before you risk demonstrating it with invitations to share your meal, your time 
and your home. The relationship is sustained as long as the other person par-
ticipates in it in a friendly manner, which might be to say that it is simply 
'virtually real'. Sceptical enquiry cannot confirm its truth, instead testing faith 
in a relationship creates doubts about it and effectively destroys the sense of 
affection and its sense of reality that makes it seem real. At the same time, it is 
common wisdom among any group of acquaintances that the conditions of 
virtually real gifts, such as gifts of friendship, depend upon accepting specific 
conditions. The belief in the reality of friendship depends upon sharing the 
belief that the camaraderie exists with at least one other person. 
One can compare technologies of the self in creating virtual forms of social 
life such as friendship, with the experience of technologically assisted forms of 
virtual reality such as internet society, or the older forms such as television, 
film and music which connect through the imagination rather than through 
channels that open direct access to each other's chosen words and images. 
Whether in friendship or in cyberspace, people aim to make the connection 
true, even when the form might be false or the ideal might betray. 
Technology as virtually real exchange 
In this chapter, I want to examine the anthropology of virtual society by enter-
ing into a discussion of the exchange of ideas in a non-Cartesian space (see too 
Auge 1992). By non-Cartesian space I mean domains of experience in which 
the body does not appear as a material fact, separate from the mind, and by 
extension, the mind is not separate from the world as a material reality in any 
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popular sense as essentially real, or in a materialist sense as a tool or resource 
for use by the sentient being. Virtually real exchange challenges anthropolo-
gists to enter into considerable investigation into the nature of anthropological 
technology and the nature of the society which uses them. Imitating exchange 
relations, I will alternate between discussions of virtual society, and the anthro-
pological proposals for a new descriptive technology to comprehend it. 
Anthropologists might meet the challenge to describe experiences that seem 
virtually real by choosing technologies of communication that evoke rather 
than record that reality. Wagner argued that through the uses of metaphor, 
which extend or carry meaning across to different contexts, people elicit under-
standing. Wagner (1986) distinguishes metaphor as the extension of meaning 
to new contexts of experience, from symbols as 'things' that represent the 
world. His position explores how meaning is made and distinguishes him from 
Geertz (1973) who argued that anthropologists must discover what actions and 
words represent, what symbols mean, and how people live meaningfully. Artis-
tic expressions can guide anthropologists in this activity; however, the work of 
ethnographic description entails further reflection upon such evocations. 
Here is an example, taking Wagner's guidance, because he admires popular 
culture. Consider the popular song named here, as a departure point for fur-
ther consideration of how to conduct anthropology after acknowledging the 
failures of the Cartesian subject to comprehend the human condition. The 
lyrics describe a woman as seen by a man who loves her. The narrator cata-
logues the other suitors who adore her, marking the manifestations of those 
failed relationships. He recalls a memory of pretty fingers lying (lie-ing?) in the 
wedding cake as an image presaging the deceived marriage. Her display of a 
'silly' valentine from another admirer belittles the unrequited love of the narra-
tor. Acknowledging that purposeless and false loves can damage both lover 
and beloved, he begs someone to turn out the 'big light' because he 'can't stand 
to see her this way'. Fearful that love's various tawdry manifestations might 
betray his ideal, the narrator sustains his belief that, at its best, neither ideal 
nor material form confirms the sentiment. The song warns the listener that 
love's virtual reality can be pained and threatened both by the ideal of 'true 
love' as well as by the physical presence of the adored. Only love's aim is true 
because love is neither an ideal nor a material fact, but simply virtually real. 
Such a departure for anthropological description is not at odds with every-
day Euro-American commonsense and folk wisdom. There is a danger that 
virtual society might be an experience specific to the bourgeois consciousness. 
Indeed, Western folk wisdom tells us that romantic love opens a world of 
knowing in which the relations between the self and the other collapse, which is 
a fantasy held by the bourgeois individual in hopes against his ultimate alien-
ation from others. Despite the etliorescence of self-help guides that advise on 
how to retain the self in love relationships (which is why they are called self-
help books), most folk wisdom understands that the distinction between the 
self and other blurs in love. That basic idea makes possible two features of love. 
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First, consider how humans make unexpected or apparently irrational deci-
sions in the name of love. This apparent vulnerability of persons in love also 
suggests the pathologies of the condition, and subsequently the general con-
cern for the compromises made by the loving subject to the object of his or her 
affection. Conversely, consider how mature love transforms relationships with 
the mutual recognition that the successful relationship positively influences the 
quality of life of the person within it. This, paradoxically, acknowledges that 
love is a relationship that distinguishes persons, by making it necessary to 
acknowledge, even create, the loved one as distinct from the self. Perhaps love's 
successes elude people; perhaps those stories remain unsung. 
Suppose I take the example of art-house cinema as a commentary on popu-
lar culture, as well as one of many different popular cultural forms. Goddard's 
Eloge de !' Amour (2000) is a eulogy mourning intimate human relationships 
and praising love's work in sustaining sociality, asking if being adult is truly 
possible without the possibility of loving. He asks if the failure of love, a fail-
ure of the spirit rather than of material reality, is the single fact of human 
alienation in a modern era. Goddard opens the film by inviting the viewer to 
recall that the theme of human relations consumed the attention of most 
ancient philosophers while modern theorists obsessed over theorizing the self, 
at great personal loss. Take for example a meditation from Plato's Symposium 
which searches for how ideal love might be known concretely within the 
human relationship. The Symposium defines love as the everlasting possession 
of the good and claims that the pursuit of love must be born in beauty, but not 
simply so. Even ideal love emerges from the basic fact of human relatedness. It 
is not thought to be a capacity of the individual so much as a virtue of those 
relationships that create human beings. 
The song, and the film, the anthropological and philosophical text are each 
a different descriptive technology for exposing the elusive character of love. 
Neither popular nor clinical science measures love's profundity in human lives, 
and love cannot be diminished to chemistry, popular psychology or con-
temporary fascination with spirituality. Many questions can be asked. What 
relationships sustain love, how is it expressed, or how can its aim be true even 
when others fail to see it? Anthropologists risk creating analysis as a form of 
such virtual reality by trying to describe virtual reality; that is, each interpreta-
tion or translation recreates the virtual real, yet again. 
Does anthropology need new descriptive technologies? 
In the previous sections I have tacked (as does a sailing craft on wind) between 
evocation and analysis of the theme of popular culture renderings of love. It is 
a form of experience that can entrap the writer and researcher with metaphors 
that carry across the sense of the problem into the interpretation and analysis 
of the problem. Where the researcher is easily entrapped in a network of inter-
pretations of a text- a web - one needs different technologies of communica-
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tion and reflection. In an effort to identify guides to the study of virtual soci-
ety, I have selected three anthropologists: Latour, Strathern, and Wagner. Each 
of them recalls the varied history of attempts to describe and change reality, 
even as they entertain the question of how to analyse virtually real gifts such 
as the exchange of ideas. In this section I will discuss the work of Latour 
(1988, 1999), Strathern (1999, 2000) and Wagner (1986, 2001) in relation to 
their instructions on how one might describe virtual society. 
In virtual society, an anthropologist would err in the attempt to refer to real-
ity in a material sense as a mute object or in any materialist sense as the trans-
formative impact on a person of an object carried in the hand (Latour 1999: 
174). Neither do they glibly refer to virtual reality (commonly understood as 
technologically assisted communication that apparently extends human capac-
ities beyond the body of the subject) as a 'new' reality that compromises the 
immediate physical and corporal reality of direct, face-to-face speech. Instead, 
Latour evokes classical Greek philosophers' discussions of Daedalus' techne 
and reconsiders him as an engineer who uses science and technical skill to 
change the world in which he is entangled and lives. So inspired, Latour argues 
that technical skill creates reality as the symmetry of nature and society; he 
docs not assume the verity of one over and above the other. A problem 
remains in regard to how to modify social theory to explain 
a continuity between nuclear power plants, missile-guidance systems, 
computer chip design, or subway automation and the ancient mix of 
society, symbols and matter that ethnographers and archaeologists 
have studied for generations in the cultures of New Guinea, Old Eng-
land or sixteenth century Burgundy. 
(Latour 1999: 195) 
In Pandora's Hope, Latour elaborates his earlier argument for continuities 
across modern and ancient society as made in We Have Never Been Modern 
(1988). The reader learns that technical skill in the modern era deepens the 
intimacy between the ideal and the material by repeatedly cross-cutting their 
separation as if finely making a long chain to weave them together. In suppos-
edly primitive society mobilizing chains of relations can imbue any object with 
the history of transactions producing it. 
Wagner and Strathern seem less certain that the separation of material from 
ideal defines the modern era, and subsequently that the remarriage of material 
with ideal form defines contemporaneous relations. More so, as scholars with 
experience in seemingly non-modern society, they are less assured that techni-
cal skill of modems ever worked differently from the skills of others, and even 
less convinced about differentiating between modes of description of reality in 
modern and primitive society, as has been Latour's aim. Instead, Strathern, 
drawing on Battaglia's ideas about displacement (1999), urges readers to con-
sider 'why we think technology requires special techniques of habitation and 
175 
A PRESENT WITHOUT NOSTALGIA 
why, in effect we distance it from us' (2001: 2). Drawing upon commonalities 
between Euro-American and New Irelander habits of 'separating themselves 
from what they see enveloping them', Strathern poses her doubts about 
'the opposition between nature and the application of knowledge that Euro-
Americans call technology' (2001: 3). Wagner argues that both Melanesian 
world views and holographic reality can impact positively the techniques and 
the practice of anthropology at home and abroad: 'What an absolute holo-
graphic reality might be is simply the right question' (Wagner 2001: xix). 
Although Latour raises clearly the possibility of a new science after the 
critique of Descartes by proposing that research into hybrid forms of nature 
and society should lead scholarship into forms of association needed by the 
collective, his work does not realize the goal of creating a post-Cartesian 
anthropological thought. Instead, it is the work of Strathern and Wagner that 
succeeds in going beyond the limits of the sentient Cartesian subject's knowl-
edge of an objective world. Most generally, their work helps anthropologists to 
understand those experiences of sociality that seem virtually real; that is, such 
meaningful experiences in which absent persons can be known through substi-
tuted images and forms and even composed of other persons. 
Indirectly, by describing virtually real exchanges and interchanges, these 
anthropologists have raised a critique of postmodern thought. Postmodern 
criticism has challenged the discipline's ability to describe an objective world. 
In this, they differ from other anthropologists who have recorded this critique, 
without replying to it with alternatives (see Marcus and Fischer 1986, Rabinow 
1996). It is widely agreed in anthropology now that descriptive accounts can be 
accused of failing because they leave incomplete coverage or inaccurate repre-
sentations of experience. More eloquent analyses of the crisis of representation 
endorsed poststructuralist insights that perhaps had been best elaborated in 
The Order of Things (Foucault 1972). Foucault had correctly recognized that 
efforts to represent experience severed the representation of life, labour and 
language from the meaningful contexts of their practice. This ironic fact of 
knowledge made scientific thought impossible. As a stunning critique of even 
the interpretative social sciences, he showed that failure lies with the scientific 
limits placed upon descriptive practice. That is, it is impossible to meaningfully 
understand any lived experience through describing it, whether thickly or sym-
bolically. In the worst-case scenario, attempts at accurate description kill off 
the meaning won in experience. Unfortunately the postmodern caveat that 
symbolic representation saps life of meaning had few rejoinders. These authors 
offer a response and a course of action. 
Some critics of virtual reality believe that technology is somehow distinct 
from society, rather than a part of it. How have we forgotten that tool making, 
technology and general artisan skill facilitate and define human society? The 
creation of the funereal sculptures which I described in chapter 9 shows that 
expert uses of technology, especially artisan skill, permeate fundamental social 
experiences. Without skilled carvers to create beautiful sculptures that keep the 
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attention of the mourners on the nature of their loss, participants in the cere-
mony could not experience grieving as fully as they do. The beauty of the form 
is etched upon the imagination of the viewer, such that the image rather than 
the material form remains as the reality of the experience of mourning and 
grief Here, I follow Strathern's descriptive definition of malanggan as an 
example of virtual reality, 'Present bodies may at once substitute for absent 
bodies (New Ireland exegesis) on the carving as a body for the deceased, and 
(exegesis mine) may be presented as composed of other bodies, as this 
(malanggan) head is composed of birds and fish' (Strathern 2001). Strathern's 
essay discusses the ways in which technology can be animated. The effect is a 
series of resonating forms of social experience that cannot be simply classified 
as material or ideal. 
How can anthropologists understand the experience of viewing the sculp-
ture at the mortuary feast without falsely assuming it is a thing to be 
described? Such questions pose afresh Gregory Bateson's search for an anthro-
pology that begins with empathy, and his efforts to expose its effects in social 
relationships. In a modern world, would that be a more radical point of depar-
ture, scepticism or empathy (Bateson 1972, 1987a, band c)? Empathy entails 
escaping Cartesian objectivity that simply finds examples of the general rule in 
particular experience. The most persistent intellectual habit of Cartesian scep-
ticism recreates a distinction between subject and object, repeatedly valorizing 
the subjectivity of the scholar as the knowing researcher of the world. A few 
anthropologists have risked putting the human relationship as love or empathy 
in the centre of their scholarly work so that they could see it. David Schneider 
did not discuss love as a means for understanding, but as an object that took 
the form of a core symbol in American families. Jn his book American Kinship 
(1975) Schneider reminded readers that the study of kinship must comprehend 
the intricacies of love. He argued that acknowledging the significance of love 
to kin relations presents the possibility of critiquing both the primary role of 
'blood' as the substance that links people and the powerful place of the law as 
it governs relations. Schneider writes, 'Relatives are friends who are with you 
through thick and thin, whether you like it or not and whether they do the job 
properly or not' (1975: 54). That relatives are loved complicates the claim that 
American kin feel intimacy through the assumption that they are of the same 
blood, but Schneider acknowledges that relatives might disappoint you fre-
quently, but that they rarely abandon you. Simultaneously, he argues that a 
better understanding of love presents the chance to critique the failings of 
legalistic approaches to human relationships. In American kinship, marriage is 
a legal relationship, emulating emotional bonds. The law makes affined kin out 
of those relations allegedly made by love and affection. Schneider's discussion 
of the exchanges of both affectionate and erotic love, as well as his discussion of 
the transactions of friendship, can disturb a reader so much that they might 
be tempted to dismiss the analysis or put the book down. Schneider acknowl-
edges that writing about experiences so close to home misleads the reader into 
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thinking that his book simply reports on the banal or that he writes about family 
life without discretion (1975). None the less, from Schneider's perspective, a 
study of kinship that fails to acknowledge the significance of love - whether it is 
taken as real, virtual or a category of experience to be interrogated by psycho-
analytic anthropology - might also risk misunderstanding human relationships 
as they are lived. 
Bateson's studies of communication and ritual life deployed intelligent uses 
of empathy in description. Wagner, following Bateson, argues that anthropology 
needs new mediums of expression following the failure of Cartesian reasoning 
to comprehend the complexity of social relations. If poststructuralism initiated 
the crisis of representation as a Kuhnian revolution in normal science, then 
Wagner responds in the terms of a revolutionary science in his proposal for a 
holographic anthropology. Wagner's proposal for a holographic anthropology 
thus distances itself from normal anthropology, just as Gregory Bateson 
championed anthropological science as 'metalogue' years after the contempla-
tions of Whitehead and Russell on the nature of reality (Bateson 1958: 280; 
1972). Holographic anthropology embraces the law of fractals in chaos theory 
to aid truthful description, thereby modelling reality. In chaos theory, models 
are not representations or descriptions in the common sense. They are the 
traces of attempts to apprehend reality's complexities that contain an internal 
record of shifts of vision or corrections of scale as a measure is taken of real-
ity. Holographic anthropology is a self-scaling medium. If this is hard to under-
stand, consider the common Euro-American experience of love, whereby 
empathy, one of love's mediums of expression, can create love by expressing 
love - empathy brings about changes in both the person who gives and the 
person who receives love. In such deployments of empathy, love becomes a 
self-scaling medium adjusting its expression to the changing nature of the love 
relationship, whereas empathy cannot be separated from love, and to call it a 
technology would require conscious difficult distinction of the experience of 
love from the demonstrations of empathy. 
Alternatively, the work of self-scaling mediums in holographic anthropology 
might parallel the work of 'metalogue', as Bateson meant it. Metalogue carries 
the sense of communication at the same time that it carries its meaning, find-
ing sense in a perpetual shifting of the question in response to the answer. In 
metalogue, as in holographic anthropology, the truth is out there, over there, 
and inescapably present in the relationships that make the model of reality, 
because reality always moves ahead of the means of modelling it. 
If anthropologists were enabled to think well about virtual reality, they 
would do better to forget the essential categories of body and mind, of inside 
and outside, of consanguine and affine. Instead, anthropologists can approach 
the description of virtual reality as if it were a network of exchanges, such as 
Latour, Strathern and Wagner have theorized it. By using the example of love 
and the empathetic approach I explore the idea that virtual reality is a modern 
construct different from non-modern ideas about the nature of reality. 
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Technocracy of virtually real exchange 
The anthropologist Riles (2000) offers a different kind of case study. She looks 
at how Pacific societies, such as the Walbiri of Australia, use artworks to under-
score how they communicate and create social relations. The image, then, exists 
both as a form that represents a place and as a pathway for travel through that 
place (see Munn 1973, Glowczewski 1983). Riles explores, then in a manner 
similar to Munn, how a network of aid organizations operates internationally 
as a model for and of social life. Walbiri make patterns on the sand, icono-
graphic images that operate to model social relationships. Drawing on Munn's 
example of Walbiri art, she aims to explain that icons - such as artefacts and 
policy documents - do not represent society; but rather, the models effectively 
make it. 
Riles discusses the work of the non-government organizations (NGOs) that 
deliver support to the underdeveloped nation of Fiji, a nation whose colonial 
past I discussed in chapter 6, in an account of the exchanges that made in-
debtedness. Riles's account helpfully demonstrates that the anthropological 
attention to virtual reality need not universalize human emotions; it does, how-
ever, find a common capacity in human beings to make aesthetic judgements 
about beauty and virtue in human relationships. Her case study follows. 
The public culture world of bureaucrats, documents, NGOs and networks 
takes on a life of its own with the confusion of social action, its documents 
and its general effects in the same way as empathy animates popular culture. 
Riles is a legal anthropologist who successfully modelled the complex network 
of aid organizations operating in the South Pacific, as a network. Although 
this similarity between what she describes and her model of it sounds superflu-
ous rather than informative, she shows ethnographically that it is not. Far from 
being redundant, the efforts by Riles to describe networked interaction help 
her to analyse the most unnerving aspect of their operation: namely, the effect 
that they have on social life in the region. Anthropological researchers working 
in the vicinity of any network of aid organizations can note that effect. The 
organizations' policies start to be self-replicating across different field locations, 
so that problems such as the empowerment of women begin to be addressed in 
the same way everywhere. This is not because the causes of women's disem-
powerment are the same everywhere, but because the organizations use the 
same strategies for exposing women's empowerment as a problem. 
Before I discuss Riles's analysis of Fiji's place in the network of aid organi-
zations working with men and women there, it helps the reader to recall a 
few details about the country. Fiji became an independent Pacific Islands 
nation after a century of British administration as a colony of the empire and 
a territory of the Commonwealth. The history of labour trade and plantation 
work supported the growth of a large South Asian population in Fiji, where 
nearly 50 per cent of the total population in 1980 claimed that heritage. South 
Asians in Fiji became most politically active there in the period after the 
179 
A PRESENT WITHOUT NOSTALGIA 
achievement on the Asian sub-continent of Indian independence in 1947 and 
through the years of political development leading to Fijian independence. 
The south Asian constituency of the Fijian Labour Party outnumbers any 
other, and these Indo-Fijians could be said to define the party itself (although 
it is not an ludo-Fijian political party by prescription). In addition to this, an 
entrenched commitment to the continuation of native or indigenous Fijian 
rights to land complicates the ethnic division in the Fijian state, which pre-
vents the purchase of land by non-indigenous Fijians. Such conditions 
challenge most definitions of democracy and Fiji was ousted from the British 
Commonwealth in 1987 for undemocratic actions leading to the staging of a 
coup against a democratically elected government. How can the work of 
NGOs as a vanguard of civil society proceed? Does the enormously complex 
policy work undertaken to ascertain civil society in Fiji defeat the most 
implicitly democratic ideals of NGOs, and challenge thereby the legitimacy of 
their efforts? 
Fiji is an excellent example of the advantages of using a network model for 
understanding the exchange of ideas that NGOs use because the complexities 
of the situation threaten to overpower the researcher with its machinations. 
Riles describes the public culture of the network not as a representation, but as 
an entity that embraces the ethnographer and tailors her work to its own rule. 
As a white woman, with legal expertise, working with third world women in a 
network of NGOs, she is both shunted into some roles and enveloped in 
others. The life of the network takes over the research itself. In the earliest 
sense, Riles's interest falls upon the exchange and circulation of documents: 
files, folders and papers that people use in the course of their participation in 
the network of aid organizations. 
Virtual society captures aspects of global relations that otherwise escape us. 
The expanding network of connections between people cannot be represented 
ethnographically as layers upon layers of descriptive meaningful stories (as in 
thick description). Neither can the network of links be contextualized in some 
greater worldwide political economic system such that it becomes meaningful 
with reference to that. An analysis of a global network of NGOs and inter-
national organizations draws upon disparate sources of knowledge, and might 
be more akin to outlining how kula partners make trade links, or to how 
artists find patrons, amass materials, organize their work schedules and com-
plete creations. The analysis of virtual society requires an aesthetic sensibility 
for how people create relationships with each other. Communication and 
exchange each are mediums for making relationships. In that context, Riles 
insightfully shows us that 'the network is a set of institutions, knowledge prac-
tices and artefacts that generally generate the effects of their own reality by 
reflecting on themselves' (2000: 3). This sense of self-similarity, the network 
described as a 'network', is simply the virtual reality of social life in such situa-
tions that seemingly expand beyond the forms of normal social life. 
Riles makes use of an example invented by the women of Fiji. They create a 
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document for the Beijing meeting of the Women's Congress in 1995 in the style 
of a Fijian mat. The mat, which is a trade item within Fiji, is woven of bamboo 
and holds a series of statements on its surface, which delegates can present 
to other delegates in the effort to place their positions on the table. Mats are 
traded ceremonially in Fiji between women at funeral feasts, between women 
in the work place and at churches, and between senior male bureaucrats whose 
work might take them into the long history of exchange of NGO paperwork. 
The women refigure men's most 'inventive' uses of the ceremonial mat for 
international negotiation, whereby men make an artefact of the village into an 
artefact in the global network. However, in this case the women do not trade 
mats, but they use the mat as an artefact of the network itself. As Riles artfully 
shows us, the mat is interlaced natural fibre, an image of a network in its 
crossover and extensions of conventional forms. Its virtual reality is the NGO 
network; the network's virtual reality is the ceremonial mat. 
Surely wit and good humour moves Riles to show us that the stacks of mats 
that Fijian women place on low tables at the times for ceremonial feast com-
pare sentimentally to the stacks of documents that they keep for meetings, 
carry to meetings and arrange in piles at meetings. Whereas women arrange 
mats on tables in meaningful patterns (one layer over another), the significance 
of the pattern remains invisible because a woman must remember the layer of 
mats in order to know the patterns (much like the simple card game of rummy, 
where remembering the preview cards in the deck which lie in the pile on the 
table centre enables the person to make patterns of cards known as runs, pairs 
and sets). Getting the documents right, as Riles shows us, entails getting the 
patterns of speech correct, not their meaning. In virtual reality, 'getting the 
wording right' means making parsimonious and elegant forms of expression 
on the document so that it looks good. Aesthetics and efficacy combine in one 
form, and to understand the social effect of the form requires one to under-
stand how the beauty of that form pleased the delegates preparing their 
representation to the conference. 
For anthropology, not technocracy 
Strathern generalizes from Riles's work to elaborate her theory of the relation, 
a programme of analysis that she has been developing over recent years 
(Strathern 1991). As in the example above, some anthropologists have argued 
that complexity of virtual exchanges lies simply in the problematic of descrip-
tion (Marcus and Clifford 1986. Rabin ow 1996, Strathern 1991; cf. Strathern 
1999). I agree that description is both a common and professional activity and 
that the complexity of social life is a matter of human fabrication, as designs 
are made upon designs in the effort to comprehend their own attempts to 
understand each other. Like Wagner and Latour, Marilyn Strathern recognizes 
the complexity of sociality and the need for a method to address that complex-
ity. Like Wagner, she advocates the ethnographic practice of anthropology: 'If 
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at the end of the twentieth century, one were to invent a method of enquiry by 
which to grasp the complexity of social life, one might wish to invent some-
thing like the social anthropologist's ethnographic practice' (1999: 1). This 
compares judgmentally with Latour's call for a new discipline (rather than the 
old one of anthropology) that honours the symmetry of nature and society, 
not the domination of nature by the social. Pottage (2001), in reviewing Strath-
ern's and Latour's ethnography, points out that Latour fails to find the ethno-
graphic edge to escape what Latour has called the 'modern settlement' (Latour 
1999: 310). Pottage shows this by contrast with Strathern's project. Of Strath-
ern's work Pottage writes: 
The ambition is to generate an analogical counterpart to the cultural 
domain of Euro-America, a perspective from which the presupposi-
tions and contexts of that domain can be made visible. This is the key 
to the difference between Strathern's analogy and Latour's model of 
symmetry: whereas the latter folds the thematic difference (the peculiar 
contents of other cultures) into the self-explanations of one mode of 
social action, the ethnographic analogy emphasizes thematic difference 
in order to generate alternative domains of social action, neither of 
which may be entirely real, but each of which affords a context or per-
spective from which to explore the presuppositions of its counterpart. 
(Pottage 2001: 113) 
Pottage's review of Strathern's and Latour's work helped me to see that the 
advantage of Strathern's argument over Latour's lies in her ability to rescue 
research from a modernist project that would seek simplicity in the complex. 
Latour's network theory expands infinitely as he, like other modernist 
researchers, describes a modern world; Strathern holds up ontological knowl-
edge for the reader to see, making the contingencies of her claims evident in 
the course of building her argument. Hence, Strathern's theory of complexity 
lies in her ethnographic practice, combining both description and analysis. 
Strathern's enthusiasm for ethnography as a destabilizing activity emerges 
from the insights of her earliest fieldwork in Papua New Guinea - she insisted 
that women's subjectivity was not obviously compromised or alienated in cere-
monial bride-wealth exchanges (1987, 1988). Strathern did not err by assuming 
this was a commodity exchange; her ethnographic insight emerged as she 
examined the transactions in ceremonial exchanges rather than focusing on the 
entities - pigs, pearlshells and women (1972). By re-shifting anthropological 
focus from object to transaction, Strathern drew attention to the combination 
of relationships and objects, demonstrating that they are inseparable when 
people generate meaning in ceremonial exchange. For example, by challenging 
the distinction between subject and object she argued that the complexities of 
bride-wealth exchanges exposed better understandings of the differences 
between men and women. Gender was neither a biological nor a sociological 
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fact as much as it was a means of marking differences between points of view 
among Highland New Guineans (1988). 
Strathern doubts the authenticity of any description that assumes that an 
eloquent and parsimonious account of the universal principles underlying the 
world might be revealed in analysis of a particular case. For example, partici-
pants in ceremonial matrimonial exchange assume that objects and persons are 
not isolates before the exchange but are made by the event itself. Unlike Levi-
Strauss's structuralism, Strathern (1985) does not use ethnography to describe 
how nature and culture are reinvented in the event of ceremonial exchange. 
Instead, she describes how ceremonial exchange makes specific forms of rela-
tionship into objects to be held, as a pig becomes the substantivization of the 
history of relations mobilized towards the amassing of bride wealth. In cere-
monial exchange, this history is self-evident to all involved in the ceremony and 
the transactions leading to it. The knowledge practices of ceremonial exchange 
can be extended to virtual society. 
Strathern exposes the claims to knowledge that an anthropologist might 
make as part of a process of the 'substantivization of social relations' (her 
original subtitle for Property, Substance and Effect). The danger, as she reminds 
readers, lies in the chance that the fact might be mistaken for knowledge, or 
that the object might be abstracted from the social relations that produced it, 
as if a germinal entity can be isolated from the nurturing partner. There is a 
risk that an insight would be taken from relations in which it might be mean-
ingful rather than described within the social relations that brought it into 
the researcher's view. She describes this relation as the merographic, a habit of 
thought common to relations made through commodity exchanges whereby a 
person sees his or her attributes in another person or thing. Examples of the 
merographic are seeing creative potential in nature or confusing love with find-
ing oneself reflected in the eyes of another. Merographic processes constitute 
social forms as if they were isolates, when they are not. 
Strathern's personal effects from anthropological fieldwork include a trove of 
images - an intellectual wealth of memories and insights that can be handled 
and contemplated for their worth to disciplinary practice. She recalls one such 
image caught in her peripheral vision; the image is now a memory from her 
first fieldwork. Two men, carrying a display of pearlshells - the ceremonial 
wealth of the Melpa - appear over the shoulder of a hill only to hurry away 
again along a sloping path. The year was 1964, but Strathern writes of recall-
ing this image in late 1999. Just as anthropologists continue to return to visit 
the people of their field sites, it is equally true that the people they knew and 
know from those places continue to come to them in the course of their daily 
living and work - in memories and with emotional force in daily life. This dis-
cussion is far from being an aside about the play of memory; Strathern begins 
with the recognition that such anthropological knowledge effects changes in 
the course of social science, even when only briefly and/or indirectly catching 
the attention of the scholar. In Strathern's study, an experience returns to the 
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anthropologist. Memory niggles at the conscience; unresolved ethical dilemmas 
from fieldwork experiences can haunt the imagination. With all of the contem-
porary effort to establish an ethical programme for anthropological research, 
and with all of the contemporary effort to search out the grounds for responsible 
reporting, discerning how to create a discipline that is true to the ethnographic 
experience remains a worthy undertaking. 
Melanesian research provided, and continues to provide in Property, Substance 
and Effect (Strathern 1999), an opportunity to think about larger questions 
in social theory; it also suggests critiques of social policy (Strathern 2000). 
Strathern named the technocracy of virtual society audit culture. Scholars in 
audit culture calculate social life, fracturing human experiences into discrete 
economic units. A critical approach is needed if anthropologists are to describe 
the contemporary process by which the world fractures at an accelerating pace 
into subjects and objects without reducing anthropological analysis to the 
process of audit. If anything, a holistic perspective such as the one shared by 
those people anywhere who practice ceremonial gift exchange, enhances 
anthropological understandings of the fracturing of the world through the pri-
vatization of wealth, as the audit of property claims. From my understanding, 
I see in Strathern's position similarities with Wagner's claim for a holographic 
worldview that helps anthropologists to see that an event images itself (Wagner 
1992, 2001). The increasing range and numbers of claims on property made by 
people everywhere - from land claims by traditional owners in Papua New 
Guinea to claims on genetic resources by legal, biological and affective parents 
in the United States and Europe - testify to their assumption of the separation 
between the objective world and the human subject. They assume the fact of 
alienation, which is hard to see and hard to know, from an experience of alien-
ation itself. To comprehend that condition, scholars require an ethnographic 
approach that begins with the connectedness between people. Departing from 
Strathern (1999), I find that the measure of the separation of subjects and 
objects - the measure of the disengagement from human relationships - can 
begin with a better understanding of the condition of the relation itself. 
Virtual society is an effect of technologies of visualization, description and 
exchange (broadly understood), like other forms of social life. These technolo-
gies are social like other forms of life. As a term, virtual society captures the 
sense of involvement in forms of life that are neither material nor immaterial: 
empathy, love, popular culture, bureaucratic life, and discursive formations 
such as the effects of government. These life forms can only be described by 
evocation; that is, by learning to see them. 
Some anthropologists argue that research in virtual society requires new 
technologies of description simply to expose or make explicit the web of con-
nections through which people live. Technologies of description trace the effect 
of visualizing relations that would otherwise remain misunderstood as self-
same versions of each other. A famous image evocated by technologies of 
description is fractal imagery, the efflorescent forms of life that emerge in the 
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effort of measurement of the rate of change of difference - as in the effort to 
trace images on paper as the after-effects of mistakes made in trying to describe, 
copy or isolate the realist depiction of any entity. 
Technologies of exchange trace the pathway of the extensions of the self 
outside the more conventionally held perceptions of the individual as sclf-
contained. Love is one example of Euro-American common knowledge of the 
immaterial extension of the self into the life of another person, such that the 
imagination of love into relations has real effects upon them, as when expres-
sions of love can generate love in return. In that example (different from the 
hau as the spirit of the gift) people exchange glances, tokens of affection, or 
they can share sentiments and a history of personal experience. Another 
example would be the aesthetic appreciation of virtue, as when a person 
expresses him or herself in deeds that others recognize or 'see' as good works 
and virtuous acts of that individual, or when a group, such as an organization 
for women's empowerment, shows that it is 'good' by its ability to create a docu-
mentary record of its intentions to change the life ways of women. That is a 
question for another chapter that aims to understand virtue, whether (or not) 
it monitors relations in virtual reality or in other forms of society. In the final 
chapter, I discuss ethics in the discipline of anthropology. 
Summary of chapter 10 
The global village is a term used to describe the worldwide society made by 
information technology since the second half of the twentieth century. How 
can the global village be analysed anthropologically by examining the 
exchange practices that are common to the small village of the earliest part of 
the century, which the first part of this book examined? How does the analysis 
of gift exchange as a total social fact succeed in exposing how people live in 
what is now termed virtual society? First, we looked at a paradox in the 
example of a love song. On the one hand virtual society is defined as a Carte-
sian space because it first appears as a technologically constituted reality 
mediated by modes of transmission, which make face-to-face communication 
unnecessary for affective expression and social connections. On the other 
hand, virtual society is a non-Cartesian space in which people make claims on 
each other through empathetic and sentimental modes of expression evoked 
through that technology. The paradox exposes a new need for anthropologists 
to surpass postmodern approaches to the study of society, especially those in 
which the analysis ends with reflexive criticism of limits of textual descriptions. 
I have discussed three different proposals for new descriptive technologies to 
describe virtual society by Latour, Wagner and Strathern respectively. Finally, I 
have examined a case study from Fiji in which one non-governmental organi-
zation aimed to influence the global community of policy makers by shaping 
the terms of a debate about what it means to be human in the virtual society 
of human rights policy. New questions might include the following. How does 
185 
A PRESENT WITHOUT NOSTALGIA 
a technocracy of knowledge practices manage some visions of what it means 
to be human to the exclusion of other ones (perhaps shown in the process of 
creating audit documents)? And how does the exchange of words, documents, 
images and policies create new opportunities to define a space of social con-
nection in which people might create different ways of living? The chapter ends 
by reviewing some of the departure points for an anthropology that is not 
simply a technocracy. 
186 
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PROPERTY 
Until this point I have not discussed the legal aspects of the gift, although at 
different points throughout this book I have suggested the importance of under-
standing the jural implications of exchanging gifts. If gift exchange becomes a 
concern of the legal mechanisms of globalization, as it does for example in the 
Fair Trade movement, then international law is being assessed against the pos-
sibility of the loss of ethical interests. I made the suggestion in the first chapter 
that the analysis of gift exchange could be brought into contemporary debates 
about globalization because it made legible the ethical aspects of most inter-
changes by demanding the assessment of the total human condition. In 
chapter 3 I discussed the gift exchange between a Trobriand father and his 
child's mother's brother, an exchange that implies that he recognizes the jural 
authority of the child's senior clansman. Previous chapters showed the various 
ways in which gift exchange embraces the domains of the political, economic, 
social, virtual and spiritual, emphasizing the gift as a total social fact that com-
prises and condenses all of social life. What then can be circumscribed as the 
legal domains of gift exchange if it precipitates the outcomes of both inter-
national law and family jural authorities? This question can be answered best 
by anthropological research. I intended that the total effect of that sequence of 
chapters would make it clearer how anthropological analysis of gift exchange 
would be a valuable critical tool against the pro-globalization movement's 
notion that humans are primarily economic beings. In part, this chapter aims 
to place a series of question marks over the use of the concept of economic 
man in globalization debates, and considers other avenues. 
Let's make a general claim that would be hard to dispute from wherever a 
person stands in the pro- and anti-globalization debate. Globalization is a 
worldwide revolution in how to live, if not simply how to be in the world. The 
emergence of the Fair Trade movement suggests the need to reappraise prin-
ciples of association among humans; not only as new forms of association (to 
monitor economic work), but also as new forms of legal relations (see for 
example, Monbiot 2003). Although not part of that movement, the United 
Nations advocated increased awareness and scrutiny of the claims to develop 
the cultural knowledge of indigenous people - from plant specimens to ritual 
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performances. Here is the contradiction: indigenous knowledge should be 
available, and paradoxically the claim that its diversity should be protected. At 
the heart of that debate is a series of assumptions about the role of inter-
national law in protecting cultural heritage, often assumed to be a gift handed 
down from the elder generations (see Blake 2001 ). In this chapter I will exam-
ine the ways in which a focus on gift exchange explains how people make 
conscious choices about how to regulate and legalize human relations as a con-
cern for how they might live together globally, including the making of legal 
provisions to protect culture as property. 
How do contemporary debates seemingly make almost all claims on per-
sonal relations into matters of private ownership of property, against assump-
tions about commonly held property? The answer lies in understanding the 
negotiation. Property debates raise key legal matters immediately because 
property is a legal construct, and not a thing. (Nothing about objects inher-
ently makes them property.) Property is a kind of claim that is made upon 
another person that extends to the material that is his or her wealth. Anthro-
pologists can think better about this, by thinking through theories of gift 
exchange. More importantly for anthropology, debates about property expose 
central ontological matters, concerns that must be addressed if the discipline of 
anthropological argument is to have any sagacity for people who try to make 
their lives viable and reasonable in a global world. Property debates are not 
new. It is a problem with which the people of the world have lived for nearly 
three hundred years. 
A comparison of the seventeenth and the twenty-first centuries: 
common wealth and property debates 
In the rest of this chapter, I wish to explore the possibility that the contempo-
rary concern that cultural property be justly distributed and claimed through 
legal mechanisms that respect cultural difference is an extension of Enlighten-
ment debates. The twenty-first and seventeenth century compare in fascinating 
ways on matters of what is common about cultural property. That issue entails 
asking first, what the concept of the commons entails in the current period by 
comparison with what we know about property debates of the earlier one, and 
further, reflecting upon the common grounds of existence as an ontological 
problem that arises when many people feel concerned with a crisis of how to 
be in the world (Crook 2004). 
I think that contemporary debates about cultural property compare intrigu-
ingly with seventeenth-century property debates among intellectuals and 
politicians following the enclosures of common land. In the earliest period, the 
times of the enclosures of common land as private property, people became 
deeply concerned with the loss of the commons to individual interests. I wrote 
about this in chapter 2, where I argued that Rousseau used the ideal of the 
Noble Savage to create a philosophy of political relations. To what extent do 
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the current debates about property compare with the earliest property revolu-
tions of the early Enlightenment period? 
The social historian of the seventeenth century, Hill (1972), argued that the 
revolution won for individuals the means and legal right to make claims on 
private property, largely by providing for their protection in democratic parlia-
ment. According to Hill's account of the revolution in the social imagination 
that brought about parliamentary democracy, as different from the medieval 
past, individuals learned that they could now make legal claim on the material 
world as private wealth. Hill's thesis is intriguing because it sets the framework 
of ontological problems to be considered for politics in the late twentieth cen-
tury. Working with the privilege of hindsight about the previous 300 years, Hill 
and others asked what should be the course of contemporary social revolu-
tions of the last half of the twentieth century. The question was: how did the 
problem of how to be in the world (as a concern of ontology) become the pre-
cise matter of how to manage private property (as the subject of politics), and 
more specifically, how to express an individual share of interest in the common 
wealth of the world (as a discourse on rights)? 
The time came in the early 1990s for the recognition that the new commons 
did exist. In the 1992 meeting of the UN Convention on Biodiversity, a new 
analysis emerged which posited that the world's biological diversity constituted 
a common resource of the globe. This created difficulties for indigenous 
peoples whose specialist knowledge of biological resources facilitated the iden-
tification of the resources and the specific uses in which the biological entity 
could be identified as useful. It seemed that indigenous peoples held responsi-
bility for its custodianship, but were not clear owners of the rights to exploita-
tion, transmission and dispersal. Despite the concerns of indigenous peoples 
for a say in the uses and preservation of their knowledge of cultural and 
natural resources, new international conventions claimed their knowledge of 
first biological diversity, then cultural diversity as the common resources of the 
planet. 
Recently, Blake (2001) sets forward the claim that culture is the new 
commons. Although he does not cite the property debates of the seventeenth 
century, this provocation to argument comes within the terms of Hill's claims 
that there exists a tension between private interests in property and the common 
wealth. Whereas Hill believed that the political and social revolution to estab-
lish common property would yet come, Blake argues that the debates around 
cultural property will establish the legal provisions for common wealth in the 
world. The idea that culture is a common wealth is so powerful that the UN 
Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001) acts to designate and negotiate this 
distinction between the integrity of culture in diverse settings, and the recogni-
tion of the common interest in the preservation of culture as a diversely 
inflected and expressed form. A somewhat ironic position emerged for different 
people across the globe, especially indigenous communities. Each distinct 
heritage of peoples could be protected only if those peoples admitted that 
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their cultural heritage could be held in common with other cultures across the 
world. 
If culture is the new commons, then the regulation of the grounds of common 
claims on ownership must be clarified. Anthropologists have much to add to this 
debate about the contemporary dilemma. Not surprisingly, some of the most 
useful arguments to be made are those that draw on the ways in which earlier 
theorists imagined gift exchange as a form of legal arrangement or negotiation. 
In the first instance, Parry's 1985 Malinowski Lecture (published in 1986) offered 
an inventive re-reading of gift exchange that called for deeper understanding of 
South Asian ethnography in order to fill in the gaps of Mauss's arguments about 
the legal significance of gift exchange. His triad of concerns with Malinowski's 
kula, Mauss's gift-exchange, and the South Asian gift establishes an important 
concern, that the rule of culture in establishing different forms of gift exchange 
pushes anthropologists to clarify what it means to be a legal person. That culture 
should be a 'rule' is a problem for further consideration, which I will address 
in the last part of this chapter. The definition of property makes a number of 
assumptions about 'interest' as an ontological concept, losing interest and 
protecting interests in particular govern legal provisions for cultural property. 
Differentiating legal ontologies: the problem of interest 
in Malinowski and Mauss 
Parry's insightful essay (1986) urges anthropologists to differentiate between 
Malinowski and Mauss on their respective ontological assumptions. I will 
summarize his essay, and push his analysis towards an understanding of legal 
implications of ontologies of exchange. Malinowski, as early as his studies of 
the kula, assumed that the person was moved by physical and libidinal inter-
ests to make social life work out for his or her own interests. Parry points 
out that by the time he wrote Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926), 
Malinowski had routinized his thought more thoroughly. According to Mali-
nowski, self-interest underpinned social life, as contrary or perverse as that 
may sound to the nature of living in social relationships. 
We learn that Malinowski's ideas are as old as Hobbes, who began to write 
about the concept of interest as it was related to human desires when he wrote 
Leviathan; following on, Parry continues helpfully along these lines. Self-
interested parties can make the social contract in face-to-face interactions. He 
shows us a resonance between Hobbes and Manderville's Fable of the Bees, 
which teaches, 'Public Benefit derives from Private Vice'. Parry summarizes 
Malinowski's position, 'Society is created by, and its cohesion results from, an 
endless sequence of exchanges in which all pursue their own advantage (how-
ever conceived)' (1986: 455). Malinowski offers a vision of a kula world, and 
the world of exchange more generally as a regime of self-interest. He reduces 
his project to the work of self-interested individuals and personal ontology 
becomes the grinding stone of legal devices based in gift exchange. 
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By contrast to Malinowski's individualist's version of law in society, Mauss's 
work is to create an essay, an argument about gift exchange as a device for 
making the social contract. The case of the hau described by the Maori as the 
spirit of the gift provides a good illustration of the problems in coming to 
terms with the relationships here. In my earlier discussions in chapter 3, I 
emphasized that the gift worked to extend aspects of the person's self into 
others' selves. The hau works between humans by making 'the absence of any 
disjunction between persons and things' (Parry 1986: 457). In Mauss, as Parry 
shows, the spirit of the gift creates the social contract (and does not stand 
alternative to or dependent upon the social contract as in Sahlins's arguments.) 
The hau is akin to a third party to exchange partners, albeit an invisible part-
ner. For Parry, the possibility of making a generalization of gift exchange to 
the whole of society was not a habit of either French or Maori thought, but 
also elaboration of South Asian knowledge of the gift. In all these cases, under-
standing gift exchange requires that the anthropologist acknowledge that the 
social exists as a kind of third party to the transactions. 
The finest discussion of the south Asian gift comes from the description of 
the Jati system. In this system, a series of offerings across castes ensures a 
person's moral claims for continuing residence within a particular region. But 
the outcome of these gifts does not confirm or protect the interests of the indi-
vidual; instead it confirms the hierarchical society. It is also the case that men 
of different castes align their hierarchical relationships with each other through 
honouring their obligations to make devotional offerings. The social form, in 
this case the caste system, becomes visible through giving gifts throughout the 
system. 
The questions of how to compare different types of gift exchange against 
this general form appears clearly in Parry' s lecture and helped later scholars to 
focus their work to greater understanding of the nexus of gift exchange as a 
legal and political construction. His paper sets forward a rationale for better 
understanding of the terms of comparison of gift exchange and that has 
required deep questioning of how similar acts can be measured across cultures. 
All in all, Parry's Malinowski Lecture inspired subsequent anthropology to 
find deeper understanding of Mauss's meanings of gift exchange for anthropo-
logical work in cross-cultural encounters. 
Parry is correct to take us to the problem of ontology in his considerations 
of gift exchange as a question of how to be in the world. That it should be 
a question of law and legal provision should not surprise us because it is in 
law that this matter finds clearest expression in Western democratic philoso-
phies. Although much has been written on the cultural habits that influence 
moral rationales for action, it is in legal debates about property that culture 
receives explicit attention. The grounds for ownership require clear thought 
about the work of culture in determining claims on residence, or the custodian-
ship, disposal and use of material culture. In the next pages, I will look at 
how ontological concerns are differently expressed in debates about cultural 
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property, depending upon the disparate legacies of Malinowski's self-interest 
or of Mauss's social spirit. 
Global interests in tournaments of value 
One of the leading advocates of Malinowski's theory of gift exchange as self-
interested competition has been Appadurai, who made a profound impact on 
efforts to bring into studies of globalization a more sophisticated appreciation 
of gift exchange (Appadurai 1986, 1996). Malinowski sets out a discussion 
about gift exchange in the Trobriand islands that has been appropriated, both 
directly and indirectly, by many other theorists working after him. If we take 
Malinowski's claims directly, then cultural property debates in global relations 
are about 'tournaments of value' (to borrow the term from Appadurai 1986). 
Appadurai seeks to use theories of gift exchange to think better about global-
ization; however, an analysis of the differences between Mauss and Malinow-
ski such as that by Parry would help him to see that the terms of Malinowski's 
debates do not enable the fuller sense of the discussion. Tournaments of value 
is a difficult term, an agonistic one which leaves the reader with the sense 
that gift exchange is reduced to a strategic struggle over claims on common 
resources. At risk in such struggles is the loss of opportunity to express private 
interests in the uses of the common wealth. 
Appadurai finds the concept of self-interested kula exchange most useful for 
his own thoughts on globalization, and makes excellent use of Malinowski's 
model of the self-interested kula trader without pursuing the important differ-
ences between Mauss and Malinowski on the legal and economic aspects of 
making gifts. He takes from the architecture of Malinowski's ethnography a 
series of theoretical claims about the struggles over the determination of value. 
Broadly speaking, value is determined in negotiation as the traders invest them-
selves in the negotiation so as to extract both social and moral claims on each 
other as kula traders. 
Before I discuss Appadurai's concerns with the moral parameters of global 
exchange, I will describe how Malinowski exposed notions of self-interest 
(even the habits of non-capitalist entrepreneurialism) in his ethnography. One 
of the more puzzling descriptions of kula (which Appadurai does not cite) 
suggesting that it might be construed as competitive tournament of value, 
comes from Reo Fortune's book Sorcerors of Dobu (1963 [1934]). 
For example, consider how Gell makes the story of the exchange of kula 
wealth into a mockery of rule and the gravity of prestige relations. He recalls 
Malinowski's observation that the kula wealth should be sent into circulation, 
as if several people had claims on it at once and it is safest moving around, 
rather than resting in one place. In the kula cycle, members enter and continue 
to play on speculation, rather than on certainty. Conjecture and speculation, 
rather than promises and certitude, keep people in the game of kula. 
The negotiations of the monitor lizard fascinated Gell, who argued that Reo 
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Fortune, even more than Malinowski, had been able to show us that the kula 
traders were strategic and canny individuals, aiming to maximize the number 
of trading relations they held in order to enhance their renown. He quotes 
Kisian, a famous Dobuan kula trader of his day, who explained the work of 
decoys and deceptions in making the trade work. 
Suppose I Kisian of Tewara, go [north] to the Trobriands and secure 
an armshell called Monitor Lizard. Then I go [south] to Saranoroa 
and in four different places secure four different shell necklaces, 
promising each man who gives me a shell necklace, Monitor Lizard in 
return. Later I, Kisian do not have to be very specific in my promise. 
ft will be conveyed by implication and assumption for the most part. 
Later, when four men appear in my home at Tewara each expecting 
Monitor Lizard, only one will get it. The other three are not defrauded 
permanently, however. They are furious, it is true, and their exchange 
is blocked for a year. Next year, when I Kisian go again to the 
Trobriands I shall represent that I have four necklaces at home wait-
ing for those who will give me four armshells. I obtain more armshells 
than I did previously, and pay my debts a year late ... I have become 
a great man by enlarging my exchanges at the expense of blocking 
[the exchanges of others] for a year. I cannot afford to block their 
exchanges for too long, or my exchanges will never be trusted by 
anyone again. I am honest in the final issue. 
(Fortune 1932: 215, in Gell 1986: 280) 
I review Gell's (and Fortune's) example here because it helps to clarify the most 
interesting aspect of gift exchange as a moral relationship. Notably, the moral 
claims of the trader on other traders emerge through the course of the transac-
tion. In Malinowski's model, ethical choices remain the purview of the 
individual, and the moral order exists only to confine self-interested action 
against abuses of others' interests. In this case, Kisian the Dobu trader on the 
kula ring ensures the fair play of trade, by compensating for the failure to 
deliver the monitor lizard to the individuals promised it. From the viewpoint 
of self-interest, the trader's success lies in his ability to keep active trading rela-
tionships with the same men whom he secretly intended to disappoint. The 
men's disappointments, had they not been appeased, might otherwise have cut 
Kisian off from future trade with them. 
In such a model, in which individual self-interest prevails, the grounds of 
moral reasoning lie in retrospection (rather than prospective deliberation). 
That means that the participants refer to their memory of how transactions 
were made in order to adjudicate the fairness of the exchange of wealth. In 
such circumstances, the elaboration of custom as a moral and legal code of 
behaviour in ceremonial exchange is replete with injunctions for how to respect 
and honour such personal behaviour that supports the achievement of the 
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wider social good. In this case, Kisian compensates the men who failed to 
acquire the monitor lizard and admonishes them for their own failures. If they 
could have been forthcoming with more of their own gifts to senior kula traders 
and made earlier gifts, then they would have received the monitor lizard valu-
able. Kisian's prestige turns on his ability to deceive his trading partners and 
make his victims happy for it. 
The exchange of the monitor lizard valuable is a good example of how a 
'tournament of value' works with deceitful and covert action. It perpetuates 
specific assumptions about the universality of moral, social and economic 
values of self-interested giving of kula goods that are created in the event of 
the exchange. Appadurai's model of 'tournaments of value' as a form of cross-
cultural exchange in globalization adopts Malinowski's model uncritically, 
although Appadurai is clearer than Malinowksi that cross-cultural exchanges 
are played out in the matrix of differential power relations. In addition to his 
dutiful following of Malinowski, Appadurai's debts to Bourdieu's practice 
theory of exchange (Bourdieu 1977) are obvious. However, Appadurai does not 
use Bourdieu's idea of misrecognition in estimating the nature of false con-
sciousness when deceits and trickery apparently affect the outcome of kula 
trade. Instead, he examines power differentials as a precondition of exchange, 
and as its determinative framework for the outcomes of the transaction. 
People reason about the transaction in order to vindicate or elaborate the 
terms through which the traders made their deal. Much of the moral discus-
sion of gift exchange triumphs the final result of creating social hierarchy, and 
only in some cases critiques the outcome. The anthropologist's task, according 
to Appadurai, is to give an account of the moral struggles across cultures, 
which are often fought in cultural terms. Appadurai's aim has been to better 
understand the moral dilemmas of globalizing economic processes through the 
theory of gift exchange. 
It is common to find that other anthropologists have used the opposition 
between personal interest and common wealth to explore the generalized 
dimensions of a theory of gift exchange. The distinction is an old one, belong-
ing to the last 300 years of reasoning about political theory beginning with the 
concept of what Hobbes called the Leviathan, a form of collective existence 
which is greater than the sum of all of the individual interests that support its 
continuing existence. Hobbes had used the word Leviathan (a biblical monster 
that had swallowed a shipwrecked man and kept that individual within its 
belly) to describe that experience of being a part of a world bigger than an 
individual's immediate experience. All humans lived in society, but not all 
humans knew it in totality through their personal experience over a lifetime. 
Since Hobbes's day, anthropologists have reasoned about political life, espe-
cially the moral injunctions that legal thought sustains, by addressing the 
constraints on the relationship between the individual and the collective. 
A number of different theorists of political life made this axis of decision-
making (between the individual and the collective) into the cornerstone of 
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their theory. Although in the next section of this chapter I will tum to the ways 
in which recent anthropologists leave behind this assumption, I want to review 
the different ways in which they have used it to discuss the political and legal 
dimensions of the uses of collective and private claims in cultural property. 
Not all of the anthropologists I discuss should be referred to as Hobbesian; 
many are committed wholly to Rousseau's project. The two approaches to the 
social contract divide simply on the disagreement about human nature as 
altruistic or nasty. I think that human social relationships are fundamentally 
neither one nor the other because that is to privilege nature outside society, 
whereas it is better to examine arguments over what is human nature as a 
modality for the discussion of ideas about the fixity of human relationships 
(for example, see Strathern 1981a and b). I take the problem here to be how 
anthropologists repeatedly use the concept of a social contract between indi-
viduals and the collective, whether they share assumptions by Hobbes or 
Rousseau, to make the work of political life appear self-evident. 
To make clearer the conceptual problem of assuming that the self-interested 
individual can be the fundamental or ontological ground in tournaments of 
value, I would like to use a general example, one which Parry elucidates plainly 
through his discussion of Sahlins's theory of gift exchange as a part to the 
domestic mode of production. Sahlins tells us that gift exchange emerges under 
duress, when in household economies the membership of the household per-
ceives that there is a lack or shortage of wealth among them. This proposal 
has such a powerfully reasonable feel to it that other anthropologists have 
extended to other situations Sahins's observations that gift exchange arises 
under strain and duress in the domestic mode of production. Although not all 
anthropologists cite Sahlins's approach as a basic orienting paradigm, they 
do share his concern to show that the framework of historical contingencies 
creates the need for altruistic behaviour from disparate participants in the 
collective interests of the group; for example in the attempts to create a more 
humane lifestyle in concentration camps (N arotzky 1998), in the effort by 
indigenous groups to assert commensurate interests in displays of artefacts in 
museum collections (Clifford 1997), and in attempts to explore the terms by 
which people's livelihood can be remade in disaster areas (Kirsch 2004). All of 
these anthropologists document the success of collective interests against 
people's perception that they have lost the cultural values which helped to sus-
tain their lives before the contemporary period. I think that these efforts 
compare similarly with Appadurai's notion that tournaments of value can be 
fought between people who do not feel that they manage or control the terms 
of their shared lives, while undertaking transnational migrations away from 
places where they hold a sense of belonging. 
Parry's argument against Sahlins's concept of gift exchange in the domestic 
mode of production applies very well to these works. Parry points out that 
Sahlins confuses 'the work of history with the work of human nature' as 
shown by reading carefully through Malinowski 's research on the free gift. 
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Similarly, Parry shows that Sahlins mistakes the altruistic gift for what Mali-
nowski called the free gift. According to Sahlins, the altruistic gift is made as 
compensation for suffering, as recognition of the common humanity of giver 
and receiver in the face of existential adversity, material constraints and social 
duress. Sahlins assumes that historical contingencies catch human beings 
by surprise (see the account in Sahlins 1985 of the early Hawaiian encounter 
with British explorers). Through adjusting their relationships to amend the 
damages of unexpected disasters, they find the best of their common humanity 
by helping each other to survive. Sahlins would argue that humans share a 
common history of disappointment and oppression; gift exchange is a reason-
able moral response to the tragedy of history. 
Malinowski meant the free gift to be only that. He did not perceive the Tro-
briands to be caught up in a struggle against the oppressive flow of world 
history. Instead, the mapula gift made by a father to his brother-in-law recog-
nizes that they share a relationship to the child. The father bears nurturing 
affection for the child, and his own interests in being a good father can only be 
realized if the child reciprocates the affection and nurture with ceremonial gifts 
at the time of the father's death to build or elucidate the renown of the father's 
virtue. The child is no less than the reason for the father's continuing relation-
ship to his wife's brother; as such, the child is a reminder that humans do not 
have to make lives together in affectionate relationships but they choose to do 
so anyway. Love is a free gift; humans need the practice of gift exchange only 
to be able to express it. 
Losing interests in cultural property 
The confusion between definitions of the total social fact of gift exchange, and 
the free gift, can interfere with progress towards an account of gift exchange 
for the development of protective measures for indigenous claims in cultural 
property. Sahlins's approach to the 'free gift' as altruism shows anthropologists 
how they can mistake a noble response to historical adversity with the facts of 
human nature. Sahlins would remind us that historical contingencies could be 
forgotten at the risk of an improper analysis of the anthropological account. 
The better approach is to examine the free gift as a story of how we think we 
need it; that would be a more thorough-going analysis of the grounds upon 
which humans make or recognize themselves as thoroughly social beings. 
So the question at the centre of the problems of understanding the legal 
dimensions of gift exchange remains an ontological one, at least in so far as 
legal provisions of the gift must express the distinctive concerns of human col-
lective existence. Two anthropologists writing about cultural property laws 
have perceived this very well. Brown (2001), for one, makes very clear that 
much is at risk in the discussion of cultural property. He argues that the trans-
formation of culture into a thing to be held, used and disposed of to others 
hands opportunities for people from diverse cultural backgrounds to retain 
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control over the ethical choices, choices that are informed by implicit cultural 
life, that they have in their lives. Brown correctly summarizes the existing limits 
in the debates over cultural property. He clarifies that culture cannot be copy-
righted because it is a fluid entity, vulnerable to the processes of change that 
those who hold it set in motion and enlivened to their ethical vision for its 
future work. 
Coombe (1998) by contrast comes closer to identifying the ontological 
dilemma presented by negotiations over cultural property. She recognizes that 
cultural life is not as easily or simply compromised and lost as Brown suggests. 
Instead, she makes a case for the analysis of cultural life of intellectual prop-
erty (here she defines intellectual and cultural property as broadly similar), that 
is, the products of the human imagination. She discusses the cultural life of 
such intangible forms of property, which are understood as the products of the 
individual or collective mind. For example, she examines the uses of indigenous 
myth by Canadian novelists, who sought to enhance public understanding of 
the traditions of •First Nations People' by using themes from ancient indige-
nous stories in contemporary art forms. The ensuing public debate tore open 
loosely held assumptions that culture circumscribed discrete and localized 
ways of life. The negotiations over what constituted a multicultural literature 
or a multicultural literary tradition advanced a new, shared assumption among 
readers, artists and authors in the 'creative community', the world of expertise 
in creative production. The public and legal debate no longer aimed to recover 
the legal provisions to protect a lost or disappearing indigenous past as the 
preserve of white insights into other ways of living. Instead, the public debate 
identified that the new legal concern lay in the designation of commensurate 
modalities of participation for indigenous communities, with the disparate cul-
tural and linguistic traditions - both English and French - and with ethnic 
migrant groups in the Canadian nation. That debate continues over the onto-
logical grounds of pluralist legal and political vision. It is limited by a model 
that would see debate and negotiation as a tournament of value, modelled on 
the disparate values expressed by self-interested individuals or the singular 
interests of the corporate group - including cultural industry companies and 
the indigenous councillors who must act as if the clans, bands or tribes could 
proceed as individuals. 
There is much to do on a global scale. Outfield and Posey (1996) produced 
a handbook of case studies, written to inform the reader of the landmark deci-
sions made in each debate. In this book, they advocate a possibility for 
indigenous communities; they think about how to identify cultural resources 
and guard rights to their exploitation based on the claims they hold by heritage 
of such cultural wealth as ritual, arts, ethno-botany, and traditional healing. 
I have seen the people of Zia village on the north coast of Papua New Guinea 
work towards an inventory of resources that they could name among them 
collectively. They negotiated a sharing agreement, in order to free them to expose 
knowledge that, previous to their management of a cultural trust, had been 
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selective to the clan, to the men's society or to individuals. They aimed to contain 
the entirety of their cultural resources within the community, and authorized 
a group of senior men and women to act as trustees of that knowledge. 
Keeping interested in cultural property 
I have discussed the extent to which anthropologists have played out the dis-
tinction between theories of exchange that focus on utility for individual gain, 
and those that focus on exploitation of the commons. Neither of these two 
theories of political economy has much play within an anthropology that takes 
as its axiom that life should be examined only as it is lived in the round. Much 
good work of recent years builds on Mauss's earlier insight into the total social 
fact of gift exchange, because these anthropologists begin with the centrality of 
the concept of obligation. Obligation matters, but not because it is a spiritual 
principle or a felt psychological state. Rather, obligation matters because it can 
be described sociologically; that is, it introduces the social context back into 
the analysis of many ceremonial events that anthropologists recorded in those 
societies undergoing rapid transitions to capitalism. 
The anthropologist Gregory made the most important use of these insights 
about the character of gift exchange within his study of the ways in which cer-
emonial exchange is elaborated and escalates in situations that capitalist 
market practices also escalate (Gregory 1982, 1997). His question arose from 
the observation in the new nation of Papua New Guinea, when in the national 
capital of Port Moresby he observed that the uses of gift exchange in Melane-
sia actually increased to the point that many people were participating in even 
more market exchanges than before independence. Gregory points out that on 
the north-west coast of Canada, after independence, the Kwakiutl joined in 
more ceremonies of potlatch. Wolf and others record how both the frequency 
and the size of potlatch ceremonies escalated, concomitant with both the per-
vasive market relations and the national legislation promoted to stop it, as 
authored and administered by the Department of Indian Affairs of the Cana-
dian government (Halliday 1935; Codere 1950; Drucker 1967; Wolf 1999). 
Potlatch ceremonies spread as more people than ever before tried to protect 
and extend their work of making personal status in a system of prestige, which 
was found perversely in the overt and public rejection of wealth. 
Anthropologists working in Mauss's shadow know that they must be vigi-
lant about marking analytical differences between the social relations through 
which people make gifts and the substance of the gifts in order to accomplish 
the aim of understanding social relations in cultural heritage. In any account 
of ceremonial exchange - whether the exchange of women and bride wealth, 
or the exchange of cultural artefacts or objects of ritual wealth over the gener-
ations - the slippages of attention to the object from the social relationships 
disarm the anthropologist. The anthropological work of examining the social 
relations remains wholly necessary to understanding cultural heritage and the 
198 
INTERESTS IN CULTURAL PROPERTY 
global effort to protect its diversity and at the same time to make it available to 
a maximum number of people. 
Jn Bastar, central India, Gell (1986) and Gregory (1997) worked in tandem. 
Each anthropologist's understanding of cultural property there differs from 
first premises. Each chooses the analytical category of the social relations 
differently; this also affects their respective understandings of other dimen-
sions of market and gift life. 
Bastar presents interesting problems to the anthropologist because it is home 
to tribal communities, allegedly falling at the bottom of, if not outside, the dif-
ferent forms of caste relations that are sustained throughout the country. In 
Bastar, tourists collect tribal artefacts because these curiosities give them imag-
inary access to ancient India. Of course, the tribal artefacts are not authentic 
in themselves, but the dealers promise the authenticity of provenance. Makers 
of 'tourist artefacts' are of the Ghassyia caste, allegedly makers with long his-
tories of skilled craftsmanship who turned out the iron figure for the benefit of 
other castes who would use them ceremoniously. 
Gell finds a paradox in the activity of artefact making. These figures have no 
obvious value to the Muria, and they do not seek to use them or to collect 
them as emblematic of their own ethnicity. The iron figurines are almost mean-
ingless to the Muria castes because they have not yet made the imaginative 
leap to understanding that cultural life can be performed in order to live it, 
that its symbolic value is as great as (or greater than) its ontological values. 
Gregory takes Gell to task for making the assumption that imaginative leaps 
can and do occur. If people do come to the decision that they can imagina-
tively become Muria, rather than just live Muria lifestyles, then a fuller 
understanding of the social context helps. Gregory holds Gell accountable for 
the explanation of the ways in which lost-wax iron figurines come into the 
hands of modern Muria, without an account of the complex ways in which 
the younger generation receives that information in the first instance. At least, 
some account of the role of government law in defining the Ghassyia as the 
worker's caste of the makers is needed. Gregory tells us that the official govern-
ment line is that Ghassyia are the poorer members of the caste system whose 
work in artefact making includes the bronze figurines. This is not the case, and 
instead Gregory insists that the problem is not how to locate people in the 
caste system, but how to use the caste system in order to locate people. It might 
help to understand that process of social differentiation as a system of values, 
rather than as a system of barter over goods. The caste of artefact maker 
cannot be more straightforward than Gell describes it, yet caste itself never 
works to locate people with such conformity. Gregory argues that the Ghassyia 
might be living within a dual system. 
In the best of this work that takes forward Mauss's insights into the social 
nature of exchange of gifts, several anthropologists addressed the cultural 
property debates in order to expose the best legal precepts for the exchange of 
material forms of cultural life. There is nothing self-evident about the way in 
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which people come to exchange material as cultural property. For example, 
Demian explains that before people can exchange property they must see it; 
before they can give it away, they visualize it as discrete from the landscape in 
which they dwell. She echoes Malinowski's basic observation from the history 
of Trobriand research, as he notes the diver's ability to 'see' a shell necklace in 
the form of the giant sea clam that he recovers from the ocean floor. What they 
see as a potential pearlshell necklace entails them visualizing the totality of 
work and exchange relations that would put it into circulation on the kula ring 
as an item of wealth. Compare Malinwoski's insight into the visualization of 
pearlshell valuables in giant sea clams, with that of his student, Powdermaker, 
who wrote two decades later about New Irelanders' worries that European vis-
itors to the museum displays of their malanggan sculptures would fail to 
recognize the immense work that had been given to their construction. Demian 
(2004), Malinowski (1927), and Powdermaker (1933) each make a similar 
point: that the work of exchanging cultural property first entails visualizing it 
as an object of value, and seeing it as separate from its context. In the work of 
all three authors, people can see the valued object only at the point at which 
the social relationships disappear from view. It would seem that before a 
person can exchange cultural property, he or she must first let slip from the 
field of vision most of the hands through which the object has passed. Oddly, 
forgetting where the object comes from aids in the work of valuing it for future 
transactions. 
I would like to end by reference to the idea of owning creativity. In his essay 
on the pretexts for cultural property, Leach (2004) aptly discussed the problem 
of creativity as an aspect of social relationships. Leach reminds us that creativ-
ity lies simply within social relationships, neither within the intellect as 
inspiration nor in the 'genes' as if a naturally given talent. It is the combination 
of different relationships that makes possible the work of keeping alive a social 
life; and that would be a social life in which people retain interest. The problem 
remains: how can anthropologists assist in the formation of legal provisions 
that recognize the fundamentally social basis of cultural property? One way 
in which this is possible is to consider the social collaboration of different 
people (and clans) as the creative effect of the perceived felt-needs of protec-
tion for indigenous cultural property. In the final chapter, I will discuss how 
that collaboration would be as much an ethical, as it is a legal, creation. Here, I 
will discuss the complexities of a particular case in protecting social-cultural 
relations through the use of cultural property: that of the public display of 
malanggan. 
In central New Ireland, Papua New Guinea, provincial bureaucrats argued 
that one of the best ways of preserving or protecting culture is to use it. In the 
interest of cultural protection, they embarked on a series of installations of 
public artwork. The most notable was the creation of many carved posts to 
hold aloft the roof of the departure hall at the new airport terminal, in the 
provincial capital of Kavieng (Figure 11.1 ). The posts are made of aquila wood, 
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Figure 11.1 Malanggan carvings on the departure hall posts of Kavieng International 
Airport, New Ireland, Papua New Guinea. Karen Sykes (2000). 
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commonly understood to bear ceremonial importance because it is used for 
house posts of the men's house, or in the gateways to the enclosures surround-
ing burial grounds adjacent to the men's house. These wooden posts, when 
properly dried before carving, will turn as hard as iron and weather the ele-
ments for many decades. In the men's houses of yesteryear, only those men 
invited to enter the enclosure could look upon the carved images; but contem-
porary men's houses rarely use artfully carved posts. Each post at the airport 
terminal is emblazoned with images used in malanggan carvings, collected 
from the area throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and now 
stored in European museums. Many of the images have been used in more 
contemporary malanggan ceremonies, when the displayed carving had been 
thrown into the sea or burnt over the fire. In this context, the carvings might be 
more familiar to the eye of European tourists visiting the region than to many 
New Irelanders who would not view malanggan images under everyday 
circumstances of the late twentieth century. The provincial government seem-
ingly sought to protect malanggan as a cultural property by celebrating it, that 
is by putting it on public display and thereby making it possible for New Ire-
land residents to see in the departure hall the kinds of images that Europeans 
had seen in museums for a long time. 
Two kinds of problems emerged. The first lies in the irony that everyone in 
New Ireland can see the malanggan images, which in the past only select per-
sons viewed at special ritual occasions. The hidden images were now made 
public in order to protect them. The first problem could have been solved if the 
proper care had been taken with how to reveal to wider public view the images 
on the posts. In this, as in other cases of ritual use, proper care meant negotiat-
ing the wide and complex network of social relationships necessary to 
complete any single malanggan carving. The second problem is related to the 
first. It lies in the misunderstanding of the role of the 'malanggan carver'. The 
government sought to employ master carvers, as individual artists. Unfortu-
nately, they erred because the malanggan carver is 'several people', working 
together in a formation more like the entire musical ensemble. As a result the 
carvers could not explain to the satisfaction of their bureaucratic employers 
how the work on each post had been apportioned among the men working on 
each. Further, the government could not allocate the time and resources neces-
sary to negotiate the complex network of people to finish the carving, when 
the time required for the completion of the carved posts outran the schedule. 
The government did not protect malanggan carving in New Ireland as fully 
as it might have done. If the bureaucrats had wanted to protect cultural prop-
erty, they needed to negotiate fully the social network in which the malanggan 
can be publicized, or simply 'revealed' to the public eye; which they did not. 
Malanggan carvers understand that they hold multiple claims on each other, 
and that to withdraw one claim jeopardizes the artwork, as well as the people 
who helped to make it. They are not 'shareholders' in the carving, with pro-
portional investments in the final artwork. Neither do they believe that they 
202 
INTERESTS IN CULTURAL PROPERTY 
participate in creating an artwork of public and common property because no 
individual carver believes that he comes as representative of his language 
group, or clan, to constitute a social totality. Instead, each person participates 
in the carving of the post so that it becomes the property, 'in effect' of his 
clan's interests in sharing in the work and social life of creating cultural prop-
erty. By similar argument, the carving is neither simply common property nor 
cultural wealth held in common. The malanggan is collectively 'owned', when 
revealed and seen properly after the negotiation of the network of social rela-
tionships that facilitate its completion and display. The correct and complete 
negotiation of that network of social relationships allows people to look at, or 
to view, the malanggan with intelligence rather than ignorance. Contrary to 
the claim of the artist, Damien Hirst, who argues that when people view art 
they kill its meaning and take the life from it by taking it out of life, the New 
Irelanders would argue that to reveal and gaze properly at malanggan art is to 
make it come to life in the imagination of everyone who is free to see it. The 
catch for this in New Ireland - and it is the same catch by which bureaucrats 
might succeed in protecting malanggan art by making it public - is simply this: 
a person should not look without protection at the improperly revealed 
malanggan. The protection of cultural property entails living with an apparent 
contradiction; that is, if you know who you are in relation to the rest of the 
people who dreamed, carved, painted, enchanted and displayed it, then you 
are free to gaze at it. When someone looks intelligently at cultural property in 
New Ireland, they preserve it as a form of social and cultural life. 
Summary of chapter 11 
If culture is the new commons, then does anthropology have the means to 
assess it? First I have looked at the debates ensuing from the UN Declaration 
on Cultural Diversity to expose the dilemmas faced by those writing legal 
devices for the protection of culture. How should one protect a form of associ-
ation that is seated in human relationships rather than in the individual or in 
artefacts exchanged between individuals? After looking at the concept of the 
commons in the seventeenth-century property debates, this chapter has exam-
ined the problem of the extent to which culture is shared. Malinowski's research 
and Mauss's can each be discussed for what it exposes about their different 
assumptions about the ontological grounds of cultural knowledge. Malinowski 
preferred to locate the significance of cultural knowledge in individual needs 
and their negotiation in shared society, whereas Mauss preferred to locate the 
significance of cultural knowledge in human relationships, as the motive to 
keep obligations. While Appadurai used Malinowski's model of exchange to 
delineate global exchanges as tournaments of value, both Brown and Coombe 
raise objections to this. Brown asks to what extent people can participate in a 
negotiated exchange of cultural values, for example in a process of copyrighting 
culture, without first alienating culture from themselves. Coombe objects by 
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pointing out that intellectual property has a cultural life, and that debates 
about it are embedded in other debates about how to live. As new departures 
for the discussion of cultural property as the new commons, several 
researchers suggest that cultural property is first and foremost a problem of 
visualizing culture as an entity, as a form or a thing to be separated from social 
relationships. Other researchers suggest that cultural property cannot be dis-
cussed as a communal form without risking it to corporate models of 
ownership, as when clans are erroneously encouraged to register lands on the 
model of corporations. Instead, cultural property can be analysed within a net-
work of social relations such that all claims on it can be addressed respective 





Some researchers aim to give anthropology away, in the sense of making 
ethnography freely available. In the best sense, giving anthropology away means 
making a gift of it, an act of making a connection to readers. In giving anthro-
pology 'a way' into the debates of other scholars, anthropologists make their 
research results vulnerable to the scrutiny of others; and by implication they 
make vulnerable those who assisted in the research, the informants. Each time 
anthropologists 'give anthropology away' they make the value of anthropology 
vulnerable to challenges: against their authority to speak and write what they 
know, against their claims for how they know it and for the routines of their 
disciplinary practice. In the best sense of intellectual exchange, giving anthro-
pology a way opens the pathways for debate. Anthropologists communicate their 
research and thereby make a way for the research to be used by others. They 
become vulnerable by sharing ideas, just as the people with whom an anthro-
pologist lives become vulnerable by inviting him or her to stay with them and 
risking that they will be treated fairly. An anthropology that builds on ethical 
practice exchanges in the vulnerability of humans from fieldwork to publication. 
That vulnerability should not be a problem because it is necessary to let 
research reports and ethnography remain open to reconsideration. Vulnerabil-
ity is a problem in the circumstances in which an anthropologist's report also 
endangers informants, students and colleagues, by creating a pathway of 
knowledge that links anthropological commentary and argument to specific 
people. Ethical anthropology transacts in the vulnerability of informants and 
researchers, in the first and the last instance, and cannot ignore or forget this 
condition of research. Because it is not possible for either fieldworker or hosts 
to remain invulnerable to human relationships in fieldwork, the better approach 
is to acknowledge vulnerability as a condition of each other's humanity. The 
anthropologist can acknowledge the vulnerable informants by being alert to 
their own vulnerability. That is a capacity that can be enhanced by disciplinary 
study and debate about ethics. I will look at anthropological ethics as it is 
valued in the discipline, by noting how codes and guidelines protect research 
subjects and by considering how the interpersonal exchange of vulnerabilities 
precipitates moral reasoning. 
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Codes and guidelines 
In chapter 10, I described what Strathern (2000) has called 'audit culture', or 
the bureaucratic regulation of social action (beyond the ken of individual 
bureaucrats). Peter Pels (1999, 2000) argues that audit culture enters anthropol-
ogy in the form of codes for ethical conduct. Anthropologists meet disciplinary 
obligations to respect codes, guidelines, and human subject's boards, ethics 
committees, in order to learn about ethical conduct and prevent unethical prac-
tice. Drawing on the classical philosophy of Aristotle and the heavily debated 
example of Malinowski's fieldwork (a case that I discussed in chapter 3), Pels 
correctly argues that to know the goal of ethical research is not the same as to 
know the ethical practice of research. I argue that, although these different 
mechanisms have made anthropologists better aware of their responsibilities to 
each other and to the people they come to know in the course of their field-
work that using these devices to guide conduct can lead the anthropologist to 
forget that they trade in vulnerability as a matter of research practice itself. It is 
impossible to understand human behaviour without acknowledging common 
vulnerability. 
The codification of conduct into ethical practice makes it possible for anthro-
pologists to monitor each other's responsibilities, and in so doing they show 
each other that they are professionally responsible. Contemporary codes of 
ethics for professional anthropologists begin with the assumption that knowl-
edge is information won through fieldwork, and that the fieldwork encounter 
entails negotiation and exchange between anthropologist and informants. 
Ethics codes assume that anthropological knowledge cannot be 'bought' with-
out compromising both truth and ethical relations with informants. The codes 
do assume that knowledge can be given freely, and that it can be given in 
exchange for fair compensation in value for the informants' time, and perhaps 
their expertise. The code exists, in the way a rulebook does, in order to ensure 
that anthropologists conduct these exchanges fairly. 
There is a second sense of knowledge as understanding that is assumed 
within disciplinary and professional codes of practice. Anthropologists can ask 
too well, just what kind of understanding comes without vulnerability. This 
question paraphrases Geertz's defence of Malinowski's fieldwork methods, and 
more generally, his defence of the interpretive method in fieldwork (Geertz 
1988). The definition of knowledge as understanding comes from the fieldwork 
experience and acknowledges that the ethnographic account is made between 
anthropologists and informants in a negotiation of their joint understandings. 
Ethical interchange in this case opens up anthropological research as a path-
way towards understanding, a pathway that is made through a sequence of 
translations from field to study. I will look at each of these meanings for ethi-
cal practice in the light of the vulnerability of informants and researchers: first, 
as a gift within codes of practice and second, as a pathway for exchange within 
guidelines for conduct. 
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Codes of practice and guidelines for professional conduct are not new. In the 
Anglophone world, the American Anthropological Association (AAA) adopted 
a code of ethics which Pels (2000) names Principles of Professional Responsi-
bility (PPR). The PPR aimed to create an explicit hierarchy of obligations for 
anthropologists to meet, differentiating the different communities of people to 
whom they hold debts: the informants in research communities, students, the 
home and host governments, and collegial and professional groups. The PPR 
uses the hierarchy of responsibilities to protect the more vulnerable member of 
any negotiation, transaction or dispute by making it clear that the more power-
ful or higher status person is less vulnerable and more responsible to the lower 
status person on the hierarchy of groups and discrete professional milieus. 
This code of practice assumes that knowledge empowers anthropologists 
and that what they do and say with that knowledge can endanger each group 
of people differently. The code aims to designate the differential vulnerability 
of each group from the others. An absolute hierarchy of vulnerable groups was 
created; informants were more vulnerable than host governments, students 
more vulnerable than colleagues, but fieldwork rarely presented conditions of 
absolute moral certainty. Commonly, an anthropologist finds him or herself 
confused about how to act in relation to any of these groups, without compro-
mising his or her relationship with the others of the group. The Code of Ethics 
ensconces a hierarchy of vulnerability; it does not proclaim a hierarchy of dif-
ferent kinds of values or obligations. By giving attention to vulnerability, the 
code acknowledges that anthropological knowledge grows out of social rela-
tionships, many of which admit to the mutual vulnerability of researcher and 
informant. This sophisticated approach to the code of ethics of the AAA 
demands clear thinking about both vulnerability and responsibility. It allows 
for anthropologists to repeatedly remind each other that ethnography depends 
upon being totally human in the company of others, who are fully persons as 
well. It is responsible to acknowledge and project vulnerabilities. 
By comparison with the AAA, the Association for Social Anthropology 
(ASA) adopted a statement on Guidelines for Good Practice in 1986. The guide-
lines are meant to enable and guide reflection on the nature of anthropological 
practice; they are guidelines, and do not regulate or judge the fieldwork and 
ethnography of colleagues. The guidelines instruct and remind anthropologists 
of their responsibilities. In many ways the guidelines of the ASA reflect a more 
personalized approach, in so far as they focus on the individual choices that a 
single researcher makes in fieldwork and hence on their duty to the informant, 
to their colleagues and to their host and home countries. Unlike the AAA 
codes, the guidelines do not distinguish one milieu from another in a hierarchy 
of vulnerability; but they detail distinct responsibilities held by anthropologists 
to informants, to host and home governments and to colleagues. There is no 
hierarchy of orders because vulnerability is measured differently in each situa-
tion, whereas professional responsibilities to informants, peers and hosts can 
be distinguished clearly as a guideline of professional practice. 
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Principles of professional research: the Yanomamo case 
More recently, American anthropologists struggled to understand the implica-
tions of encoding ethics in terms of the differentiated vulnerability of research, 
student and professional communities. They entered an intense conversation 
about the nature of ethical practice, with the intention to revise their code 
of ethics. In an iconic debate over the work of the anthropologist Chagnon 
who worked in the 1950s in the Venezuelan Amazon, American anthropolo-
gists aimed to create a public statement on their ethical practice that would 
reflect disciplined approaches for future research by its members. There is 
much to consider in the debate about what ethical conduct is and how anthro-
pologists can recognize and monitor it. How should anthropologists open 
pathways of moral reasoning in intellectual exchange with their informants? 
Chagnon was criticized by an investigative journalist (Tierney 2000) for his 
fieldwork ethics in the midst of an influenza epidemic in which many villagers 
of the Yanomami died. His peers (AAA 2002) raised more questions about 
this tragedy forty years later, querying what Chagnon did to protect indigenous 
people, whom many perceive to be vulnerable members of the Amazonian com-
munities. Some asked questions about the decisions he made that took him to 
the Amazon in the early 1960s, about the sources of funding for his project, 
about his choice to give medical treatment to informants, and about his per-
sonal conduct in the field. Many of the answers to these questions show that 
Chagnon acted in a paternalistic way when he chose to act on partial knowl-
edge of the nature of the epidemic. Because of the nature of medical treatment 
plans for epidemics, some felt that he risked the health of the villagers by sur-
mising that he could act in their best interests on his privileged but limited 
personal knowledge of Western medicine. (Usually anthropologists have some 
personal knowledge of medical care based upon their experience of medicines 
used in developed countries, but not professional knowledge of medical drugs 
and treatment.) 
In defence, Chagnon's supporters argued that he was making reasonable 
decisions in the field in the effort to protect informants from further illness. 
He was not mortally vulnerable to infection, but his informants were and he 
aimed to rectify that balance. By most accounts, Chagnon's record of behaviour 
could be defended within the PPR, as drafted by the AAA. He acknowledged 
his superior responsibility given the personal advantages he enjoyed as an 
educated man from the developed Western world. However, was research vul-
nerability quantifiable, that is, only a matter of measuring who was more and 
who less vulnerable? 
How does remaining vulnerable in fieldwork become instrumental to the 
transactions entailed in its conduct? Chagnon's example does not show this 
vulnerability; neither does the anthropologist acknowledge his vulnerability to 
others, nor does he recognize fully the vulnerability of the Yanomami people 
to his research. If Chagnon never relinquishes his paternal role in the field, if 
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he never gives up his 'god's eye' to the situation, then his research makes other 
people appear as archetypes of the Western imagination. Under such circum-
stances research becomes a fable and people who can act as informants become 
nothing other than exotic people, who cannot meet anthropologists face-to-
face and exchange life-stories and the work of daily living in fieldwork. 
The guidelines for professional conduct and the Yanomami 
Chagnon's ethical practice intrigued professional anthropologists for many 
months, and is worth a brief introduction for what it tells about the ethics of 
representation. In chapter 2 I described Chagnon's research with the Yano-
mami as an effort to establish the argument that political forms evolve as 
people respond to human acts of violence by trying to contain and restrict it 
with legal and institutional mechanisms. In his effort to understand the human 
nature that informed Amazonian Indian behaviour, he had undertaken to 
describe environmental and historical causes for the events unfolding at the 
time of Levi-Strauss's visit in his effort to discredit structuralist's arguments 
and to re-establish the Yanomami case as one upon which to build the argu-
ment for the theory of political evolution. The involvements of Chagnon with 
the Yanomami become iconic of the wider problem: what are the ethics of rep-
resenting people who do or do not conform to ideals of the Noble Savage? 
Although Chagnon published his research findings widely, I do not offer a 
full study of how he depicted the Yanomami people here. Instead, I will look 
only at how he worked with the film maker Asch to present their social life, in 
a film entitled The Ax Fight. Chagnon tried to provide more authority for his 
research into the nature of non-state violence by using the visual evidence pro-
vided on film. There is nothing simple or straightforward about such a plan. 
The film is comprised by the sequence of events, presented and re-presented 
three different times. Each presentation offers a different edit of the first rush 
of film, to demonstrate that the final product was true to the initial filming and 
also that the work of editing (like the work of writing) could highlight or bring 
forward the social structures that lay behind the surface. The final edit is fol-
lowed by the construction of a kinship diagram (to the eyes of the viewer, this 
is a somewhat strange moment in the filming). They make the effort to repre-
sent, several times, the process by which the very same event could be viewed 
and reviewed for new information. Grimshaw 2001 tells us that later reassess-
ments (Moore 1994, Winston 1995) show that the evidence in the film itself 
could undermine the empirical claims of Chagnon that warfare in the Amazon 
region constituted an intermediary stage of political evolution, from which the 
state emerged with the purpose of using legitimate forms of violence to end 
the condition of warfare. 
Chagnon had worked hard with the film maker Tim Asch to create a com-
pelling portrayal of an event in which violent fighting erupted in the Amazon. 
Asch worked with conventions of ethnographic film making that did not assume 
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that 'natural shots' were the only authentic record. Asch followed traditions of 
ethnographic film begun in the 1920s by Flaherty, which assumed that the 
fieldworker should endeavour to keep the camera's eye innocent from human 
prejudice about the scene in front of them. Flaherty used film to expose the 
patterns of everyday life, by building up the evidence layer upon layer until the 
picture or image emerged clearly. Following Flaherty's form of film making, 
Asch filmed numerous versions of the same actions, thereby exposing to the 
eye of the anthropologist the ideal or archetypical image contained within 
apparently disparate and unconnected human acts. 
Subsequent historians of the ethnographic film discussed how Flaherty and 
Asch worked to expose the ideal forms of behaviour, illuminating these with 
effective reviews and additions to make the image clear (Banks and Morphy 
1997). For the creation of The Ax Fight, which appeared to be a realistic shot 
of the events that developed naturally in front of them, the film makers worked 
to create opportunities to record effective images of the violent conflict on the 
screen and images of the build-up to that conclusive conflict. In the course of 
their work Chagnon had made gifts of axes to Yanomami men, and subse-
quently these weapons appear in the fight. The film focused on the build-up of 
antagonism by filming the different events leading to the conclusive conflict. 
Remember the context of Chagnon's research and filming. His effort to illus-
trate in film that warfare was a natural condition challenged the converse claim 
that peaceable activity is the work of human beings in social relations. By cre-
ating a stage in film for the presentation of the evidence of violent conflict, he 
eliminated the occasions of more peaceful human activity. Intriguingly, this 
attention to one facet of human experience set him at odds with Flaherty's aims 
for documentary film, which were to record the visual manifestations of deep 
patterns informing everyday life (not only dramatic events such as the conflict 
Chagnon and Asch filmed in The Ax Fight). 
Asch expressed doubts about the editing and presentation of the film, as well 
as the work of creating the scene of filming. In later years, he reflected upon 
the experience and argued for explicit reflection upon the processes by which a 
film maker records human behaviour. Asch's reflection contributed to a richer 
discussion of the work of ethnographic film than had existed in the techniques 
of film making before the Second World War, enlivening discussion to include 
the role of various ways of enabling artistic presentations of visual 'evidence' 
in either documentary film or ethnographic cinema. Anthropologists began to 
explore earnestly the visual technologies, in the broadest sense, that mediated 
best the ethnographic science with the art of ethnography. How do anthropol-
ogists contribute to the 'scene' to be documented on film? This question took 
the film-making approach in new directions towards cinema. But my concern 
here is how the exchanges and interchanges of fieldwork open an ethical path-
way to anthropological understanding. 
Chagnon had filled a conceptual space that Trouillot named 'the savage slot', 
the conceptual space imagined by anthropologists as the counter example, the 
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alternative to, life within the state. He gave up opportunities for developing his 
best personal relationships with the Yanomami, to support the fashioning of a 
picture of the lives of men and women whose lives on film are about their lives 
as 'natural savages'. In this sense, he gave away any chance of success at ethical 
practice within anthropology. 
There remains an alternative to representing the Yanomami as the archetyp-
ical noble savage in transition to political evolution. In the next section I will 
discuss the exchanges that a fieldworker makes in order to record their experi-
ence and thoughts. Experience might be exchanged for field notes, and field 
notes for ethnography, as an anthropologist negotiates the way of his or her 
research into a wider community of readers. Each exchange negotiates a moral 
relationship. I will discuss transaction in fieldwork and intellectual exchanges 
sustaining ethnographic writing as it opens pathways of ethical reasoning. I 
assume that humans make themselves vulnerable in fieldwork exchanges, and 
I thereby recognize that vulnerability makes anthropological knowledge 
possible. Research with human subjects remains interesting, enlightening, and 
important as long as humans acknowledge each other's humanity. Face to face, 
this entails acknowledging the vulnerability of each human to his or her social 
relationships. Eyes see and mouths speak, and thereby assist humans in the 
exchange of knowledge. These vulnerable orifices, the open eye and the speak-
ing mouth, are as much the eye that receives the world, and the mouth that 
devours it with surprised utterance, or spoken request that reduces felt experi-
ence to words. These bodily openings to the world are the savage slots that all 
humans share, as anthropologists and as research subject. 
Fieldwork and the ethics of recording experience 
Can ethical practice create a pathway for moral reasoning, rather than a moral 
code for behaviour? I take a case from my own work. In the early months of 
my fieldwork I learned to make small feasts for guests who would help me with 
my research. The elderly women who were my guests are pictured in Figure 12.1 
(overleaf). I cooked large pots of chicken stew and I invited a group of elderly 
women in order to conduct an all night party, a group interview about their 
common experience of an initiation into a selective women's society, through 
which they acquired the name Ladaven to indicate their prestige. I was curious 
about the links between initiation into selective societies in the rituals of the 
past, and the leap or initiation into secondary education in the present. I knew 
that each woman joined the society in a different ritual at a different time over 
the past fifty years, yet at my invitation on this occasion they joined together to 
talk about the past events. It amused them, but not unpleasantly so. The 
evening passed easily and with much laughter. 
I had hoped to recreate the conviviality of the original feasts with this small 
event, or party as they called it. Good food, a warm fire and good conversation 
created the ambience for successful conversation in many different places for 
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many people, and it seemed reasonable to hope for the same social effects after 
giving a feast in the village. We laughed about the songs that they sang into my 
tape recorder. They said their voices were no longer as sweet and true as they 
had been when they were adolescents. I did not aim to create a semblance of a 
ritual event, but wanted to create the conditions of conviviality and thereby 
make it possible to recall with alacrity the details of the early years, despite the 
distant memory or the time passed between the present and their first participa-
tion in the rituals. They punctuated the songs with riotous laughter, a stanza of 
a ritual tune interrupted with uproars and collapse. They heard their own aged 
voices singing the words and melodies most meaningful to the adolescent girl. 
They could not sing poetic evocations of the nature of men's desire for beautiful 
young women's bodies without realizing that they created a ridiculous scene; 
they had ancient withered skin and their voices cracked on high notes of a 
melody carrying lyrics about young love. They told me that the event was comi-
cally obscene, and that it was fun to make jokes about the past. This initially 
confused and saddened me because I had hoped to honour their past. Worse, in 
their attempts to reassure me that they found the time together happy, I learned 
that had men been present or nearby (none were) then the women would have 
been ashamed of their situation. That night the women turned my work into 
frivolity, a frivolity they shared by revelling in the ludicrous. They knew that 
they were elderly women, but they sang as if they were pubescent girls. 
At this party I recorded material restricted from common use, but I have 
never exploited that knowledge in publications, although they agreed to release 
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Figure 12.1 (above and left) Former Ladaven initiates from Central New Ireland, 
Papua New Guinea. Karen Sykes (1991). 
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it to appear in my 'book'. The event recalled and the songs sung once were 
open to a selective group of people, and normally not publicly available in ways 
that a book might permit. I did not want to risk misusing their trust in me by 
assuming that they understood the public nature of publishing. 
The most interesting difference between my record of their experience and 
their uses of the presentation lies in how the ritual is meaningful more than 
what it means. At that event they exposed my naivete about feminine erotics. 
They discovered my ignorance and they decided I was unteachable; my elderly 
companions tried to make me appear and behave as a younger woman should, 
but with no luck. My elderly friends worried that I could fail as a woman 
(what kind of man would want to marry a woman who did not understand 
femininity, especially a Melanesian style of femininity?). Women's femininity is 
learned indirectly among women, the erotic required an imaginative leap. 
Women educate each other in femininity through parody and burlesque. It is 
humorous. 
The songs that the women sang have greater public dissemination if they are 
sung at school graduation ceremonies, but such reconstructed ritual events of 
the contemporary period have less potency. Women's power and edginess that 
night made the event more than theatre. The event of ritual performance differs 
from the event of a theatrical presentation of ritual, which differs from its bur-
lesque. Giving a ritual status to another is a very different matter than either 
giving a dramatic presentation of ritual to an audience, or giving comic insight 
into the ritual for a scholar educated to its different meanings through pub-
lished sources. 
That evening we broke down together in the confluence of our respective 
educations, how I, as a nai"ve ethnographer, started research and how elderly 
women learned for the first time that they could remember their initiation into 
a secret women's society. First their laughter, then my inescapable sleep eclipsed 
all my attempts at note taking. The maddening transcripts of that evening's 
work lie between that place and me. I can listen to my recordings in which the 
laughter is punctuated with phrases and words, uttered in answer to some 
question I had asked. The point was not to record accurately all the details of 
their earlier youthful experience and the secret knowledge that they learned. 
The goal was to learn in this experience of the ways in which a person trans-
forms him or herself through relationships with others. Learning about per-
sonal transformation cannot be a failure, nor can it be a success. It is merely 
the elicitation of the necessity of our relationship, elder women who had lived 
there forever and a younger immigrant woman. My attempts to record them 
turned my work into a parody of anthropology and their experience into frivol-
ity. An ethical anthropology, but done in the dramatic mode of comedy, and 
with a few laughs? Or not? 
An anthropologist getting started at fieldwork, like a kula trader getting 
started in ceremonial exchange, sets a chain of other transactions into play. 
When I had finished my evenings of interviews with elderly women about 
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their youthful initiations at the time of the malanggan mortuary ceremony, a 
new debate opened. The small settlement where I lived in a small house asked 
me how they could best help me to write. Writing, in central New Ireland 
parlance, is known as rnalanngan. The word malanggan is used to describe 
the practice of mortuary feasting, and the specific work of carving a sculpture 
of wood or weaving one of hand-made rope. It is intriguing to consider what 
it means to draw equivalences between writing and malanggan because accord-
ing to New Irelanders' wisdom, the work of malanggan ends meaningful 
communication. Making a malanggan ends all conversation, discussion and 
talk about the life of the deceased. This transformation of the social person 
from the world of speech to that of silence could be called the death of commu-
nication. Different from the New Irelanders, I took the work of recording and 
of writing to be the technologies that make up social relationship. I write and 
inscribe; I interpret and translate what can be claimed as shared understand-
ings of experience. 
Every day at noon an elderly man sat with me over cups of sugared tea. He 
came to talk when I stopped writing on the typewriter. All morning he had sat 
and listened to the machine strike keys on the paper; he liked to hear it 'pira 
ap', to make a clattering noise like a bad truck engine. He asked me a very good 
question that bothers me still. How did all my experiences there get inside 
those little black marks on the page? Indeed. What did I have to forget just to 
write it all down? 
Fieldnotes are the product of moral technologies; that is, writing is not a 
neutral technology. Writing creates moral relations (either in text or by elicita-
tion) by making these relations clear in practice and by inscribing some of 
them on the page. A debate grew in the hamlet in which I lived. Was writing 
my 'work'? Was the fieldworker who did not find her wealth in the gardens 
really a grown woman? If I wrote down their stories, then what would that 
record of them mean to them? If writing is malanggan, then what does that 
imply? Malanggan makers needed to be hosted, but who would host me as a 
writer/malanggan creator? If I sculpted experience into notes on a page that 
they called malanggan, then should I receive gifts of food and shells in 
exchange for the artistic creation that I gave them? 
My experience is not uncommon. In his book, The Invention of Culture (1975) 
Wagner recalls the existential angst in the years of his first fieldwork. His hosts, 
the Daribi, wondered about the work of the 'storimasta', as they called the 
anthropologist who wrote down the stories they told him. The 'storimasta' 
wrote stories. Was this the work of a grown-up? Was Wagner, who lived among 
them, a grown man? Who really has claims on such knowledge, and what does 
it rely upon in order to be understood sufficiently for a final account? These 
questions about the making of fieldnotes take me in turn to the problems of 
ethnographic writing, and the politics of translation across cultures, of translat-
ing the distant places into face-to-face relationships. 
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Pathways for ethical exchange 
Some anthropologists doubted the role of scientific reason in the ethical 
practice of anthropology and advocated an assessment of the uses of rhetoric, 
style and genre. Marcus and Cushman (1981 ), Marcus and Clifford (1986), 
Clifford (1988, 1997) and Marcus and Fischer (1986) initiated an assessment 
of narrative style and genre of writing in ethnography in order to examine how 
anthropologists created the authority and credibility of their ethnographic 
descriptions. These anthropologists tried to think about anthropological narra-
tives because ethnography begins with writing about experience. Many 
anthropologists refer to this legacy of reflection upon the way in which anthro-
pologists write it down as 'the literary turn' in anthropology. Many literary 
anthropologists' books explored poetic devices for the end of being able to 
communicate more evocative portrayals of the beliefs that other people 
hold, and the ways in which they act towards each other. They acknowledge 
that ethnography can be aesthetically beautiful or can comprise challenging 
accounts which engage the reader in order to illuminate the life of people who 
are not easily known. These efforts in anthropological writing do not claim to 
be 'science' and often raise doubts about the certainty of what an anthropolo-
gist can know while conveying some insights, as does good literature. 
Many anthropologists experimenting with different forms of anthropo-
logical writing also hold the aims of a more broadly construed scientific project. 
Marcus drew on the work of the philosopher of history, White (1981 ), who 
appealed to the philosopher Vico, to show that by using a range of aesthetic 
styles anthropologists aimed to create realistic portrayals of the people and 
places they knew. Marcus welcomed Vico's aims to create a new history, and a 
new historical critique of the arts. As Marcus observed in his efforts to map 
this terrain for anthropology, early and later anthropologists accomplished the 
realist aims of early ethnography by using a number of different rhetorical 
devices to convey their authority to write about a particular place. Some 
anthropologists simply used a literary device of establishing an authorial voice 
that conveyed to the reader the sense of 'being there', that is of actually having 
been in another place far away from the chair of the reader. 
Marcus raised a second interesting question about terms of ethnographic 
writing; he asked how the anthropologist introduced the sense of time to the 
ethnography. In some cases the ethnography seemed to have been written 
about events that had happened in the past, providing the reader with a sense 
that the world being described had stopped in the ethnography. This style of 
writing supported ethnographers' assumption that they described a life style 
under threat by modern times, or even the claim that they described a whole 
society of complete, enduring, unchanging structures and institutions. Marcus's 
creative critical observations about ethnographic writing became part of a 
wide-ranging debate among anthropologists about the different value of scien-
tific and literary approaches to the discipline. 
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A considerably wider-reaching critique of the uses of the concept of time by 
Johannes Fabian (1983) drew on Foucault's philosophical and historical cri-
tique of social sciences. Fabian's book analysed the various ways in which 
anthropologists represented their research community as different from their 
home society. The anthropologist's habit of finding the research community to 
be very different from his or her home society implicated anthropologists in an 
ideological framework, even where they aimed to avoid it. For Fabian, as for 
Foucault (1972), descriptive writing is a political act and anthropologists 
should reflect on the circumstances in which they write. For Fabian, as for 
Foucault, analysing experience different from the writer's own draws anthro-
pologists into a necessarily critical exercise. But what kind of criticism did 
anthropologists make in ethnography? Fabian explored the ways anthropolo-
gists used the sense of passing time in their ethnography so as to describe the 
'other' as different from them. Often the other's habits reflected aspects of life 
from the anthropologist's society's past, customs and traditions left behind 
with modern life. Fabian argued that anthropologists should critique the ways 
in which they used the 'other' to legitimate their own version of human history 
as a natural progression towards a more enlightened society. 
A third response came from Clifford Geertz (1988). He reflected upon the 
history of anthropological scholarship and pointed out that this might be 
accomplished through conventions of writing that communicated a sense that 
the researcher had been 'eye-witness' to the events described. In equally com-
plex efforts, like those of Ruth Benedict whose work I have mentioned in the 
introduction (seep. 7), the sense of 'being there' could be communicated with 
more 'whimsical' illustrations of what the observations on another society's 
ceremonies meant for understanding the peculiarities of our own habit. These 
concerns with 'being there' and 'eye witnessing' in ethnography underline that 
anthropology can extend a radical and profound critique of what it means to 
be human. Geertz's anthropology as a critique of ontology elaborates dis-
tinctly different ideas about how people think they exist socially, or should 'be', 
in the world. Geertz has been criticized wrongly for fetishizing culture as text. 
He does not make texts his object of study, but he does privilege meaning of 
social processes. He believes that meaningful communication is the goal of 
every social act. (His assumptions are hard to displace because how can we 
assume that some social action is not meaningful?) An anthropologist who 
assumes it is his or her work to translate others' social acts into fieldnotes and 
eventually into ethnography also assumes that ontological critique is the justifi-
cation for fieldwork. Geertz's interpretive approach to anthropology returns 
anthropologists to the field, yet again. 
At first, as a student of anthropology, I welcomed Fabian's and Marcus's 
assessments of the intellectual history of the discipline and their call for a new 
anthropology that was self-consciously critical about its work. I think that they 
contributed to the contemporary work of the discipline by recalling that 
anthropology is basically a critical project because anthropologists often doubt 
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any claim to the certainty of knowledge. Later, I took seriously the injunction 
that as an ethnographer I must be able to take responsibility for describing the 
social life of another community in the way I did, even when I lacked the deep 
knowledge of community history that those who live there forever can assume 
in their daily work. 
Ethics of translation: the mistakes of modern people 
The crisis of representation is one of the most powerful critiques of anthropo-
logical science. Fabian, Geertz and Marcus have recorded this critique, without 
replying to it with alternatives (see Marcus and Fischer 1986, Rabinow 1996). 
The crisis of representation arose as postmodern thought challenged the disci-
pline's ability to describe an objective world. The more eloquent analyses of this 
crisis endorsed poststructuralist insights that perhaps were best elaborated in 
The Order of Things (Foucault 1972). Foucault correctly recognized that efforts 
to represent experience severed the representation of life, labour and language 
from the meaningful contexts of their practice. This ironic fact of knowledge 
made scientific thought impossible. As a stunning critique of even the interpre-
tative social sciences since Descartes, Foucault showed that failure lies with the 
scientific limits placed upon descriptive practice. That is, it is impossible to 
understand meaningfully any lived experience through describing it, whether 
thickly or symbolically. In the worst-case scenario, attempts at accurate descrip-
tion kill off the meaning won in experience. Unfortunately, the postmodern 
caveat that claims that symbolic representation saps life of meaning has had few 
rejoinders. In chapter 10, Latour, Strathern and Wagner, in approaches to the 
description of virtual society, offer a response and a course of action in their 
respective discussions of the ethics of translation. Here, I will discuss each in 
turn, referring to Geertz's concern with translation as a foil to their claims. 
It seems that the intellectual habits distinguishing people in modern society 
after the Enlightenment hobble rather than enable researchers. As I discussed 
earlier, anthropology needs better mediums of description in order to escape the 
current crisis of representation that has been associated with postmodernity. 
Latour details the concept of network as a narrational field, recalling for me an 
earlier anthropological approach to ethnography that Clifford Geertz (1973) 
called thick description. Geertz's work, like Latour's, has been wrongly targeted 
in the science wars of the past decade as simply anti-realist. Both scholars have 
worked to clarify the intellectual techniques that social scientists use to explore 
and interpret the real world to create the impression of a real world that can 
be discovered. For both Latour and Geertz, translation remains the principal 
intellectual activity. In Geertz's thick description, anthropological science's legit-
imacy depends upon the acknowledgement that all humans share the work of 
translating experience in communicable thought into speech and language. All 
humans, anthropologists included, interpret culture and, in the process, invent 
it. As I have shown, Roy Wagner (1986, 2001) focuses on how things mean, 
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thereby differing from Geertz whose anthropological record infinitely explains 
away human experiences, even those made in the act of interpretation. 
For Latour, translation is also the work of purification; it abstracts a 
description from the social relations of shared experience, thereby leaving that 
description untainted by multivalent meanings of the concept as it is used. 
Instead of making translations, Latour argues, scholars must attend to the 
mutual processes of purification and translation as just that - as processes. 
Scholars should comprehend the experiential world in the swerve of its transla-
tion and know the translated world in the sway of its enactment. Network 
theory promises to hold the creative act within the grasp of the intellect - espe-
cially an intellect that comprehends the world in action. Translation remains 
the common ground between Geertz's and Latour's science of society. 
Cross-cultural translation, according to Geertz, is the fact of social life that 
makes moral reasoning possible. In his essay 'Found in translation' (in Geertz 
1983), Geertz shows that an anthropologist must first tolerate difference in 
order to understand cultural phenomena when describing the habits of one 
society for members of another, and then later convey to others his or her 
understandings of local knowledge. Gcertz maintains moral reasoning as the 
preserve of the sceptical Cartesian subject because the anthropologist, not the 
informant, weaves ethnographic meaning from his informants' accounts. As 
such, Geertz does not surpass or escape realism because the anthropologist 
remains the interpreter of the real world throughout the process of creating 
thick description. Geertz's mistake lies in his acceptance of the sceptical sub-
ject as the reasoning anthropologist whose knowledge falls between 'experience 
near to the native's point of view' and 'experience distant' from that perspec-
tive in the world of academic writing (Geertz 1983: 57). For Latour, translation 
makes moral reasoning necessary. Latour understands the translation of expe-
rience not as the narrative of thick description but as the long thread of 
connection elaborately deepening intimacies between material and ideal reality, 
at the very point of the severe abstraction of the representation. An anthro-
pologist who follows that long chain from one end to the other links the 
translation to reality. Latour then discovers the world as networks that are 
hybrids of culture and nature rather than translations of nature by culture. On 
the surface, this appears to be a critique of scientific rationalism, but it is not. 
Latour leaves readers with such insights as 'An experiment is an event' and 'we 
speak truthfully because the world itself is articulated, not the other way 
around' (1999: 296), recalling Gecrtz's own evocations of thick description's 
particular truths. I think that Geertz would concur with Latour; in his essay 
'The cerebral savage' Geertz (1973) offers similar critiques of scientific ratio-
nalism. But neither Gcertz nor Latour forgoes the Cartesian distinction 
between mind and body that makes scientific scepticism possible. 
Through highlighting critical comparison, Strathern's ethnographic practice 
shifts the work of moral reasoning on to the shoulders of her reader. The unset-
tling of received wisdom, as described earlier, acts as an impetus to assessing 
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the implications of ethnography for how to live. In carrying out their research, 
people create knowledge of the world and, in so doing, change the world 
in which they act. How should a reader of Strathern's ethnography then 
swing that knowledge into action in the world? Ironically, to act might require 
doubting the role of the sceptical Cartesian subject. Akin to the impetus of 
Strathern's ethnographic practice, Wagner's holographic theory of the subject 
makes clear that times come when moral reasoning risks becoming an apology 
for conventional social life and its efforts are suitably shifted to unsettling those 
habits inventively. Wagner first developed this theme in The Invention of Culture 
and elaborates it for The Anthropology of the Subject. 
Anthropologists could return to conventions of Cartesian science after the 
postmodem tum. In doing so, they might even rectify the scientific method with 
the history of its effects, as Latour's account suggests. But to do that would be 
to risk so much of everything that surrounds humans and gives them cause to 
wonder about the condition of life. Faith, hope and love are some of the for-
gotten preconditions of knowing about something; they are ways of knowing 
that confound any social science whose practitioners assume that only the sen-
tient, sceptical subject could know the world. These preconditions of 
knowledge are as necessary to critical thought as tolerance is to understanding 
difference. 
Exchanging vulnerability 
So far, I have been arguing for an ethics of fieldwork that acknowledges its 
pathways of exchange, especially those that acknowledge different vulner-
abilities of fieldworker and informant. In the first pages of this chapter, I 
introduced the idea that fieldworkers should acknowledge their own and the 
informants' vulnerability in making ethical decisions along the way. Here, I 
want to discuss the exchange of vulnerability in fieldwork, both as its ethical 
and as its genuine route to anthropological understanding. 
Fieldwork is a daunting undertaking, but it would be a mistake to try to 
triumph over it. Fieldwork can begin slowly, and understanding of social life 
improves gradually with thickening knowledge of the processes of daily life 
playing out. This slow learning in fieldwork depends largely on active adult 
participation and observation, and less on child-like inculcation into the habits 
of the place. This entailed living with a kind of double bind: on the one hand, 
rejecting adolescent-style relationships to adults and, on the other hand, acknowl-
edging that I held imperfect understandings of how adults act. This is partly 
why my discussion of initiation with the elderly women became a ludicrous 
activity. 
I experienced a breakthrough in my work when I acknowledged that if I 
thought about how to claim responsibility for what I did not know (rather than 
what I did), then other people could help me to understand better what is hap-
pening. Sometimes I can claim responsibility for my lack of ethnographic under-
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standing, if I remain sceptical in the field, checking his or her misassumptions 
and assumptions about all that is happening. In different situations, I can con-
front and acknowledge all that I do not know if I concede to vulnerability in 
fieldwork, admitting that my ignorance of particular ways of the place seems 
ludicrous to my hosts. Whether that mutual recognition of ignorance is fair-
minded, or even-handed by standards set by the profession does not matter. 
There is no way of getting fieldwork right according to the code; that is similar 
to having a destination without knowing how to get there. 
Perhaps it is time to rethink this 'savage slot' that is part of fieldwork experi-
ence. Trouillot (1992) used the term 'savage slot' to warn against mistaking 
material grounds of anthropological knowledge for the ideal construct. He 
reminds us that it is not possible to continuously discover new 'things' to 
describe as if perpetually discovering another kind of Noble Savage, whether 
that might be the 'condition of poverty' or the 'culture of violence'. Recording 
and analysing experience is the work of eyes and mouth, as much as it is the 
work of the hands that draw, write and push the button of the recorder. The 
'savage slot' is marked upon each human. The eyes and the mouth mark vul-
nerability; they open us to the world beyond ourselves, and admit the world to 
us as thinking, perceiving humans. 
Perhaps, acknowledging vulnerability in anthropological exchanges is the 
beginning of ethics. This mode of knowing, this mode of making relationships 
in order to understand how people live in the world, uses the 'savage slot' as 
much as the recording technologies. You can recall that you are vulnerable 
because you try to understand with the gaping holes of your face, with its eyes 
and its mouth. You can speak with your mouth, and you can write with a pen 
or on a keyboard. The sentences communicate thoughts clearly because you 
have a language. Trying to describe an immediate experience in words pushes it 
away from you, as if it were beyond your knowledge (which of course it cannot 
be). The body to use and learn cannot be separated from the discipline of 
seeing and saying things clearly and well. It is a discipline of vision and gaze 
and of language and lips. This discipline to find a way between the ideal and 
the material, and between the noble and the savage, keeps anthropology faith-
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